Opinion
22-1969
03-27-2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADEN ALAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Hans Becker, Judge.
A defendant appeals his criminal convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
BADDING, JUDGE.
Braden Johnson had a chaotic stay at the Hamilton County Jail in September 2021. He ripped two cameras off the jail cell walls and struck a jailer in the head with one of them while being tackled and tasered. After he bonded out of jail, Johnson was involuntarily committed for mental-health treatment and diagnosed with bipolar disorder. A jury rejected his defense of diminished responsibility and found him guilty of assault on a jailer and third-degree criminal mischief. Johnson appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed by the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In the days before his arrest on September 19, 2021, Braden Johnson's wife said that he was "starting to change day by day." She explained: "He wasn't sleeping anymore. He was getting agitated. He was always hurting." And he "was scared all the time" that people would hurt them or their children. After he was arrested on charges not involved here, Johnson's wife thought he would be taken somewhere for mental-health treatment. Instead, law enforcement took Johnson to the Hamilton County Jail.
Johnson had a quiet first night in jail. Jailer James Witt started his shift at 6:30 a.m. on September 20. Johnson was in the male holding cell and ate his breakfast at 7:00 a.m. with no problems. But around 10:00 a.m., Johnson became agitated. A female inmate was starting "to make a commotion," and Johnson thought the woman was his wife. The jailers assured Johnson that it wasn't, and he calmed down, only to "flare up" again when the woman kept yelling. At about 10:20 a.m., Johnson tore the camera in his cell off the wall. Witt and another jailer, Stephen Steward, went into the cell and put Johnson in a restraint chair. They moved Johnson, who was still upset but cooperative, to the detox cell. After about thirty minutes, Johnson calmed down and was taken out of the restraint chair. He apologized to the jailers and told them that he "shouldn't have done that." Steward said the "day went better for a little bit, and he got lunch."
After lunch, Witt was doing walkthroughs and saw Johnson laying on the ground in the detox cell. Johnson told Witt, "I'm having a medical problem," and Steward thought he "started to seize." They called for medical help and went into the cell to assess Johnson. He was in and out of consciousness. Johnson agreed to go to a nearby hospital, and Witt went with him. Hospital staff "did some checks" on Johnson and a blood draw. They then cleared him to return to the jail.
At around 5:00 p.m., Johnson was put back into the detox cell. But Witt said that about five minutes later, he became agitated again and started "yelling and screaming and hollering." Steward explained: "He just started to get worked up"-"[b]anging on the windows, agitated screaming, yelling." Johnson's behavior would wax and wane, according to Steward: "Every time he would go up, it would get worse, more banging, more yelling, more screaming. And his downs would last less." Eventually, Johnson started punching the camera in the detox cell. Steward testified that he "would hit it for a while and stop. Hit it for a while and stop. It was kind of like he wanted a reaction from us every time."
Johnson kept hitting the camera until it broke off the wall. At that point, Steward said it became a weapon that they could not allow to remain in the cell. The jailers asked Johnson to pass them the camera through the food port in the cell door. He tried, but it wouldn't fit and fell to the floor inside the cell. Johnson picked it up by the end of the cable and started swinging it around, hitting the door several times. The jailers told Johnson to put the camera down, and they would come in to get it. At that point, Steward testified that Johnson's "mentality changed from being cooperative to it's going to be a fight." Witt thought about pepper spraying Johnson, but he decided not to because Johnson was holding a blanket up in front of his face. When Johnson got close enough, Witt yanked the blanket through the food port and "then went to go spray him again." But Johnson grabbed a mattress and put it in front of him as a shield.
By then, Jail Administrator Alicia Salic-Leeck had become involved in the standoff with Johnson. She was certified to use a taser. With her assistance, the jailers decided to go into the cell to take the camera from Johnson. Witt and Steward were first. Witt remembered that as they went in, Johnson made a "threatening move towards" them. In a "very, very quick" series of events, Witt and Steward "bull rush[ed]" Johnson, with Witt going for his chest and Steward going for his legs. Salic-Leeck was close behind and, with her taser drawn, told Johnson: "hand it over, drop it, comply, or you are going to get tased." When Johnson didn't comply, she deployed her taser on Johnson. Both taser prongs hit him in the chest. Salic-Leeck testified that Johnson threw the camera "either right at the same time [she] deployed" the taser "or like instantly afterwards." The camera, which Salic-Leeck believed Johnson deliberately threw, hit her in the head.
Salic-Leeck went to the emergency room later that evening and was diagnosed with a concussion.
Even after being tased, Johnson kept struggling. It took the three jailers plus two police officers who were at the jail to subdue Johnson and get him back into the restraint chair. Johnson calmed down after a bit, according to Steward, and "then finally you could tell that every energy he had [was] exhausted." He didn't fall asleep but was in "kind of a semi-conscious state. He was still alert, oriented, and breathing, but you couldn't have a conversation with him. Drool was pooling out of his mouth." After medical personnel checked on Johnson, he was transferred to a different jail.
Johnson's wife testified that when she picked him up from jail, "[h]e was terrified" and in poor physical condition, with bruises all over his body. He was "paranoid over everything" and "thought there was cameras everywhere." Johnson's wife and sister tried to get him help at a local hospital, but he refused treatment. So his wife sought to have him involuntarily committed. Johnson received inpatient treatment for thirty days and was diagnosed with "psychosis bipolar," according to his wife. He was released to go home under a safety plan with outpatient treatment once per week.
Johnson was charged by an amended trial information with assault on a jailer causing bodily injury and third-degree criminal mischief. Before trial, he filed a notice that he intended to rely on the defense of diminished capacity. A jury found Johnson guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault on a jailer and guilty as charged for third-degree criminal mischief. The district court sentenced Johnson to one year in jail with all but sixty days suspended for the assault and two years of suspended prison for the criminal mischief, to be served consecutively to one another.
Johnson appeals his convictions, claiming that due to delusions from his bipolar disorder there "was insufficient evidence to establish that [he] had the requisite mental intent to commit the offenses." He also claims that he "did not act voluntarily when he released the camera because he was tased and tackled simultaneously." Lastly, Johnson challenges his sentences, claiming the court abused its discretion by not suspending the sentence on the assault conviction and failing to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.
II. Analysis A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Our review of Johnson's claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions is for correction of errors at law. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are highly deferential to the jury's verdict." Id. We are bound by the jury's verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is "evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 516-17. While we "consider all evidence in the record, including evidence that does not support the verdict," we view that evidence "in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence." State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 490 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
1. Specific Intent
The marshaling jury instructions for both charges burdened the State with proving that Johnson acted with specific intent. The instructions provided:
"Specific intent" means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but, in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind. Because determining the Defendant's specific intent requires you to decide what the Defendant was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the Defendant's specific intent. You may, but are not
required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of the person's acts.
As for Johnson's defense of diminished capacity, otherwise known as diminished responsibility, the jury was instructed:
The terms "diminished capacity" and "diminished responsibility" have been used interchangeably in our case law, although Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(12)(b) refers to "diminished responsibility." See Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 n.6 (Iowa 2008). To remain consistent with our rules of criminal procedure, we will use the term "diminished responsibility." See id.
For both Counts I and II, . . . one of the elements the State must prove is that the defendant acted with specific intent. The lack of mental capacity to form a specific intent is known as "diminished responsibility."
Evidence of "diminished responsibility" is permitted only as it bears on his capacity to form specific intent."
"Diminished responsibility" does not mean the defendant was insane. A person may be sane and still not have the mental capacity to form an intent because of a mental disease or disorder.
The defendant does not have to prove "diminished responsibility"; rather, the burden is on the State to prove the defendant was able to, and did, form the specific intent required.
Pointing to his post-jail involuntary commitment and diagnosis of bipolar psychosis, Johnson argues that he was having a "mental health crisis" in September 2021 "that profoundly impacted his life." He contends the evidence showed he was having "persistent mental delusions" that "prevented [him] from forming the specific intent necessary to sustain his convictions." But, as Johnson acknowledges, "[w]hile a bipolar diagnosis may support a diminished-capacity defense . . ., the diagnosis by itself is not a defense." Brown v. State, No. 14-1646, 2016 WL 351459, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016). Although Johnson's appellate brief cites various medical authorities on the specifics of bipolar psychosis, none of that information was placed before the jury. Cf. id. (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for not pursuing diminished responsibility because there was no evidence, expert or otherwise, "that his bipolar diagnosis prevented him from forming the requisite intent"); see also State v. Miller, ___ N.W.2d____, ___, 2024 WL 995262, at *6 (Iowa 2024) ("Our task on appeal is to judge the sufficiency of the evidence admitted at trial and not the possible sufficiency of the evidence in a different trial.").
The jury did hear testimony from Johnson's wife that his behavior changed before he was jailed-he wasn't sleeping as much, and he was agitated, fearful, and paranoid. That paranoia continued after she bailed him out of jail. But the jury had no evidence linking those behaviors to Johnson's ability to form specific intent. And Johnson's wife acknowledged that while he was behaving differently, he was not seeing a mental-health professional or taking any medication for his mental health before he was jailed. She testified that things "were okay" at home, and Johnson was going to work every day. See State v. Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Iowa 2023) (noting that evidence the defendant engaged in "ordinary activities" undermined his diminished responsibility defense); see also Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 869 (Iowa 2012) (same). What's more, the jailers testified that agitated and erratic behavior from inmates is commonplace. A reasonable inference from this evidence is that Johnson's actions were not abnormal or the result of delusions, as he contends on appeal. See Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d at 180. In fact, the only delusion Johnson says that he had in jail was his belief that his wife was also being held there. That happened before he knocked the first camera off the wall in the male holding cell. After he did that, Johnson apologized to the jailers, telling them, "He was angry. He knows he shouldn't have done that. He knows better."
Johnson's apology is a strong indicator that he was aware of what he did and that he did it voluntarily. See State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 23 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (stating a defendant's "expressions of remorse are inconsistent with his insanity defense"); see also State v. Pitman, No. 12-1742, 2014 WL 251899, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (highlighting a defendant's apology to his mother for his actions in concluding that he had the specific intent to kill her); Frost v. State, 453 So.2d 695, 698 (Miss. 1984) ("Actual expressions of remorse such as the ones at issue here would be probative of whether a Defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he committed the crimes."). Other circumstances support that inference. See Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 153 ("[A] jury will undoubtedly consider any asserted diminished responsibility defense in the light of trial facts that tend to establish the defendant's specific intent.").
The dissent points out that two of these cases involve an insanity defense. We recognize there is a difference between the defense of diminished responsibility and insanity. See State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Iowa 1981) ("[D]iminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary criminal intent. It differs from the usual insanity situation where illness confuses or distorts the thinking process."). But as Pitman and other cases make clear, expressions of remorse and acknowledgments of wrongdoing do bear on a defendant's capacity to act with specific intent. See Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 155 (noting a video of the defendant after the attempted murder of his former girlfriend "would have provided powerful direct evidence of [his] intent" where the defendant admitted to the shooting and "to having done a 'terrible thing'").
For instance, the jailers testified that Johnson followed their instructions at times, like when he tried to pass the camera to them through the food port, and he used his blanket and mattress as shields when threatened with pepper spray. See State v. Mahoney, No. 19-0843, 2020 WL 2988411, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (considering the defendant's capacity for "purpose-driven behavior" in finding sufficient evidence that he acted with sufficient intent). One of the jailers also told the jury that, as to the second camera in the detox cell, Johnson was hitting it to get a rise out of the jailers. And Salic-Leeck testified that she believed Johnson deliberately threw the camera at her. From this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that Johnson had the capacity to act in a way calculated to produce a certain result-meaning he had the ability to form specific intent. See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) ("[S]pecific intent requires an act calculated to produce a result that the law forbids.").
While there was evidence on both sides of the question, it was for the jury to decide whether Johnson had the capacity to form specific intent. See Mahoney, 2020 WL 2988411, at *4 (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence because question of whether "delusions, psychotic history, methamphetamine use, and alcohol consumption" negated capacity to form specific intent was "for the jury to consider"); see also Collins, 305 N.W.2d at, 437-38 (indicating evidence of diminished responsibility, like intoxication, "is simply evidence to be considered by the jury on the issue of intent"). Taken as a whole, we conclude there was substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that, despite Johnson's later mental-health diagnosis, he acted with the specific intent required for both offenses. See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021) ("Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding." (citation omitted)).
Relying on the prosecutor's opening statements and closing arguments, the dissent contends "the State conveyed to the jury an inaccurate view of Johnson's diminished responsibility defense." But the jury was instructed that "[s]tatements, arguments, questions, and comments by the lawyers" were not evidence. And we "presume juries follow the court's instructions." State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2010).
2. Voluntariness
Next, as to the assault conviction only, Johnson claims the State failed to prove he acted voluntarily because he was tased and tackled at the same time he threw the camera. Johnson argues those circumstances rendered him incapable of controlling his muscles, so the act could not have been voluntary as required by the specific-intent instruction attached to the marshaling instruction for assault. See Fountain, 786 N.W.2d at 263-64 ("'Specific intent' means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition doing it with a specific purpose in mind.").
A soundless video with a view of the detox cell is inconclusive on this point. It shows Salic-Leeck entering the cell behind the two male jailers with her taser drawn. The camera can be seen leaving Johnson's hand while his hand is moving toward Salic-Leeck's head. But it's difficult to tell whether Johnson was tased before, at the same time as, or after the camera was thrown.
To support his argument, Johnson relies on testimony from the jailers that the "effect of a taser is to immobilize an individual and create[] a reflexive action in the human body that causes them to stop moving." But there was evidence that the taser did not have that desired effect on Johnson because it was not deployed correctly. Steward testified that instead of one prong hitting Johnson above the belt and another below, which would have caused his entire body to stiffen up like a board, both prongs hit him in the pectoral muscles. Because Johnson continued to struggle on the ground after being tased, Steward testified the taser was not effective. Yet Johnson points out that "he went limp, was in a semi-conscious state, and had drool pooling out of his mouth." This was well after the tasing though-after it took five individuals to subdue Johnson and secure him in a restraint chair. On top of this, Salic-Leeck testified that she believed Johnson "was aiming that camera" for her: "Well, he threw it, and I was the only person there, and it was my head that it bounced off of." Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find a rational jury could conclude that Johnson voluntarily threw the camera at Salic-Leeck. The assault conviction was therefore supported by substantial evidence.
B. Sentencing
This leaves us with Johnson's sentencing challenges. We review those for correction of errors at law and "will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure." State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
Johnson first argues that the district court ignored mitigating factors when sentencing him to jail, including the "underlying circumstances of [his] mental health crisis as well as the significant financial hardship that would be caused by a jail sentence." Had those factors been given appropriate weight, Johnson contends a probationary sentence should have been imposed.
Trouble is, the court is not "required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant." State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Further, "the failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered." Id. In reality, Johnson is asking us to substitute the district court's decision with our own. But "[o]ur task on appeal is not to second-guess the sentencing court's decision." State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Iowa 2022); accord State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) ("On our review, we do not decide the sentence we would have imposed, but whether the sentence imposed was unreasonable."). We find no abuse of discretion here.
Next, Johnson argues that "the district court failed to state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence." "Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the district court to 'state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.'" State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016). The rule "applies to the district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences." Id. "Although the reasons need not be detailed, at least a cursory explanation must be provided to allow appellate review of the trial court's discretionary action." State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000).
The district court stated it was imposing "consecutive sentences because these involve separate and distinct crimes which deserve separate and distinct punishments." Johnson argues that was not enough, claiming the "existence of separate offenses is only the first step," and the court "failed to address the second step-to state the specific reasons why the separate offenses should be served consecutively." To the extent that Johnson is arguing the court needed to cite other sentencing factors-like those listed in Iowa Code sections 901.5 and 907.5(1) (2021)-he is incorrect. See, e.g., State v. Carberry, 501 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 1993) ("It is reasonably clear from what was said that the judge imposed consecutive sentences based on his perception of the aggregate culpability of two separate and distinct heinous offenses."); State v. Dudley, No. 18-1864, 2020 WL 1310296, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2020) (finding court's reason for imposing consecutive sentences-separate and distinct offenses-was sufficient); State v. Gibson, No. 18-0342, 2019 WL 2879934, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2019) (same); State v. Cruz Cordero, No. 23-0334, 2023 WL 6292325, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2003) (finding court's brief statement that it was imposing consecutive sentences "because of the different victims and separate date of offenses" was sufficient); see also State v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1976) (stating if a defendant is convicted on several counts for "[s]eparate and distinct offense[s]," the court can impose consecutive sentences, even if "the several offenses were committed in the course of a single transaction" (citation omitted)).
III. Conclusion
We affirm, concluding Johnson's convictions are supported by substantial evidence and his sentences are not the product of an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
Chicchelly, J., concurs; Tabor, P.J., dissents.
TABOR, Presiding Judge (dissenting).
"I'm not asking you today to make a decision or a referendum of how law enforcement treats people with mental illness. What I'm asking for you to do today is to look at how law enforcement dealt with Mr. Johnson specifically." From that modest request delivered to jurors in closing argument, defense counsel leveled this indictment of the jail's policies:
But when a situation arises where one specific individual, when Mr. Johnson needed help, when he needed medical treatment, the jail did not have a policy in place to protect him or to protect the jailers. I believe that Mrs. Johnson said it best, what he needed was to be locked in a hospital, not locked in a jail cell.
Because the evidence at trial revealed a failure to recognize an inmate's mentalhealth crisis rather than the inmate's specific intent to assault a jailer or damage property, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the convictions.
I start with a point of agreement. Like the majority, I recognize the deference we afford jury verdicts. See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). But we are not bound by a verdict unless it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence means proof that "could convince a rational trier of fact that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). In deciding whether there is substantial evidence, we must consider the entire record, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Id. at 340. After considering the entire record, I disagree that the State's evidence of specific intent was substantial.
The majority asserts that because "there was evidence on both sides of the question, it was for the jury to decide whether Johnson had the capacity to form specific intent." I respectfully disagree that the State offered much if any evidence to show Johnson could form specific intent to assault jailer Salic-Leeck or damage the jail cameras. Instead, the State conveyed to the jury an inaccurate view of Johnson's diminished responsibility defense.
First, in opening statements, the prosecutor claimed that Johnson was "playing possum" in his jail cell-pretending to be unresponsive. That claim was not supported by the evidence. The evidence showed that jailers found Johnson unresponsive in the detox cell, determined that he lost consciousness, and performed a sternum rub.
Then, in closing arguments, the prosecutor highlighted the fact that Johnson apologized to the jailers for his actions as they released him from the "restraint chair." The prosecutor told the jury: "That does not sound like somebody who didn't know what he was doing. That sounds like someone that did something they shouldn't have done, knew it, and felt bad about it." The prosecutor also recounted Johnson's use of a mattress to shield himself as the jailers "bull rushed" into the cell. "This is someone who knows what he is doing. He is protecting himself. He is trying to defend himself, and he is ready to fight." The prosecutor later argued that Johnson "had the ability to understand right and wrong, which he appeared to do all day. He chose not to do what was right. He chose to do what was wrong."
The majority also describes Johnson's apology as a "strong indicator that he was aware of what he did and that he did it voluntarily." For that proposition, the majority cites two cases involving an insanity defense. See State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 23 (McDonald, J., dissenting); Frost v. State, 453 So.2d 695, 698 (Miss. 1984). It also cites State v. Pitman, No. 12-1742, 2014 WL 251899, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) where we found the jury could reasonably conclude that Pitman had the specific intent to kill his mother despite his voluntary intoxication defense when he had three motives for the crime and apologized to the victim while he was strangling her. I disagree that Johnson's remorse for breaking the camera had any bearing on his specific intent. As defense counsel noted in closing arguments, her client's apology did not mean that "he intended to do anything. It just means that he was sorry that it happened."
The prosecutor's arguments misrepresented Johnson's defense. Johnson was not raising an insanity defense which would require him to prove that he "suffered from such a deranged condition of the mind as to render [him] incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act [he] was committing or was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the act." See Iowa Code § 701.4 (2021). Rather, Johnson pursued the common law defense of diminished responsibility, alleging he lacked the mental capacity to form specific intent. See State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (contrasting insanity defense, which requires "proof of the more aggravated kind of distortion of the thinking process" from the "mental unsoundness" that leads to diminished responsibility); State v. Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d 141, 161 (Iowa 2023) (McDermott, J., dissenting) ("Diminished responsibility does not mean that someone is insane; a person may be sane but still not have the mental capacity to form specific intent because of a mental disease or disorder.").
Between opening statements and closing arguments, the State's evidence did not show that Johnson had the specific intent to assault a jailer or cause property damage. The State called four jailers to testify. None of them suggested that Johnson had a motive to damage the jail cameras or assault Salic-Leeck. Salic-Leeck had not met Johnson before that day and was unaware of any reason that he would have been upset with her. She was hit with the camera after she rushed into the cell with two other jailers and tased Johnson. Only jailer Stephen Steward recalled Johnson making any threats, but those were "not directed at any personnel, just all of us for doing our job." All the jailers agreed that Johnson was agitated and, at times, aggressive.
The majority cites the jailers' testimony that it is common for inmates to be disruptive. And from that testimony draws a "reasonable inference" that "Johnson's actions were not abnormal or the result of delusions." The majority adds that Johnson's only delusion in jail was believing that his wife was the female inmate making noise down the hall. In my view, that persistent delusion is strong proof of his diminished responsibility. But, at bottom, Johnson need not show that he was suffering from delusions. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson acted with a specific purpose to cause Salic-Leeck pain or injury, to create physical contact that was insulting or offensive to her, or to place her in fear of such contact. And for the criminal mischief count, that he pulled the cameras off the cell walls with calculated aim to damage or alter that property. In my opinion, the State failed to marshal the evidence necessary to prove that Johnson had the specific intent to commit the crimes of assault and criminal mischief.
On the other hand, the defense presented compelling evidence from Johnson's wife that he was having a mental-health crisis when she bonded him out of jail. She told the jury: "He was paranoid over everything. He thought there was cameras everywhere." He thought someone was trying to kill their son; he thought people were spying on him; he thought the well water was contaminated. Less than a day later, he was involuntarily committed to a hospital behavioral health unit-staying for thirty days. The doctors diagnosed him with psychosis bipolar and prescribed medication that stabilized his condition. The majority emphasizes that this diagnosis alone was not a defense and criticizes Johnson for not presenting expert testimony that his bipolar disorder prevented him from forming specific intent. Yet nobody disputes Mrs. Johnson's testimony outlining her husband's strange behavior and its explanation. Indeed, the prosecutor said in closing, "it's great that Mrs. Johnson wanted to get Mr. Johnson help and wants him to be better." But the prosecutor also argued: "It doesn't change what Mr. Johnson did." That argument did not advance the State's case. What Johnson did was not at issue. The question was whether he "subjectively desired the prohibited result." See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) (citation omitted). The evidence of Johnson's hospitalization to address his mental health coming immediately after his disruptive behavior at the jail draws into serious question his capacity to form specific intent.
Mrs. Johnson also testified that her husband started acting paranoid before his arrest: "He just kept getting weirder and weirder."
What evidence supports the specific intent element? The majority points to Steward's testimony that Johnson would hit the camera for a while and then stop, hit the camera for a while and then stop: "It was kind of like he wanted a reaction from us every time." But the jailer's assumption about Johnson's thought process was not helpful. As Steward conceded on cross-examination, he was not trained to determine whether someone was having a mental-health crisis. The majority also relies on Salic-Leeck's testimony that she believed that Johnson "deliberately" threw the camera at her. But her belief does not satisfy the specific intent element of assault. See id. ("General intent is only the intention to make the bodily movement that constitutes the act that the crime requires, while specific intent requires an act calculated to produce a result that the law forbids." (cleaned up)).
He was not alone. None of the other jailers explored the possibility that Johnson's behavior related to his mental health. Deputy Jordan Stangeland testified he did not investigate whether Johnson had any mental-health problems or was hospitalized after the incident. Likewise, when asked if he checked on Johnson's mental-health status, Jailer James Witt testified: "I am not a doctor, so I would have no clue on mental status."
In the end, it was defense counsel who accurately portrayed the evidence: "Mr. Johnson was not playing possum. He wasn't doing it for attention. He wasn't trying to get a rise out of the jailers. He had a medical crisis." Because the record lacks substantial evidence to show Johnson acted with specific intent, I would reverse his convictions.