Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0392
02-27-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. CHASE ROBERT JOLLEY, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Karen Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defender Robert P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20154279001
The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Karen Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defender
Robert P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred. BREARCLIFFE, Judge:
¶1 Chase Jolley appeals from his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon/dangerous instrument, aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement, armed robbery, and aggravated robbery. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss after his first trial ended in a mistrial, admitted the victim's inculpatory out-of-court statements, precluded the victim's exculpatory out-of-court statements, prevented him from impeaching the victim with a recent felony conviction, and denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor's characterization of the DNA evidence during closing. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). In May 2015, Jolley and a second man went to C.B.'s home, approached C.B. at his fence line, feigned car trouble, and asked him for water. Over the next several minutes, Jolley and the second man attended to their car across the street from C.B.'s home, smoking cigarettes all the while, and eventually, with firearms, jumped C.B.'s fence, beat C.B., causing him numerous injuries, and took his pants.
¶3 Officers collected several cigarette butts both in the street near where Jolley had been at the car and near C.B.'s house. A cigarette found in the street contained DNA matching Jolley's profile with a random-match probability (RMP) of one in 2.2 quintillion. A cigarette found near C.B.'s house contained DNA matching Jolley's profile with a RMP of one in 330 quadrillion.
Random-match probability is "the frequency of the [DNA] alleles with which such a match could be expected in the general population." State v. Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329, 333 (1996); see also National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, at 127 (1996) ("The frequency can be called the random-match probability, and it can be regarded as an estimate of . . . the probability that a person other than the suspect, randomly selected from the population, will have this profile.").
¶4 At the beginning of the second day of Jolley's first trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that C.B. was refusing to testify. The court confirmed this with C.B. The court asked C.B., "Is there any legal reason, or is it just that, because you're in Department of Corrections, it puts you in an uncomfortable position to testify against someone?" To which C.B. responded, "Something like that." The court and counsel then discussed the consequences of a mistrial and the admissibility of C.B.'s prior statements to police in lieu of testimony. Also, C.B.'s girlfriend, K.S., had failed to appear at trial though subpoenaed by the state. The court then ordered that a material witness warrant be issued for K.S.'s arrest and recessed until the afternoon.
¶5 When consideration of the issue continued in the afternoon, the trial court learned that Jolley had been talking to C.B. while both were in the court holding cells for the first and second day of trial. This was supported by a jail call after the first day of trial in which C.B. told K.S. that Jolley knew intimate details about their lives, that he was well-connected, and that he had "smuttened . . . up" C.B.'s reputation at the jail but was going to clear C.B.'s name. C.B. also told K.S. not to testify, that he would plead "the fifth" and that there was nothing they could do about it because he was already in jail. C.B. also told K.S. that he was unsure if Jolley had even been involved.
"[H]e already knows all our information . . . he knows you live [with] your dad, he knows everything about you"; "he knows everything about me, too. He knows I had allergy diets, he knows what store I get, he knows what bed I slept in"; "he knew everything about me . . . he knew you were out there smoking G, he knew everything."
"He's connected, baby. He's connected with the . . . wrong people"; "he's got pull in the yard."
"[H]e's going to clear my name so I can go back to a yard and not have to worry about nothing [be]cause he's the one that smuttened me up on the yard already."
"Yeah, don't . . . even go tomorrow . . . I'm gonna go, but I'm gonna plead the fifth, so they can't do nothing"; "all I'm gonna do is just plead the fifth and whatever they . . . might try and give me contempt of court, but I'm already in prison, so they can't do nothing to me about it."
¶6 The state asked the trial court to declare a mistrial "sua sponte" rather than on the state's motion. Over Jolley's objection, the court ruled as follows:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there's—that a potential crime had been committed by the defendant that affects this trial. The Court finds that there's no other actions the Court could reasonably take to ensure a fair trial; that what occurred was through no fault of the State. Further, the Court finds that it would be unreasonable to keep this jury empaneled until a full investigation can be conducted. The Court therefore finds that there's a manifest necessity that a mistrial was necessary, and the Court so orders.
¶7 Before his second trial, Jolley moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, essentially arguing that the first trial could have gone forward. The trial court denied his motion, noting that it would have been necessary to do an investigation to determine whether or not a crime had been committed, and, after which, it would have needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the hearsay exception applied, what statements were admissible, and which should be precluded. Jolley argued that such an investigation could have been done in a short time. The court disagreed, noting that the state would have had to gather and evaluate more information and the parties would have needed to interview witnesses in preparation for the hearing itself. The court also stated that it would have been unreasonable to have the jury come back in a week because the jury had been told during selection the trial would be finished in a couple of days.
¶8 After the trial court's denial of Jolley's motion to dismiss, the state moved to admit C.B.'s out-of-court statements made to police on the night of the assault under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The court held a hearing on the day before Jolley's second trial. At the hearing, C.B. maintained his refusal to testify. Court security officers testified that, on the first day of trial, Jolley and C.B. were in adjoining cells in the superior court's holding cells for six hours, where they were seen talking to one another. The court also reviewed the jail calls from C.B. to K.S. and another one to C.B.'s father. The court found that the state had satisfied the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception and admitted C.B.'s out-of-court statements.
¶9 Following his second jury trial, Jolley was convicted of the above counts, and sentenced to four concurrent, enhanced prison terms, the longest of which was 15.75 years. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033.
Double Jeopardy
¶10 On appeal, Jolley argues that the trial court erred in finding manifest necessity to support a mistrial because it did not consider any reasonable alternatives and that a second trial violated his double jeopardy rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants from being tried twice for the same offense, and is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Givens, 161 Ariz. 278, 279 (App. 1989). The Arizona Constitution provides double jeopardy protection through Ariz. Const. art. II, § 10. "Jeopardy attaches once the jury is empaneled." State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, ¶ 8 (2007). However, "the defendant's right to a single trial 'must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.' Thus, when a mistrial is granted, retrial of the defendant is not always precluded." Id. ¶ 10, quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
¶11 When a trial court declares a mistrial sua sponte, whether double jeopardy bars retrial "depends on whether there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial or whether the ends of public justice will otherwise be defeated." McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Ariz. 274, 277 (1986). Although manifest necessity requires a "high degree" of necessity, it does not mean absolute necessity, Givens, 161 Ariz. at 281, and "[t]he trial court is ordinarily in a superior position to determine when manifest necessity demands that a mistrial be declared," McLaughlin, 150 Ariz. at 277. "In evaluating a double jeopardy claim, we review the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial for an abuse of discretion." Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, ¶ 7.
¶12 The degree of deference given to a trial court's finding of manifest necessity "depends on the circumstances that gave rise to the mistrial." Id. ¶ 13. For instance, when a jury is deadlocked, a reviewing court gives the trial court's decision great deference. Id. "On the other end of the spectrum, when a mistrial is declared because critical evidence for the prosecution is unavailable, we should apply the 'strictest scrutiny.'" Id., quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508 (1978). Additionally, "the difficulty which led to the mistrial . . . [may fall] in an area where the trial judge's determination is entitled to special respect." Washington, 434 U.S. at 510.
¶13 "[W]hen a trial court fails to consider viable alternatives" to the granting of a mistrial, "manifest necessity has not been shown." Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, ¶ 17. Under strictest scrutiny, a finding of manifest necessity may be reversed when a trial court fails to consider such alternatives as taking a short recess to hold an evidentiary hearing, see McLaughlin, 150 Ariz. at 277, polling jurors about future availability, or precluding evidence, see Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, ¶¶ 18-20. However, when reviewing with great deference, we will uphold a trial court's finding of manifest necessity if it exercised "sound discretion," reversing only if it "act[ed] irrationally or irresponsibly." Washington, 434 U.S. at 514. "A trial court has acted within its sound discretion in rejecting possible alternatives and in granting a mistrial if reasonable judges could differ about the proper disposition, even though '[i]n a strict literal sense, the mistrial [is] not necessary.'" Givens, 161 Ariz. at 281, quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 511 (alteration in Givens). "This deference means that the mere availability of another alternative does not render a mistrial order an abuse of discretion." Givens, 161 Ariz. at 281.
¶14 Jolley argues that we should apply the strictest scrutiny because the mistrial was due to the loss of testimony key to the state's case. However, where the defendant's own actions led to the mistrial, a trial court's finding of manifest necessity is reviewed with great deference. See Givens, 161 Ariz. at 280-81 (reviewing trial court's finding of manifest necessity with great deference where "defendant's conduct was a deliberate attempt to delay or terminate the proceeding"). Jolley argues that his conduct did not lead to the mistrial because there was insufficient evidence that his conduct was a but-for cause of C.B.'s unavailability as required by the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing hearsay exception. See State v. Franklin, 232 Ariz. 556, ¶¶ 24-25 (App. 2013). However, at the time it declared the mistrial, the trial court had not yet reached the issue of whether the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception should apply, and the test for that exception is not the test for declaring a mistrial. The record supports the court's finding that, at minimum, Jolley's apparent actions caused the need to delay trial for a thorough investigation followed by an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, here, we will give the trial court's finding of manifest necessity great deference.
¶15 The record supports that the finding of manifest necessity for a mistrial was not irrational or irresponsible. Washington, 434 U.S. at 514. Though Jolley argues that any investigation and evidentiary hearing could have been conducted and completed within a short time, we are in no position to gainsay the trial court's assessment of how long an investigation and evidentiary hearing would take. Because we grant the trial court's finding of manifest necessity great deference, we find no abuse of discretion.
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
¶16 Jolley argues that the trial court abused its discretion during the second trial when it admitted C.B.'s out-of-court statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. "Rulings regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Franklin, 232 Ariz. 556, ¶ 10. We will uphold rulings on the admissibility of evidence "'if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.'" State v. Salamanca, 233 Ariz. 292, ¶ 8 (App. 2013), quoting State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 29 (2004).
¶17 Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, "[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result" is not precluded by the rule against hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 802. In order to admit such out-of-court statements, the state must prove: (1) that the declarant is unavailable to testify, (2) that the unavailability is the result of wrongdoing, (3) that the defendant engaged in or acquiesced to the wrongdoing, and (4) that the defendant intended to procure, and actually procured, the declarant's unavailability. See Franklin, 232 Ariz. 556, ¶¶ 13-16, 22-24.
¶18 Jolley argues that because the precise nature of his conversation with C.B. is not known, and that C.B.'s girlfriend and father also encouraged him to not testify, the state did not prove that he had engaged in wrongful conduct that actually procured C.B.'s unavailability. The trial court found that the state had satisfied the four prongs of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing test after hearing testimony and reviewing jail call transcripts. The record provides ample circumstantial evidence to support what Jolley said to C.B. Cf. State v. Swoopes, 155 Ariz. 432, 434 (App. 1987) ("A conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone."). Jolley essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness's credibility, which we will not do. See State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500 (App. 1995) ("The finder-of-fact, not the appellate court, weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of witnesses."). Likewise, the record supports the trial court's determination that C.B. refused to testify due to Jolley's influence rather than his father's or his girlfriend's. Because sufficient evidence supports the court's conclusion, we find no abuse of discretion.
Preclusion of Exculpatory Statements
¶19 Jolley argues that C.B.'s out-of-court statements of his lack of belief that Jolley had committed the assault should have been admitted under the residual exception to the hearsay rule because they were sufficiently reliable. "Rulings regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Franklin, 232 Ariz. 556, ¶ 10. Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, in limited circumstances—even where the enumerated exceptions do not apply—an out-of-court statement may be admissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 807(a). "To be admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the declarant must be unavailable and his out-of-court statement must have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the traditional exceptions." State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 497-98 (App. 1996). The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances that surround the statement's declaration and the declarant's trustworthiness. Id. at 498. Factors relevant to the court's inquiry include spontaneity, repetition, mental state of the declarant, and lack of motive to fabricate. Id. We will not disturb a trial court's ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent an abuse of discretion, id., and will uphold it if any reasonable evidence supports the court's decision, Salamanca, 233 Ariz. 292, ¶ 8.
¶20 Jolley argues that C.B.'s out-of-court exculpatory statements were admissible because he had multiple reasons not to testify, the conversations were made in private, the statements "were not necessary to his decision not to testify," and the statements demonstrate that he changed his mind about testifying because he had thought more about it. However, the trial court found the statements had no guarantee of trustworthiness because C.B. had ample reason to allege Jolley's innocence to his girlfriend and father due to Jolley's influence on his decision not to testify. We agree. Because there is reasonable evidence to support the court's preclusion of C.B.'s out-of-court statements, we find no abuse of discretion.
¶21 In the alternative, Jolley argues that the trial court erred by precluding C.B.'s exculpatory out-of-court statements because the rules of evidence clearly allow for their admission under Rules 106 and 806, Ariz. R. Evid. Because Jolley did not make this argument below, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19 (2005). To establish fundamental error, Jolley "must show that the error complained of goes to the foundation of his case, takes away a right that is essential to his defense, and is of such magnitude that he could not have received a fair trial." Id. ¶ 24. Jolley fails to meet the initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged error was fundamental by not developing any argument as to the application of either rule. We therefore consider these arguments waived. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (insufficient argument waives claim on review); see also State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶¶ 17-18 (App. 2008) (defendant cannot sustain burden in fundamental error analysis "absent any argument or authority that the alleged error . . . was fundamental").
Prior Conviction
¶22 Jolley argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from impeaching C.B. with a prior felony conviction. We review the admissibility of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes for an abuse of discretion. Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 305. "An error of law committed in reaching a discretionary conclusion may [be] an abuse of discretion." State v. Hall, 234 Ariz. 374, ¶ 3 (2014), quoting State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12 (2006). After C.B.'s out-of-court statements were played in court, Jolley sought to impeach C.B. with two prior felonies. The court allowed impeachment with one conviction, but precluded the other, stating: "It's irrelevant if it occurred after this event. It has nothing to do with his credibility with regard to the statement he made to [the officer]."
¶23 Rule 609, Ariz. R. Evid., permits impeachment by felony convictions provided that "their probative value outweigh their prejudicial effect and that the conviction not be overly remote in time." State v. Hatch, 225 Ariz. 409, ¶ 12 (2010). Additionally, Rule 806, Ariz. R. Evid., "specifically permits impeachment of a hearsay statement made by an absent declarant by any means which would have been permissible had the declarant been present and testified." State v. Hernandez, 191 Ariz. 553, ¶ 9 (App. 1998), quoting State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 501 (App. 1996).
¶24 In Hernandez, we affirmed the trial court's admission of a prior conviction to impeach the defendant's out-of-court statement even though the conviction happened after the statement was made. 191 Ariz. 553, ¶¶ 9-15. Prior to incorporating the Federal Rules of Evidence, our supreme court reached the same result. See State v. Owen, 101 Ariz. 156 (1966), approved by Hernandez, 191 Ariz. 553, ¶ 10. In Owen, at his second trial, the defendant offered an unavailable witness's prior testimony from his first trial, which the state sought to impeach with a conviction that took place after the first trial. Id. at 158. The trial court allowed the impeachment, and our supreme court affirmed, noting that "[t]he introduction of this prior reported testimony has the same effect as though the absent or dead witness were on the stand and testifying before the jury. The testimony may be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact and is subject to impeachment as is any other testimony." Id.
¶25 Here, to the extent that the trial court precluded the prior conviction as a matter of law because the conviction post-dated the admitted statements, it erred. However, such error was harmless. "Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict." Hatch, 225 Ariz. 409, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). "To constitute reversible error, the error must actually prejudice the defendant." Hatch, 225 Ariz. 409, ¶ 15. Here, C.B. was properly impeached with one felony conviction, making the second conviction potentially cumulative. Cf. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 485-86 (1996) (improper impeachment with misdemeanor offenses was harmless error in light of proper impeachment with two prior felony convictions). Even if impeachment with an additional and more recent conviction would have had an effect despite its cumulative nature, there is overwhelming evidence of Jolley's guilt even should the jury find C.B. untrustworthy. See State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 120 (1988) (evidence overwhelming where two eyewitnesses saw defendant commit crime). The jury heard K.S. testify to the events, saw video tape evidence of the incident, and heard testimony that Jolley's DNA matched that found at the scene. We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jolley was not prejudiced by precluding the use of a second prior conviction for impeachment of C.B.
Prosecutor's Fallacy
¶26 Finally, Jolley argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the state's expert's testimony about RMP in DNA testing and inviting the "prosecutor's fallacy," by not sustaining his objection to the state's alleged use of the prosecutor's fallacy during closing, and by denying his motion for new trial. "The prosecutor's fallacy is the assumption that the random match probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample." McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128 (2010). "It is further error to equate source probability with probability of guilt, unless there is no explanation other than guilt for a person to be the source of crime-scene DNA." Id. The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, ¶ 13 (2014). A trial court's ruling on challenged closing arguments is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114, ¶ 8 (2016). Likewise, whether the trial court erred by allowing (alleged) prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tims, 143 Ariz. 196, 199 (1985). Denial of a motion for new trial is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶ 12 (App. 2015).
Although Jolley cites to his objection to a similar issue arising during opening statements, he does not develop any argument about how error occurred during opening statements. We therefore consider that aspect of his argument waived. Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 298 (insufficient argument waives claim on review).
¶27 In Brown, the Court noted the potential error where the expert's testimony and the prosecutor's argument equated RMP with the probability of innocence. Brown, 558 U.S. at 128. The Court also noted the inaccuracy in the expert's testimony that the probability of the DNA coming from a defendant's brother was 1 in 6,500 when the actual odds were 1 in 132. Id. at 129. Without deciding whether such erroneous testimony was inadmissible, the Court found that such errors were harmless, noting that "DNA evidence remains powerful inculpatory evidence even though the State concedes [their expert] overstated its probative value by failing to dispel the prosecutor's fallacy." Id. at 132, 136.
¶28 Here, the state's expert did not equate RMP to Jolley's guilt or innocence. Nor did the state's expert testify that RMP was the same as the probability that someone other than defendant was the source of the DNA. To whatever extent that the state's expert may have mischaracterized the DNA evidence, any alleged error was remedied upon Jolley's cross examination of the expert, where the expert conceded that RMP is not the same as the probability that defendant was not the source of the DNA sample. Further, the Rules of Evidence are not rigid, and the general approach is one that liberalizes the admission of expert testimony. See State v. Favela, 234 Ariz. 433, ¶ 8 (App. 2014), citing to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993); thus, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting the state's expert's testimony.
¶29 During closing the prosecutor stated the following:
Because they were tested and look at these numbers, astronomical numbers, astronomical, absolutely incredible. A thousand planets won't fit into this number. There hasn't been this many people in the history of the world added up. That's D.N.A. and that's how D.N.A. works.The prosecutor's argument does not equate RMP to the probability that someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA. Although the jury could have understood these arguments to infer that the RMP excluded someone other than Jolley as a source of the DNA, it need not have done so and it could have been taken as a proper comment going to the weight they should accord the evidence. Cf. State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, ¶¶ 85, 89 (prosecutor's closing argument stating that defendant's crimes would "go down in history as some of the worst" was a comment on the weight the jurors should give the criminal history evidence). The state at most asked the jury to give the RMP evidence great weight in determining identification, which is a proper purpose given that the primary reason DNA evidence is valuable to the jury is because it is probative of identity. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 576 (using DNA for identification is a well-accepted proposition); see also State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶¶ 68, 72 (2004) (random match statistical evidence is admissible). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that statements made during closing arguments are not evidence. See Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, ¶ 89 (presuming the jurors followed court's instructions that the lawyers's statements are not in evidence). Because there was no prosecutor's fallacy in this case, we do not reach the question of whether testimony and arguments committing the prosecutor's fallacy would be inadmissible or reversible error. As such, we find no abuse of discretion.
. . . .
Do you know what the identification in this case is? 220 quintillion. That's the identification.
Disposition
¶30 For the above reasons, Jolley's conviction and sentence are affirmed.