Opinion
No. 52482-8-I.
Filed: June 1, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-1-01167-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/14/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Cheryl B Carey.
Counsel for Petitioner(s), Deanna Jennings Fuller, Attorney at Law, W554 King Co Courthouse, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2385.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Eugene Edward Piculell, Law Office of Gene E. Piculell, 10900 NE 8th St. Ste 1115, Bellevue, WA 98004-4456.
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a traffic offense has been committed. Because a police officer's visual observations can constitute sufficient evidence for a person of reasonable caution to believe that a speeding offense had been committed, even when there is no foundational evidence of a speed-measuring device's reliability, we conclude that probable cause was established in this case. We reverse the superior court and reinstate Jackson's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI).
FACTS
Leon Jackson was charged in district court with DUI. Claiming that the officer who arrested Jackson for DUI lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle for speeding, Jackson's attorney moved to suppress the evidence of the charged crime. The court granted the defense motion as to the actual results of the laser speed-measuring device used by the officer. But it denied the motion as to the officer's `conclusions for probable cause purposes for the traffic stop.' The officer then testified that it was `visually obvious that Mr. Jackson . . . was approaching [his] location in well excess of the 60 miles per hour posted speed limit.' He stated that the defendant was traveling at a great speed and was pulling away from cars. He estimated the defendant's speed at over 80 mph. He also testified that he had received training at the State Patrol Academy on doing visual estimation of speeds. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court stated, `Having heard the testimony of the officer about this circumstance and his objections and his actions, I make a finding that there [were] reasonable grounds based on the officer's observations alone for the traffic stop, and make a finding of probable cause for the traffic stop.'
Jackson was convicted of DUI and appealed his conviction to the superior court under the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ). The superior court reversed his conviction, stating Sthere is not substantial evidence in the record to support the factual and legal conclusions.' This court granted discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b).
ANALYSIS
This is an appeal of a RALJ decision. On appeal, this court reviews the decision of the district court, not the superior court, for errors of law. State v. Brokman, 84 Wn. App. 848, 850, 930 P.2d 354 (1997).
The State asks this court to affirm Jackson's conviction based upon the district court's conclusion that probable cause for the traffic stop existed. The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, which means that the trial court's factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence. State v. Vasquez, 109 Wn. App. 310, 318, 34 P.3d 1255 (2001), aff'd, 148 Wn.2d 303, 59 P.3d 648 (2002). Those factual findings must support its conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. Vasquez, 109 Wn. App. at 318. Probable cause does not require the officer to have evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bellows, 72 Wn.2d 264, 266, 432 P.2d 654 (1967).
In Clement v. State Dep't of Licensing, 109 Wn. App. 371, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001), review denied, 146 Wn.2d 1017 (2002), this court rejected the argument that foundational evidence to support a radar reading is required to prove probable cause for a traffic stop. There, the police officer stopped a motorist and relied upon a fellow officer's radar reading of 82 mph. The officer then observed the front end of the car dip as if the driver had suddenly hit the brakes. The radar reading after that was 77 mph. The court held that even without foundation evidence of the radar's reliability, a person of reasonable caution could conclude, based upon this information available to the officer, that a traffic offense was committed. Clement, 109 Wn. App. at 376.
Jackson's argument is that the trial court's factual findings do not support its conclusion that probable cause was proved because without the laser speed reading, there is no objective evidence that he was speeding. We must disagree. In Clement, we held that an officer's visual observations and his reliance on a radar reading were sufficient to establish probable cause. This case is no different. In addition to relying on a speed-measuring device, the officer here had training in observing and estimating vehicle speeds and testified that based upon this training, he estimated Jackson's speed to be in excess of the posted speed limit. It is not required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was speeding, but rather to prove sufficient facts that could cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a traffic offense was committed. The officer's testimony satisfied this requirement.
We reverse the superior court and reinstate Jackson's conviction.
COLEMAN, KENNEDY and BAKER, JJ.