Opinion
No. 1-1051 / 01-0834.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, MICHAEL R. STEWART, District Associate Judge.
The State was granted certiorari review of a district court's order granting a deferred judgment. WRIT SUSTAINED; SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger and Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles A. Stream, County Attorney, and Richard F. Scott, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Lori Holm, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
The State was granted certiorari review of a district court's order granting a deferred judgment to Richard Harrington. The State contends the district court erred in interpreting Iowa Code section 321J.2(3)(a)(1) (2001). We sustain the writ, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
In the early morning hours of January 28, 2001, a law enforcement officer stopped Harrington in response to a dispatch regarding an assault. Based on the arresting officer's observations of Harrington's driving and preliminary field tests, Harrington was asked for and consented to a breath test on the intoxilyzer 4011A machine. The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .150. Harrington requested a second test which subsequently revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .153.
On February 23, 2001, Harrington was charged by trial information with operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). Harrington entered a written plea of guilty. Harrington requested a deferred judgment; the State resisted. The district court granted Harrington's request for a deferred judgment based on the first intoxilyzer test result. The State filed a petition for certiorari from the district court's order granting deferred judgment. Our supreme court granted the petition on June 29, 2001.
During the sentencing colloquy, the district court stated in pertinent part:
Mr. Harrington, basically I am going to defer judgment based on your .15 test. I think if you had — there is a lot of interesting things there. The second one is I think your .153 test is under the .15 requirement which is only out two digits. If that comes up, we can go into that more. I think the test you actually took, and most people would have taken just the one test, you would have had a .150 which qualifies you for the deferred. You requested a second test which turned out to go up slightly.
II. Standard of Review.
A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. Therefore, "we may examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions." Director of Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 621 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998)). Our review is at law. Amro v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 429 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 1988).
III. Merits.
The State contends the district court cannot grant a deferred judgment if a defendant's intoxilyzer test result exceeds .15. Iowa Code section 321J.2(3)(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 901.5 and 907.3, the court shall not defer judgment or sentencing . . . if the following apply:
(1) If the defendant's alcohol concentration established by the results of an analysis of a specimen of the defendant's blood, breath, or urine withdrawn in accordance with this chapter exceeds .15, regardless of whether or not the alcohol concentration indicated by the chemical test minus the established margin of error inherent in the device or method used to conduct the test equals an alcohol concentration of .15 or more.
Iowa Code § 321J.2(3)(a)(1). According to this provision of the code, the State argues the district court did not have the authority to drop the third digit of an intoxilyzer reading. The State contends because the second test result of .153 exceeded the .15 limit set forth in section 321J.2(3)(a)(1), Harrington is ineligible for a deferred judgment.
We agree. When the language of a statute is plain and clear, we are not permitted to look beyond its express terms. State v. Maher, 618 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 2000); State v. Neary, 470 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1991). Iowa Code section 321J.2(3)(a)(1) explicitly prohibits a deferred judgment when a defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeds .15. Moreover, our supreme court has held the district court does not have the authority to drop the third digit of an intoxilyzer reading. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2001). To the extent the district court granted a deferred judgment based on the higher intoxilyzer result of .153 minus the third digit, the court erred.
The State further contends the district court erred by relying on the lower of the two intoxilyzer test results, which showed an alcohol concentration of .15, just under the limit for deferred judgment eligibility. The State argues the district court resolved any concerns about the intoxilyzer device's margin of error in the favor of the defendant for purposes of sentencing, contrary to legislative preferences against granting deferred judgments and resolving shortcomings in favor of defendants. Id. Moreover, the State asserts Harrington requested the second intoxilyzer test and therefore should be bound by its results. We agree and conclude the district court erred by relying on the lower intoxilyzer test result. Accordingly, we sustain the writ, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
WRIT SUSTAINED; SENTENCE VACATED; AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.