Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4035-13T4
03-14-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SALADIN HURT, a/k/a TROY WILLIAMS, DUANE PICKETT, SEAN MCMICHAEL, and TROY H. WILKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robert J. Wisse, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Leone and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 09-09-1127. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robert J. Wisse, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an August 8, 2013 conviction for aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) after entering a guilty plea. We affirm.
R.W. died after being stabbed on May 6, 2009. A police investigation ensued and defendant was arrested. Defendant was later indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).
In pretrial proceedings, the State sought to admit evidence of defendant's erratic and disruptive behavior in Paterson in the hours leading up to the stabbing. Defendant had filed motions in limine to exclude the other acts evidence that the State intended to use at trial. See N.J.R.E. 404(b). At a hearing, witnesses testified that defendant spent much of the day in the area around Godwin Avenue and Graham Street. His behavior became increasingly erratic over the course of that afternoon and evening, and he was implicated in numerous incidents with others that afternoon.
Defendant was first seen jumping on top of a car that was passing through the intersection at 5:00 p.m. After defendant jumped off of the car, he ran into and out of the stores and social clubs on the intersection, which were occupied by numerous patrons that evening. Defendant yelled "which one of you out here wants it today . . . [because] one of you mother f*****s out here is going to get it today," as he went around the intersection. Defendant's other behaviors included punching street signs and cars, tackling and hitting the owner of a nearby grocery store, and telling one of his friends that he did not want to see him anymore after another person "whipped his butt."
In another instance, defendant pulled out a knife and displayed it to his friend before putting it away. Later in the evening, video surveillance of the intersection showed defendant riding a bicycle on the street waving a large knife above his head for several minutes before placing the knife back into his pants. After these incidents, defendant was observed striking a person with his fist outside a liquor store on the intersection. Witnesses testified that, as defendant was displaying his knife, defendant entered a nearby liquor store several times and consumed several beers and shots of liquor.
Witnesses testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m., after each of these events occurred, defendant purposefully bumped into R.W. A physical altercation ensued after defendant bumped into him. Defendant then stabbed R.W. during the altercation, causing his death.
On August 6, 2013, the trial judge denied defendant's motion on the basis of N.J.R.E. 404(b), State v. Cofield, 121 N.J. 328 (1992), as well as the intrinsic evidence doctrine. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), and waived his rights to appeal except as to the issues concerning his in limine motion. The trial judge sentenced defendant to fifteen years in prison subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualification pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following points for our consideration on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT OTHER-ACT EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 404(b) BECAUSE THE INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE OF THESE ACTS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AT TRIAL IN ORDER FOR THE STATE TO PRESENT ITS CASE AND IS THEREFORE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT ISSUE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS INTRINSIC EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXPLAIN ITS RULING TO THAT EFFECT AND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT DIRECTLY PROVE THE CRIME.
When reviewing a trial court's decision to exclude or admit evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), this court uses an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 483-84 (1997) (citations omitted). This court defers to the trial court's ruling unless the trial court committed a "clear error of judgment." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011) (citing State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 391 (2008)).
Defendant's first argument is that N.J.R.E. 404(b) bars the State's use of this evidence at trial. Specifically, defendant also argues that this evidence, if introduced at trial, would be more prejudicial than probative because of its inflammatory nature. See N.J.R.E. 403. We disagree. N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides that:
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.
The purpose of N.J.R.E. 404(b) is to prevent the "underlying danger . . . that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a bad person in general." Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 336 (1992). Not all evidence, referred to as "other acts," evidence is barred under N.J.R.E. 404(b), however. The Rule "seeks to strike a balance between the prejudice to a defendant that is inherent in other-crimes evidence and the recognition that the evidence may be highly relevant to prove a defendant's guilt of the crime charged." Barden, supra, 195 N.J. at 388. When a defendant's "motive or intent is at issue, [the court] 'generally admit[s] a wider range of evidence.'" State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 365 (2004) (citing State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999)).
When determining whether to admit other acts evidence under N.J.R.E. 403 and 404(b), our Supreme Court has instructed us to apply the following test:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338.]
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the evidence because it violated the fourth prong of Cofield, because such evidence is more prejudicial than it is probative. Defendant argues that the evidence was unnecessary because the State's witnesses would have testified that they saw defendant stab the victim, and that the only purpose for the additional testimony would be to "portray [defendant] as some sort of menace," and to bolster the State's testimony. As defendant correctly points out, admitting evidence solely to bolster a witness's testimony does not satisfy the Cofield test or the requirements of N.J.R.E. 404(b), and such evidence should be excluded from trial. State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 256 (2010) (citing State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 520 (2002)).
But here, the State's use of "other acts" evidence goes beyond bolstering witness testimony, and is probative in a variety of respects. First, the defendant initially pled not guilty to the charges, and as the trial judge noted in her oral findings, defendant raised no affirmative defense. Accordingly, defendant's identity would have been an issue at trial. The incidents about which witnesses testified at the hearing would help establish identity, which our Supreme Court has long held is a valid basis upon which to permit "other acts" evidence. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 336 (citing State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 475-76 (1990)). Specifically, evidence of defendant's incidents involving the knife he carried that day would help the State establish his identity as the person who stabbed the victim.
Moreover, defendant's interactions with others on that day provide evidence of defendant's intent to harm others. The trial court noted that defendant's statement, "one of you mother f*****s is going to get it, which one will it be," was evidence establishing defendant's "intent to do harm to one or more other people without any discernable reason or motive." This intent is another well-established basis for admitting "other acts" evidence. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266-67 (1987) (abrogated on other grounds). Defendant's statement, as well as the numerous physical altercations he had with other passersby throughout the afternoon and evening of May 6, 2009, help establish his intent to do harm to people on that intersection that night.
We also reject defendant's claim that the probative value of this evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Such evidence prejudices defendant, but the probative value of this evidence far outweighs its prejudicial featurse. The evidence that defendant contests is probative because it helps establish identity and intent. Further, without such evidence, a jury would be left with "more questions than answers. Without that knowledge, the jurors would have been left with a huge gap in understanding the evidence at the center of the case[.]" Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 164-65. Defendant's analogy to Barden, supra, 195 N.J. 375, is thus inapposite. In Barden, prosecutors sought to introduce evidence of a drug sale the defendant had participated in six months prior to the robbery for which she was on trial. Id. at 387. Unlike in this case, such evidence could only have been introduced to demonstrate defendant's propensity for criminal activity. Id. at 392.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's decision should be reversed because the court never offered to "sanitize" the evidence for purposes of Rule 404(b). Defendant correctly asserts that a "trial court must instruct the jury concerning [the] limited relevance" of other-crimes evidence." State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 304 (1989) (citing State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 466 (App. Div. 1987)). However, the court explicitly noted that it would formulate jury instructions with "an appropriate limiting instruction." Because no trial occurred in this case, no specific instruction was yet formulated (although the trial court clearly indicated its intent to "sanitize" the evidence by employing a limiting jury instruction). Defendant provides no cognizable basis upon which to reverse the trial court's decision on this ground, and accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion on the trial judge's part.
Defendant also asserts that the trial judge improperly admitted the testimony pursuant to the intrinsic evidence doctrine. Although the contested testimony is admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), we add the following comments for purposes of clarity. For purposes of evaluating the trial court's decision to admit this evidence under a theory of intrinsic evidence, a "trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is review on appeal for abuse of discretion." Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 157 (citing Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007)).
Intrinsic evidence is admissible evidence generally defined by our Supreme Court thusly:
First, evidence is intrinsic if it "directly proves" the charged offense. This gives effect to Rule 404(b)'s applicability only to evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts." If uncharged misconduct directly proves the charged offense, it is not evidence of some "other" crime. Second, "uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the charged crime may be termed intrinsic if they facilitate the commission of the charged crime." But all else must be analyzed under Rule 404(b).
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that our holding will exclude much, if any, evidence that is currently admissible as background or "completes the story" evidence under the inextricably intertwined test. We reiterate that the purpose of Rule 404(b) is "simply to keep from the jury evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad person, implying that the jury needn't worry overmuch about the strength of the government's evidence." "No other use of prior crimes or other bad acts i[s] forbidden by the rule," and one proper use of such evidence "is the need to avoid confusing the jury."
[Id. at 180 (citing Green, supra, 617 F.3d at 248-49).]
Here, the State's evidence was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence in two respects. First, evidence of defendant carrying and waving the knife at people on the street directly proves that defendant possessed the knife, which proved two of the three original charges defendant faced: possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Secondly, all of the events described occurred contemporaneously with the stabbing for purposes of the intrinsic evidence doctrine. Although defendant asserts that "[e]vents that occur prior to some other event are definitionally [sic] not contemporaneous with that event[,]" courts are permitted use of "background evidence" to establish a context that will not confuse the jury. Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 180. All of the events that the State sought to introduce at trial were part of a larger chain of events that explains defendant's motive and intent, which, as the Rose court held, are permissible bases upon which to admit evidence. Ibid. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION