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State v. Kelson

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Litchfield, Geographic Area 18 at Bantam
Apr 17, 2007
2007 Ct. Sup. 5479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)

Opinion

No. L18W MV 06 0219953S

April 17, 2007


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS


The defendant, Kevin Kelson, was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in the area surrounding Leo's Cafe, on Church Street in Torrington, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2006) § 14-227a(a), which provides in relevant part that: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state or in any parking area for ten or more cars." General Statutes § 14-212(6) defines "parking area" as, "lots, areas or other accommodations for the parking of motor vehicles off the street or highway and open to public use with or without charge."

Public Acts 2006, No. 06-147 § 1 amended § 14-227a(a) to delete the language, "in any parking area for ten or more cars." The effective date of this revision was October 1, 2006. This incident occurred prior to the effective date of the revision, however, and, thus, the previous version of § 14-227a(a) is applicable to this case.

The defendant now moves to dismiss this action on the ground that the state cannot sustain its burden of proof regarding the element of operation on a public highway or parking lot for ten or more vehicles because there is no evidence that there are ten or more parking spots within the metes and bounds of Leo's Cafe. The area surrounding Leo's Cafe does not have specifically marked parking spaces, rather, it is a general area where patrons are permitted to park. The defendant submitted the land records describing the metes and bounds property descriptions for Leo's Cafe and the surrounding parcels of land. Some of the surrounding areas where cars could park are technically outside the metes and bounds of the property containing Leo's Cafe. The defendant argues that these areas cannot be included when determining whether the area is a "parking area for ten or more cars," and, thus, operating a motor vehicle within the metes and bounds of Leo's Cafe does not violate § 14-227a(a).

The state submitted photographs of the area surrounding the Cafe, and the state's witness, Lieutenant Newkirk, identified where cars could park.

At the hearing on this issue, Lieutenant Wayne Newkirk testified that on the night of the arrest, he believed there were nine cars on the premises of Leo's Cafe. He further testified that there was room for additional cars to be parked in the surrounding area, which meant that the total area could accommodate ten or more cars. The surrounding areas, both those contained within the metes and bounds of Leo's Cafe and those on surrounding parcels of land, are used by patrons of Leo's Cafe.

The issue raised here is what constitutes a parking area for ten or more cars within the meaning of § 14-227a(a). The defendant argues that the surrounding parcels that are not part of Leo's Cafe were never intended to be a parking area or other accommodation for the Cafe, and, therefore, cannot count towards the ten or more car requirement of § 14-227a(a).

In State v. Innamorato, 76 Conn.App. 716, 821 A.2d 809 (2003), the Appellate Court was faced with a somewhat similar issue. In Innamorato, the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence in a parking lot that only contained nine spaces but routinely accommodated more than ten cars. State v. Innamorato, supra. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the parking lot was not "a parking area for ten or more cars." Id. The court ran through an analysis of § 14-227a, including a review of the legislative history, and found that "[t]he intent of the legislature [in enacting § 14-227a] is to protect the general public from drunk drivers, so it would be absurd and against that legislative intent to argue that the statute would make it a crime to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence only in a parking lot that happened to have a site plan or have been approved by the zoning commission for ten or more spaces." Id., 722. Furthermore, the court reiterated that "the legislatures and the courts have emphasized the need to protect the public from drunk drivers whether on streets or highways or other public or private property." Id., 723. The court found that it was "inconceivable that the legislature's broad umbrella of protection would insulate intoxicated persons from the drunk driving laws pursuant to § 14-227a(a) because the parking area did not have zoning approval for ten or more spaces." Id. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied because the evidence showed that the parking lot at issue regularly accommodated ten or more cars. Id.

The rationale of Innamorato is very instructive on the present case. Although there is not a specific parking lot at Leo's Cafe, the evidence and testimony show that the area surrounding the Cafe — both within the metes and bounds of the Cafe and on the surrounding parcels — is used by patrons of the Cafe and, in sum, accommodates more than ten cars. As the state correctly pointed out in its argument, the language of § 14-212(6) does not restrict "parking areas" only to lots, rather, it includes "areas or other accommodations for the parking of motor vehicles." In the present case, Lieutenant Wayne Newkirk testified that the area and accommodation surrounding Leo's Cafe does accommodate more than ten cars. Just as the court in Innamorato, found it inconceivable to require specific zoning approval for ten or more cars, it is likewise inconceivable, in the present case, to limit the area that must accommodate ten or more cars to the metes and bounds of the Cafe itself. The issue under the statute is whether the ten or more cars can be accommodated in the area in which the motor vehicle was operated. Given the language of the statute, and following the policy enunciated in Innamorato, the court finds that operating a motor vehicle under the influence in the area surrounding Leo's Cafe does fall within the reach of § 14-227a(a). The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.


Summaries of

State v. Kelson

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Litchfield, Geographic Area 18 at Bantam
Apr 17, 2007
2007 Ct. Sup. 5479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)
Case details for

State v. Kelson

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEVIN W. KELSON

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Litchfield, Geographic Area 18 at Bantam

Date published: Apr 17, 2007

Citations

2007 Ct. Sup. 5479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)
43 CLR 229