Opinion
No. 2020-KH-00877
01-12-2021
STATE of Louisiana v. Darren L. JARVIS
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
PER CURIAM:
Writ granted. The sentence reductions in Act 403 of 2001 and Act 45 of 2002 are expressly applicable retroactively to inmates sentenced prior to 2001. See La.R.S. 15:308(A)(1) and (2) (prior to amendment by 2014 La. Acts No. 340, § 1); see also State ex rel. Esteen v. State , 16-0949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 233, 238 (per curiam). Applying these amendments to applicant's life sentence as a third-felony offender is difficult because of confusion in the record, and discrepancies between the transcript and the district court's written reasons for judgment, with regard to whether a prior conviction for simple burglary was used as a predicate felony in the habitual offender adjudication. Given this record, it is possible that defendant's life sentence exceeds that authorized by statute if simple burglary was not used as a predicate felony. See La.R.S. 15:529.1, as amended by 2001 La. Acts 403. Accordingly, we grant the application to vacate the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and we remand to the district court to conduct a new habitual offender adjudication. Applicant will also have the opportunity to argue in the district court that the sentence imposed is excessive or seek a downward departure below the statutorily mandated minimum sentence. See State v. Dorthey , 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993).
VACATED AND REMANDED
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Johnson, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
WEIMER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I agree with the majority that the 2001 and 2002 sentence reductions are expressly applicable retroactively to inmates sentenced prior to 2001, I concur in the majority's granting of applicant's writ application.
See 2001 La. Acts 403; 2002 La. Acts 45.
La. R.S. 15:308(A)(1) and (2) (prior to amendment by 2014 La. Acts 340, § 1).
Applying the amendments to applicant's sentence imposed in 1999, I note that La. R.S. 15:529(A)(1)(b)(ii) provided for a life sentence only if the third felony and the two prior felonies were crimes of violence, a sex offense, or violations of the controlled dangerous substances law punishable by imprisonment for more than ten years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. The sentencing court's reasons for judgment indicate that applicant's two prior convictions consisted of (1) unauthorized use of a movable over $1000 and (2) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle over $1000 and aggravated battery. Unauthorized use of a movable is not a crime of violence, a sex offense, a violation of the controlled substances law, or a crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. Consequently, applicant's life sentence as a third-felony habitual offender is for a term longer than authorized by law. See State ex rel. Esteen v. State , 16-0949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 233, 238.
Given these circumstances, I find it unnecessary to vacate the habitual offender adjudication and remand to the district court to conduct a new habitual offender adjudication. Rather, I would reverse the denial of applicant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, grant applicant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and remand the matter simply for resentencing in accordance with Esteen . Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Hughes, J., dissents in part.
I agree applicant should be resentenced, but only under the provisions of Esteen as a third felony offender.
CRAIN, J., concurs and assigns reasons:
I agree with vacating the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and remanding to the district court to conduct a new habitual offender adjudication. Additionally, the district court does not have discretion to adjudicate the defendant anything less than what the state charges and proves. State v. Pollard , 93-0660, (La. 10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370, 371 ; State v. Dorthey , 623 So.2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993).
Johnson, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
I agree that the sentence reductions in Act 403 of 2001 and Act 45 of 2002 are expressly applicable retroactively to inmates sentenced prior to 2001. See La.R.S. 15:308(A)(1) and (2) (prior to amendment by 2014 La. Acts No. 340, § 1); see also State ex rel. Esteen v. State , 16-0949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 233, 238 (per curiam).
The critical issue here is the fact that in the trial court's reasons for judgment, the court found applicant to be a third-felony offender based on only the first two predicate offenses listed by the state: unauthorized use of a moveable, and unauthorized use of a moveable and aggravated battery––the latter two convictions having been obtained on the same date and thus only counting as one predicate offense. The trial court did not reference simple burglary as a predicate offense in its written reasons for judgment, and found applicant to be a third-felony offender, not fourth as the state had alleged in its multiple bill. Therefore the defendant's life sentence exceeds that authorized by statute and the case should be remanded for re-sentencing as a third felony offender. See La. R.S. 15:529.1, as amended by 2001 La. Acts 403.
As a third felony offender on remand, the applicant would face a sentencing range of not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. The applicant's instant conviction is for distribution of cocaine, and therefore he would face a range of 20 to 60 years in prison as a third felony offender. R.S. 40:967(B) ; R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(i) (2001). Any number of years within that range is still a very long prison sentence for a person whose criminal history includes only one act of violence.
Nothing is gained here from remanding this case to give the State another bite at the apple to ensure that this defendant—a petty criminal—spends the rest of his natural life in prison; a sentence which I believe violates the state and federal constitutions. See State v. Jarvis , 01-0799 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 338 (Johnson, J., would grant, finding the "life sentence is constitutionally excessive"). Remanding this case for a new habitual offender adjudication would be a waste of judicial resources and does not serve the interests of justice.