Opinion
Case No. 1904002545
02-12-2020
State of Delaware, Petitioner, v. J---- L---------, Respondent.
ORDER
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Currently before the Court is a Motion to Suppress ("Motion") filed by J---- L--------- ("Defendant") (DOB: ), by and through his attorney, Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire, on September 23, 2019. This Motion relates to Defendant's charge for one count of Rape in the Second Degree, stemming from an incident that reportedly took place on September 7, 2018. The State did not file an Answer to Defendant's Motion. The Court held a hearing on Respondent's Motion to Suppress on January 13, 2020.
BACKGROUND
The Court takes judicial notice of the entire record in this matter. In the interest of judicial economy, only the background specifically relevant to the pending Motion is discussed herein.
On September 23, 2019, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Suppress. This Motion relates to Defendant's charge for one count of Rape in the Second Degree. Therein, Defendant avers that after receiving a complaint on September 7, 2018, police responded to Seaford High School where they determined that the Defendant was a student. Hoping to interview the Defendant, the police requested that the Defendant's parent or guardian come to the school so they could do a preliminary interview and make arrangements for a more formal interview at Troop 5. In response to their request, Defendant's Aunt, I----- G-----, gave her permission for the police to conduct the interview. Arrangements were then made to meet again at Troop 5 where police did a more thorough interview, again with the consent of Ms. G-----. At the time the Defendant was interviewed, Ms. G----- was not the Defendant's legal guardian. The Defendant submits that because Ms. G----- was not his legal guardian, she could not have waived his Miranda warnings and given police permission to interview him. As a result, the Defendant avers that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his Miranda rights; thus, any statement taken as a result of the faulty waiver cannot be used against him.
The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on January 13, 2020. The Defendant appeared and was represented by Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire. Julie Johnson, Esquire, DAG, appeared on behalf of the Delaware Department of Justice. The evidence presented is as follows:
On September 10, 2018, Detective Mills, a detective with the Delaware State Police Major Crimes Unit, received a complaint of an alleged rape involving the Defendant. Detective Mills testified that on that same day, he went to the Defendant's home in an attempt to speak to him. Detective Mills stated that Trooper Quintero Tovar of Troop 5 accompanied him to Defendant's home since Trooper Tovar was able to speak Spanish. Detective Mills explained that it was his understanding that the Defendant did not speak English. Detective Mills stated that when he arrived to the Defendant's home, the Defendant was not there. Detective Mills was met by two individuals who told him that I----- G----- was the Defendant's guardian. Detective Mills was able to contact Ms. G----- and asked if she could meet him at the Defendant's school, Seaford High School. Ms. G----- agreed.
Detective Mills explained that the Delaware State Police received the complaint on September 7, 2018; however, the complaint originated with a Detective Lindsay Coleman before being transferred into the Major Crimes Unit on September 10, 2018.
Once Detective Mills arrived at Seaford High School, the school identified Ms. G----- as being the Defendant's guardian and Ms. G----- introduced herself as such. Ms. G----- and Defendant agreed to go to Troop 5 in Bridgeville, Delaware, so that the Defendant could be formally interviewed by Detective Mills. Once the parties arrived to Troop 5, Detective Mills testified that Trooper Tovar continued to act as an interpreter. He stated that Trooper Tovar advised the Defendant and Ms. G----- of Defendant's rights and explained the interview process to them. Detective Mills testified that both Defendant and Ms. G----- agreed that the Defendant would speak to the police.
At the January 13, 2020, hearing, the State argued that Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied. The State contended that Detective Mills acted in good faith when he believed Ms. G----- to be the Defendant's legal guardian since she holds herself out to be as such. Further, the State maintained that the Defendant waived his Miranda rights by agreeing to participate in the police interview on September 10, 2018. Defendant disagreed. The Defendant argued that Ms. G----- did not have the legal standing to make decisions on his behalf. Defendant stated that the police interview should not have proceeded without the consent of one of Defendant's parents. Defendant concedes that he is currently living with Ms. G-----; however, he asserts that just because he is currently living with Ms. G-----, that does not make her his legal guardian. Defendant explained that it is not uncommon for children who are new to the country to live with family members. Finally, the Defendant argued that he followed the lead of Ms. G----- and only agreed to the police interview since she agreed to it.
DISCUSSION
The Motion before the Court involves the issue of whether the police followed the proper procedures in interrogating the Defendant, a juvenile. Defense counsel argues that Defendant's aunt, Ms. G-----, lacked the legal authority to consent to the police interviewing the Defendant. As a result, it is asserted that the Defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
The Constitutional provisions of Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966), extend to both adults and juveniles. Miranda must be given when an individual is subject to custodial interrogation. Therefore, the Court must first examine whether Defendant was in custody at the time of his statements.
See In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (In general, Miranda extends the self-incrimination privilege to in custody interrogation of a person accused or suspected of a crime).
See iranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
The legal standard in determining custody for purposes of Miranda, which has been clearly delineated, is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. On September 10, 2018, Detective Mills interviewed the Defendant. On or about April 5, 2019, the Defendant was formally arrested. Thus, the Court concludes that at the time the statement was made to the Detective, Defendant had not been formally arrested. When there is no formal arrest, the Court must look to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a reasonable person would feel such a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest to such an extent that they would not feel free to leave. As neither Defendant nor the State addresses the issue of whether Defendant was in custody, the Court accepts, for purposes of this decision, that Defendant was in custody and was subject to custodial interrogation. The parties agree that Miranda warnings were administered to the Defendant and Ms. G----- prior to being questioned by Detective Mills.
See DeJesus v. State, Del.Supr., 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 1526, 1529 (1994); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,1125 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); see, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984); Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-441 (1984); Beckwith v. United States 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976); Marine v. State of Delaware, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1185, 1192-93 (1992); Chao v. State, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1992).
See State v. Aiken, Del.Super., Cr.A.No. IN92-01-1293, Barron, J. (October 9, 1992) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 at 442. (1972)).
In addition to the Miranda protections, the Delaware State Legislature provides additional protections for juveniles: a police officer who takes a potentially delinquent or dependent child into custody must notify a child's custodian. The Delaware Supreme Court has not, however, construed these provisions to require the presence of a custodian or other friendly adult during the interrogation of a juvenile. Further, there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement that the police obtain parental permission before interviewing a juvenile suspect. The absence of a parent or "friendly adult" at the custodial interrogation of a juvenile does not per se invalidate any statement but is one of the factors the Court may take into account in determining if a juvenile's incriminating statement was offered freely and voluntarily.
10 Del. C. § 1004 (previously § 933). This section provides in pertinent part that a peace officer may take into custody a child he believes to be dependent, neglected or delinquent. Any peace officer having taken such a child into custody shall immediately notify the child's custodian citing the reasons therefore. See also Family Court Criminal Rule 5(b)(1) (any peace officer who takes a child into custody shall immediately attempt to notify the child's custodian of this fact).
See State v. Haug, 406 A.2d 38 (Del. 1979);
See State v. R.E., 1999 WL 692094, at *6 (1999).
See In re John F.A., 1990 WL 91596 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1990).
The law has historically reflected the assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them. Children often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. Any police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has "coercive aspects to it." Thus, juveniles are more susceptible to police pressure than the average adult. Accordingly, the presence of an adult is likely to assist juveniles in understanding their rights and in making good decisions during an interrogation.
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
The Defendant argues that since Ms. G----- was not his legal guardian at the time of his interview with police, she did not have the legal authority to waive his Miranda warnings and give police the permission to interview him. The Court disagrees. As stated above, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1004, any peace officer having taken such a child into custody shall immediately notify the child's custodian citing the reasons therefore. A custodian is defined as "any person who is charged by law with or who has assumed responsibility for a child's care." The Court recognizes that this definition is somewhat broad. Other jurisdictions have interpreted a custodian as an interested party who acts in accordance with the best interests of the child. Ms. G----- was recognized as the Defendant's legal guardian at the Defendant's school and Detective Mills was told that Ms. G----- was the Defendant's guardian. Further, Ms. G----- introduced herself to Detective Mills as the Defendant's guardian. Based on the evidence presented, there is nothing to indicate that Ms. G----- does not act in the best interests of the minor child. Further, it is clear that Ms. G----- is the interested party who has assumed responsibility for the Defendant. Thus, the Court finds that Ms. G----- had the authority to consent to the police interview on September 10, 2018.
See Com. V. McCra, 694 N.E.2d 849 (Mass. 1998); In the Interest of N.L., 711 A.2d 518 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998).
The Court does not find Defendant's argument that Ms. G----- cannot give consent on his behalf just because she holds herself out as Defendant's guardian, particularly convincing in this case. While it was clear that questions arose concerning the whereabouts of the Defendant's parents at the outset of Detective Mills' investigation, as stated above, Ms. G----- was assumed to be the Defendant's legal guardian. Other jurisdictions have recognized, as the Defendant has argued, that over half of children conceived are likely to live in a home with a step-parent, adoptive home, foster home, or with other relatives. Further, a child may live with an adult who establishes an in loco parentis relationship. In this case, while the Defendant has expressed concern that his aunt, rather than his biological parents, gave consent for the police to interview him, nothing in the record indicates that Ms. G----- was not an interested adult authorized to give her consent.
See In the Interest of N.L., 711 A.2d 518 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998).
Id.
Although Defendant raised the issue of Ms. G-----'s authority to consent to his police interview, this is but one factor to consider when determining if one has waived their Miranda rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. In a Motion to Suppress hearing, the State carries the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a waiver of one's Miranda rights during a police custodial interrogation was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Delaware Courts look at the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogations of juveniles to determine if Miranda rights were properly waived. The Court evaluates the "juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given to him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Furthermore, in examining whether a juvenile's statement was voluntary, the Court must determine whether the statements were coerced or suggested by a law enforcement officer and whether the statements were the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. The United States Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme Court have both declared that "a youth's age and experience are relevant factors for consideration under the totality of the circumstances test and that the confessions and admissions of a juvenile require a special scrutiny."
See In the Matter of Harvey M.R., 1999 WL 692062 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1999).
See In re John F.A., 1990 WL 91596 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1990).
See Torres v. State, 608 A.2d 731, 732 (Del. 1992) (citing Fare. V. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
See In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
See State v. Haug, 406 A.2d 38 (Del. 1979). --------
While the Court recognizes that there is a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine if one has waived their Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, Defendant's Motion to Suppress only alleges that the issue with his interrogation was that Ms. G----- lacked the authority to consent to his police interview. Thus, relying solely on what has been alleged in Defendant's Motion, the Court is led to assume that all other factors of the "totality of the circumstances" test indicate that Defendant's level of comprehension was sufficient to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Because the Court has found that Ms. G----- did indeed have the authority to consent to Defendant's police interview, the State has met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of February 2020.
/s/_________
PETER B. JONES, JUDGE PBJ cc: