Opinion
No. 3-222 / 02-0963
Filed May 14, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble, Judge.
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Trever Hook of Hook Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Charles Kenville, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Ricky Dean Hunt challenges a ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Late one night, Des Moines police officers Bartak and Little received a complaint that someone was pounding on a roof and shining a light into houses. On arriving at the site, the officers saw a man, later identified as Ricky Dean Hunt, standing on a ladder. The man saw the officers and came down. He told them he had completed working on the house and would put his things away. Officer Bartak then asked him his name. Hunt paused and said, "Carpenter." Bartak asked him for identification. Hunt responded that his identification was in the house. The officers followed him into the house. Once inside, Hunt informed the officers he in fact did not have identification. Officer Bartak asked him about a bulge in his back pocket. Hunt took a wallet out, opened the compartments, and showed them to Bartak while reiterating the absence of identification. As he did so, Bartak observed what appeared to be a traffic ticket. The ticket was inscribed with Hunt's name. At this point, Hunt admitted his true identity. He was taken into custody on outstanding warrants and was searched. The search uncovered a small plastic baggie corner containing methamphetamine.
The State charged Hunt with possession of a controlled substance. Iowa Code § 124.401 (2001). Hunt filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The district court overruled the motion and found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance, third offense.
II. Suppression Ruling
On appeal, Hunt contends the officers conducted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. SeeU.S. Const. art. IV, Iowa Const., art 1 § 8. The State responds that there was no seizure of Hunt triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis, but concedes "the argument that no seizure occurred was neither made nor decided below." It is established that we may not affirm the district court on a ground not raised before the district court. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002). Therefore, we decline to consider the State's "no seizure" argument.
Nonetheless, on our de novo review of this constitutional issue, we conclude the district court properly overruled the suppression motion. The court decided that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to continue the investigation after Hunt came down from the roof. See State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 496 (Iowa 1993) (stating, "the police may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has `reasonable cause to believe a crime may have occurred.'"). The record supports this determination. Officer Bartak explained he was concerned that the house Hunt had been working on was not his own. Partially in light of this concern, Bartak asked Hunt his name. Hunt "paused for a little bit" and then said his name was "Carpenter."
We agree with the district court that Hunt's response justified further inquiry and investigation by the officers of Hunt's true name and identity. We find no constitutional violation under these circumstances. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d at 497 (stating "[t]he principal function of an investigatory stop is to resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity is afoot.")
AFFIRMED.
Zimmer, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., specially concurs.
I specially concur. I too would affirm.
Contrary to the majority and district court's opinions, I agree with defendant that there would have been no reasonable and articulable suspicion under the facts for the officers to have detained defendant after determining he had been working on his roof and was finished for the night.
I agree with the State, however, that Officer Bartak was not detaining defendant when he asked him his name and if he had identification. Police may pose questions, ask for identification, and seek consent to search, as long as they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. United States v. Drayton, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 536 U.S. 194, ___, 153 L.Ed.2d 242, ___ (2002); State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984) (holding attendees at private parties are not required to answer officers' inquiries into their identities, but noting officers are still allowed to make such inquiries).
I would affirm because there was no seizure. While the district court did not find the search valid because there was no seizure, the issue was presented, and defendant had an opportunity to address it. The defendant stated in his motion to suppress, if the investigatory search under Terry v. Ohio,was valid the Officer should have ceased the search once the Defendant agreed to stop working on the roof.
4. Any search thereafter is invalid . . . as an unreasonable search and seizure.
(Emphasis added.) Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877-1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903-05 (1968), the seizure issue has two very clear subparts: 1) whether a seizure exists; and 2) whether it is reasonable. The issue of whether there was or was not a seizure was inherent in defendant's argument and the district court's ruling. Consequently, DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Iowa 2002) does not preclude us from affirming on this ground.