Opinion
No. COA12–385.
2013-02-5
STATE of North Carolina v. Raymond Lee JONES.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Yvonne B. Ricci, for the State. Danielle Blass for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 4 November 2010 by Judge E. Lynn Johnson in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Yvonne B. Ricci, for the State. Danielle Blass for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.
Raymond Lee Jones (“defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon his 13 April 2010 guilty plea to eighteen counts of felony larceny, sixteen counts of felony breaking and entering, two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of conspiracy to trade with a convict in prison. Defendant also admitted to attaining habitual felon status. The plea agreement provided for postponement of sentencing until a later date and for a sentence not to exceed a total minimum sentence of 240 months imprisonment. On 4 November 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of 80–105 months imprisonment. On 12 November 2010, the trial court entered prayers for judgment upon the remaining charges.
On 3 August 2011, defendant, pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. We allowed the petition “to review the 4 November 2010 judgments entered by Judge E. Lynn Johnson upon defendant's guilty plea in the above-captioned cases.” Defendant has filed a brief in which his sole argument pertains to the plea proceedings concerning habitual felon status. Acknowledging that this issue does not fit under the umbrella of this Court's grant of the original writ of certiorari, he filed a petition for writ of certiorari to permit review of that issue. We grant the petition for certiorari, and, after careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On 13 April 2010, defendant pled guilty pursuant to plea negotiations. The trial court engaged in a plea colloquy with defendant asking if defendant understood the nature and elements of the charges, that defendant had a right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury, and that defendant had “the right to have a jury determine the existence of any aggravating factors that may apply to your case beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court also asked defendant if he understood that he was pleading guilty to “36 different charges and each charge of the 36 has a special bill of indictment as [a] habitual felon attached to it elevating each of those charges, carrying a maximum punishment of 261 months ... and if you add all the maximum penalties together, you come up with a total exposure of 9,411 months which equates to 784.25 years [?]” Defendant affirmed that he understood. The habitual felon indictment status was summarized in open court by the assistant district attorney. Defendant stipulated that he had attained habitual felon status for all attached file numbers. On 4 November 2010, the court sentenced defendant to three terms of 80–105 months, to run consecutively. The court also entered prayers for judgment upon the remaining charges. On 30 April 2012, defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we herein grant.
Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as a habitual felon because he was not tried on the habitual felon charges and did not enter a valid guilty plea on those charges. Defendant relies on State v. Artis, 174 N.C.App. 668, 622 S.E.2d 204 (2005), disc. review denied,360 N.C. 365, 630 S.E.2d 188 (2006), to support his argument. In Artis, this Court held that the trial court failed to satisfy N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1022(a) in its acceptance of defendant's guilty plea on being a habitual felon because “[t]he trial court did not: (1) determine that [the] defendant understood the nature of the habitual felon charge; (2) inform [the] defendant of his right to deny habitual felon status; or (3) inform [the] defendant that his admission of attaining habitual felon status would waive his right to jury determination of that issue.” Id. at 677, 622 S.E.2d at 210. The trial court in Artis failed to conduct any sort of inquiry of the defendant regarding the habitual felon status except to ask defendant “[w]hat do you have to say?” Id.
Here, the trial court clearly inquired as to whether defendant understood the nature of each of the charges against him, including the habitual felon status, whether he understood that he was giving up his right to a jury trial, and whether he understood that he was giving up his right to a jury's determination of any aggravating factors. The trial court provided defendant with the maximum sentence defendant could face. The trial court then asked the State to outline the habitual felon indictment status and again inquired if the defendant was stipulating as to all attached file numbers. We find that these facts are distinguishable from those in Artis and are more aligned with those in State v. Williams, 133 N.C.App. 326, 515 S.E.2d 80 (1999). In Williams, this Court found that the defendant “did in fact plead guilty to the habitual felon charge despite the fact that she did not expressly admit her guilt” because her responses to the trial court's questions “informed the court that she understood that her stipulations would give up her right to have a jury determine her status as a habitual felon.” Id. at 330, 515 S.E.2d at 83. As in Williams, defendant responded affirmatively to the trial court's questions regarding his understanding of the habitual felon charges. The trial court's inquiry was more thorough than the inquiry made in Williams. Here, the trial court inquired as to whether defendant understood that the attachment of habitual felon status exposed him to a maximum sentence of 9,411 months imprisonment and ensured that the State summarized the habitual felon indictment in open court before defendant stipulated to his habitual felon status. Thus, the trial court's colloquy was sufficient and the trial court's sentencing of defendant as a habitual felon was not in error.
Conclusion
In sum, the trial court's sentencing of defendant as a habitual felon was proper, and its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED. Judges CALABRIA and ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).