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finding Krugle's prior registrations established he knew of his obligations under chapter 692A
Summary of this case from State v. ArringtonOpinion
No. 2-816 / 02-0083.
Filed December 30, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, MICHAEL G. DIETERICH, District Associate Judge.
Mark Krugle appeals his conviction of failure to register as a sex offender. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, and Timothy Davis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Mark Krugle appeals his conviction of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of Iowa Code section 692A.7 (1999).
In October of 1992 Krugle pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor and sexual abuse in the third degree, offenses requiring him to register as a sex offender. See Iowa Code §§ 692A.1, 692A.2. He complied with registration requirements on January 6, 1997; July 17, 1997; and July 29, 1999. On July 13 or 14, 2000, Krugle appeared at the Des Moines County Sheriff's office and told the clerk that he did not believe he needed to register as a sex offender any longer. The clerk gave Krugle a week in which to bring in verification of his assertion; upon his failure to do so, the clerk reported to the sheriff. The record indicates that on July 14, 2000, Krugle went to the Des Moines county jail, where he paid the required ten-dollar registration fee and was fingerprinted. See Iowa Code §§ 692A.6(1), 692A.9. Krugle, however, did not report to the sheriff as required. A deputy attempted to find Krugle and was finally successful in talking to him on November 7, 2000. The deputy advised Krugle of Krugle's failure to register his address change and of his need to do so within five days of changing his residence. Krugle was told to register no later than November 13, 2000. On November 16, 2000, the deputy encountered Krugle at the sheriff's office where Krugle was registering as a sex offender. The deputy arrested him at that time for his failure to timely register as a sex offender.
On appeal, Krugle argues:
(1) The district court erred in finding sufficient evidence with which to convict him of knowingly failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A, and
(2) The district court erred in failing to establish that his waiver of a jury trial was knowingly and intelligently made.
We initially reject Krugle's claim that the district court failed to establish he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. Because Krugle did not challenge the jury trial waiver in district court, he cannot challenge it for the first time on appeal. State v. Combs, 316 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 1982) (citing State v. Mark, 286 N.W.2d 396, 408 (Iowa 1979)).
We review Krugle's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1983). The district court's finding of guilt is binding on us unless we conclude there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding. State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993). Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
A person required to register as a sex offender who knowingly violates any of the registration requirements specified in chapter 692A commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 692A.7 (2001). Krugle concedes the sufficiency of the State's evidence establishing his failure to timely register as a sex offender. He argues, however, that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove his failure to do so was a knowing failure. We disagree.
Like the trial court, we find evidence that Krugle's prior registrations in January and July 1997 were sufficient to establish that he knew of his obligations under chapter 692A. Additionally, as a finder of fact, the trial court was free to reject Krugle's versions of disputed conversations with law enforcement which Krugle claimed mislead him concerning the time within which he was required to register. See State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314, 315 (Iowa 1970). Because this evidence is sufficient to support Krugle's conviction, we affirm the judgment of the district court.