Opinion
No. 5-963 / 05-0585
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, K.D. Briner (Trial, Post-Trial Motions) and Jon C. Fister (Refusal to Compel Prosecution to Disclose Agreement), Judges.
Willie Carl Jackson appeals his judgment and sentence for first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Brian G. Sayer of Dunakey Klatt, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas W. Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Two men robbed a convenience store in Waterloo, Iowa. The robbery was captured on videotape. Police apprehended Willie Jackson at the scene. In a subsequent interview, also videotaped, Jackson confessed to the crime.
The State charged Jackson with first-degree robbery and a jury found him guilty as charged. Iowa Code § 711.1, 711.2 (Iowa 2003). The district court subsequently denied his post-trial motions and imposed sentence. This appeal followed.
The State also charged Jackson with assault on a police officer. The district court sustained Jackson's motion for judgment of acquittal on this count.
Jackson raises several arguments in support of reversal, none of which we find persuasive.
I. Challenge to Sufficiency of the Evidence
The jury was instructed that the State would have to prove several elements including "the specific intent to commit a theft." At trial, Jackson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State did not prove this element. The district court denied the motion. Our review of this ruling is for errors of law, with the jury's finding of guilt binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 2004).
A jury could have found the following facts with respect to Jackson's intent. Jackson was at a party at his step-daughter's house. Jackson and others were using crack cocaine and consuming alcohol. One of the men at the party, Andrew Stephens, asked Jackson to participate in a robbery of a convenience store. Jackson agreed. He put on someone else's shoes and his step-daughter's jacket, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, and left with Stephens.
At the convenience store, Stephens acted as if he was about to purchase a bottle of soda. When the clerk opened the cash register, a masked Jackson entered the store. He and Stephens displayed knives as they took money from the cash register. They next ordered the clerk to open a second cash register. She initially demurred but changed her mind after Jackson said, "You think I'm kidding. I'll cut your throat." Jackson removed money from the second cash register, and he and Stephens began to leave the store. They quickly reentered, on seeing police outside. Officers entered the store, apprehended the men, and placed them under arrest. During a subsequent police interview, Jackson admitted his role in the robbery and acknowledged that he would have to face the consequences of his actions.
In the face of this evidence, Jackson's sole contention is that his consumption of drugs and alcohol prior to the crime rendered him unable to form the required specific intent. See Iowa Code § 701.5. (stating the fact that a person is under the influence of intoxicants or drugs may be relevant in proving the person's specific intent). In his view, the State did not "negate [his] claim of a lack of specific intent due to intoxication from narcotics and alcohol." To the contrary, the officer who questioned Jackson at the police station testified, "I did smell slight odor of an alcoholic beverage on his person, but it wasn't anything that would affect the way he communicated with me." While she admitted Jackson told her he had "smoked some crack," she stated she had "no concerns" that he was still feeling the effects of the drug at the time of the interview. She elaborated, "[h]e was very coherent, cooperative. Like I said, I could smell a slight odor of an alcoholic beverage from him, but I had no indications that he was unable to communicate with me or understand what I was asking him."
A jury could have found the officer's testimony more persuasive than Jackson's witnesses. Jackson's step-daughter testified to his drug and alcohol use, a fact that was not in dispute. As for an expert witness proffered by Jackson, a jury could have found that his opinion on specific intent was riddled with inconsistencies and was formulated without the benefit of key information such as the videotapes.
We have little trouble finding substantial evidence of Jackson's specific intent to commit a theft. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Jackson's motion for judgment of acquittal on the robbery count.
II. Motion for New Trial A. Law and Evidence
Jackson next contends the verdict was contrary "to the law and evidence." In evaluating such a motion, a district court is obligated to apply a "weight of the evidence" standard. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). Our review is for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Jackson's attorney did not mention this standard and neither did the district court. On appeal, no one has made an issue of this. Therefore, we will assume, for purposes of our opinion, that the court applied the correct standard.
First, Jackson essentially reiterates his argument in support of his motion for judgment of acquittal, stating, "all the evidence indicated that [he] was heavily drugged immediately prior to the incident that led to [his] arrest."
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this portion of Jackson's motion. His step-daughter, by virtue of her relationship with Jackson, could have been deemed less credible than the convenience store clerk, who was present during the crime, and the police officer who interviewed Jackson immediately following the crime.
As for Jackson's expert, his court testimony was inconsistent with his written report. For example, he testified to his belief that Jackson used "amphetamine." When confronted with his report which stated Jackson used crack cocaine rather than amphetamines, the expert suggested "crack" and "crank" were one and the same. He also stated that, after he wrote the report, Jackson told him he used methamphetamine and the amount of money Jackson expended on drugs was more consistent with the use of methamphetamine than crack cocaine. This statement was inconsistent with all the remaining evidence of drug use.
As noted, Jackson's expert also conceded he did not have key information prior to formulating his opinion. When asked whether he had viewed the videotape of the crime or the videotape of Jackson's police interview, the expert stated that an examination of these pieces of evidence would not have helped him in assessing Jackson's intent. He even went so far as to testify that he did not rely on what Jackson said in assessing his intent. Later, however, he acknowledged that his opinion was partially based on an interview with Jackson.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson's new trial motion to the extent it alleged that the jury's finding of guilt was contrary to the law and evidence.
B. Juror Misconduct
Jackson next notes that a local newspaper published an article about the trial on the last day of jury deliberations. He maintains the article deprived him of a fair trial. However, as Jackson himself conceded when he initially raised this post-trial issue, there was no indication that any juror read the article. And, when defense counsel argued the motion for new trial, he acknowledged "we certainly can't assert that we've got proof of this. We don't have any jurors that would testify to that fact. We're simply asking the court to make an assumption that the verdict was a result of this newspaper article." The district court denied this portion of the motion for new trial.
Given the absence of any evidence that one or more of the jurors read the cited article and were persuaded by the article to render a finding of guilt, we discern no abuse of discretion in this aspect of the court's ruling. See State v. Christianson, 337 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1983) (quoting State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Iowa 1980)) (stating new trial justified only if defendant proved, by competent evidence, that the misconduct "was calculated to, and it is reasonably probable that it did, influence the verdict"); State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 44-45 (Iowa 1981) ("We will not presume prejudice from the mere publication of a newspaper article.").
C. Denial of Fair Trial
Jackson contends he was denied a fair trial because the district court did not recognize a claimed plea agreement between his step-daughter and the State that, he believed, inured to his benefit. He raises this argument twice. We will address it in Part Four.
III. Motion in Arrest of Judgment
A motion in arrest of judgment should only be granted when no legal judgment can be rendered on a verdict of guilty. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). Such a motion may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990).
Jackson contends, "[w]ith no evidence, irrespective of sufficiency, that even tends to show specific intent on the part of [him], no legal judgment on a guilty verdict as to the First Degree Robbery can be pronounced." This challenge is in fact a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and, as such, a motion in arrest of judgment was not the appropriate vehicle for raising it. Id. IV. Motion to Compel Disclosure of Plea Agreement
Jackson next contends the district court abused its discretion in refusing to require the State to reveal the details of its plea agreement with his step-daughter. See State v. Grimme, 338 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 1983) (setting forth standard of review). The district court denied the motion on the ground that "there was no plea agreement." The record supports this finding. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion. We also conclude Jackson was not denied a fair trial by virtue of the district court's failure to recognize this claimed agreement and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying this part of his new trial motion.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Jackson contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that (1) he "was represented by three different attorneys in preparation for trial," and was prejudiced by the fact that his first attorney was called as a witness, (2) his first attorney did not keep a record of the claimed plea agreement with his step-daughter, and (3) the prosecutor used leading questions to which no objections were made.
With respect to Jackson's first contention, the record reflects that his first attorney was forced to withdraw after Jackson filed an ethics complaint against him. His second attorney withdrew after sensing a lack of trust with his client. Jackson's final trial attorney called the first attorney as a witness at Jackson's behest, in order to establish the existence of a plea agreement between his step-daughter and the State.
As Jackson was partially, if not entirely, responsible for the removal of his first and second attorneys and the decision to call his first attorney as a witness, he is hard-pressed to complain of these events. See State v. Stewart, 445 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) ("In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's action we consider the attorney's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by defendant's own statements or actions."). Accordingly, we reject this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
As for Jackson's second contention, the district court found, and we agree, that there was no plea agreement. Therefore, the court could not compel the disclosure of documents relating to that nonexistent agreement. For this reason, we reject Jackson's second ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Finally, Jackson has failed to cite specific examples of leading questions that he contends deprived him of a fair trial. For this reason, we reject his final ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 689 (Iowa 2000).
VI. Disposition
We affirm Jackson's judgment and sentence for first-degree robbery.