Opinion
No. 2-027 / 01-0894.
Filed July 3, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, PATRICK C. McCORMICK, District Associate Judge.
Defendant Allon Jenkins appeals his jury convictions for lascivious conduct with a minor and sexual misconduct with a juvenile in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.14 and 709.16 (1999). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Mullin, County Attorney, and Ann Long, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
Defendant Allon Jenkins appeals his jury convictions for lascivious conduct with a minor and sexual misconduct with a juvenile in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.14 and 709.16 (1999). Jenkins contends the district court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of his prior and subsequent acts of sexual misconduct with female patients other than the alleged victim. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On June 26, 2000, Allon Jenkins was hired as an addiction technician at Gordon Adolescent Center (Gordon) in Sioux City. Gordon is a licensed psychiatric medical institution for substance-addicted children. As an addiction technician, Jenkins was primarily responsible for supervising the children, monitoring their behavior, imposing penalties for refusal to perform jobs, and generally assisting other staff. Because of poor work habits, Jenkins's employment terminated on October 2, 2000.
Following Jenkins's termination, a female patient, J.W., came forward with allegations of sexual misconduct against him. She alleged he had escorted her from her room into a room used for discipline. Once in the room, J.W. alleged that Jenkins lifted her shirt and kissed and sucked on her breasts. She then stated that he pulled down her pants and underwear and licked her buttocks. Despite her protestations, she stated that he forced her to have intercourse. J.W. also alleged that approximately two weeks later, she awoke to Jenkins masturbating her. He then took her to the laundry room where he again attempted intercourse. She stated she pleaded to be allowed to return to her room, but Jenkins took her to the pantry, where he again sexually abused her. Other residents of the facility also revealed inappropriate contact with Jenkins. The allegations were immediately reported to the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) and the local police.
Jenkins was charged by trial information with lascivious conduct with a minor (Count I) and sexual misconduct with a juvenile (Count II). Prior to trial, Jenkins filed a motion in limine requesting that all allegations regarding improper conduct with any female juvenile other than the alleged victim be excluded during trial. The court denied Jenkins's request. At trial, the State offered evidence of three female patients, J.R., K.O. and C.B., regarding inappropriate sexual contact they had with Jenkins while he was an employee at Gordon. Jenkins was found guilty on both counts. Prior to sentencing, Jenkins filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. The district court then sentenced Jenkins to a one-year term on the lascivious acts with a minor charge, and a two-year indeterminate term on the sexual misconduct with a juvenile charge. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Jenkins appeals.
Standard of Review. We ordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion . State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997). "A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law." Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000).
Evidence of Prior and Subsequent Sexual Acts. Jenkins contends the district court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of his prior and subsequent acts of sexual misconduct with female patients other than the alleged victim. Specifically, he argues the testimony is inadmissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 given that such evidence is irrelevant, and even if relevant, the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) addresses the admissibility of evidence of other bad acts. It states:
This rule has been recently renumbered as Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Iowa R. Evid. 404(b). In the instant case, the district court allowed the evidence to prove motive. The alternative purposes listed in the rule are not exclusive. State v. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Iowa 2001). Our supreme court has recently observed that rule 404(b) "is a codification of our common-law rule that one crime cannot be proved by proof of another." State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 2001). Thus, rule 404(b) seeks to exclude evidence that serves no purpose except to show the defendant is a bad person and from which the jury is likely to infer he or she committed the crime in question. Id. at 439-40.
The important question, therefore, is whether the disputed evidence is relevant and material "`to prove some fact or element in issue other than the defendant's criminal disposition.'" Id. at 440 (quoting State v. Cott, 283 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1979)). If the challenged evidence is relevant to a legitimate issue in dispute, then it is prima facie admissible, regardless of any tendency to also establish a defendant's bad character or propensity for committing bad acts. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d at 298.
In determining whether the challenged evidence is admissible, the district court must employ a two-step analysis. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 440. In employing the two-step analysis, the district court must exercise its discretion. Id. We will reverse its decision only when we find a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
Our supreme court has recently stated that these decisions invoke the district court's sound discretion but have recognized that discretion is circumscribed as follows:
It should be recognized, however, that this is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference that accused is a bad man and hence probably committed this crime, must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to exclude the other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on appeal as an abuse of discretion.Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting State v. Johnson, 224 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Iowa 1974)).
The court must first decide whether the evidence is relevant. Id. If it is not relevant, then the challenged evidence is inadmissible. Id. Evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Iowa R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). All relevant evidence is admissible except for certain exceptions not applicable here. Iowa R. Evid. 402. We conclude the testimony of J.R., K.O. and C.B. was relevant.
This rule has been recently renumbered as Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.401.
This rule has been recently renumbered as Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.402.
Our decision regarding relevancy does not end our inquiry. If the evidence is deemed relevant to a legitimate factual issue in dispute, the court must then decide whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 440. Even relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ." Iowa R. Evid. 403. Probative value gauges the strength and force of relevant evidence. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 440. "Unfair prejudice" in rule 403 is defined as "`an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" Id. (quoting State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988)). Evidence, therefore, that
This rule has been recently renumbered as Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.
appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instincts to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. The appellate court may conclude that "unfair prejudice" occurred because an insufficient effort was made below to avoid the dangers of prejudice, or because the theory on which the evidence was offered was designed to elicit a response from the jurors not justified by the evidence.Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231-32 (quoting 1 Jack B. Weinstein Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 403[03], at 403-33-40 (1986)). In making a rule 403 determination, we consider the following factors:
(1) the actual need for the evidence in view of the issues and the other available evidence, (2) the strength of the evidence showing that the prior bad acts were committed by the accused, (3) the strength or weakness of the prior bad acts evidence in supporting the issue sought to be proven, and (4) the degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evidence improperly.State v. Query, 594 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
We have made a careful and thorough review of the evidence in light of the above factors and find each was satisfied in this case. We therefore conclude that the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We further conclude that the district court's cautionary Instruction No. 18 lessened, even further, the danger the jury would use this evidence improperly. We note that there were several staff concerns already existing about Jenkins's inappropriate actions. The testimony indicates there were several independent staff observations which corroborated the victim's testimony and, therefore, this was not a case where the contested evidence was admitted to bolster the victim's credibility as in Mitchell. In addition, the acts testified to by the three other residents were less serious than those testified to by the victim. Therefore, this is not a case where the contested testimony would rouse the jury to "overmastering hostility." Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 243.
The district court made a judgment call that the contested evidence should be admitted. We agree with that decision. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.