Opinion
KNLCR16355957T
10-25-2018
State of Connecticut v. Dante A. Hughes
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Jongbloed, Barbara Bailey, J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Jongbloed, J.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 42-53, the defendant, Dante A. Hughes, moves for a new trial on the basis that he was prejudiced by the misconduct of a juror, who looked up the definition of the term "manslaughter" in the dictionary during deliberations. The state objects, contending that, even if misconduct occurred, the defendant has not suffered any prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion is denied.
The court denied the motion on the record on October 17, 2018 and indicated that this written memorandum of decision would follow.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts are relevant to the disposition of this matter.
On July 26, 2018, a jury of twelve unanimously found the defendant guilty of Manslaughter in the First Degree with a Firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a. The jurors were individually polled and each indicated unequivocally their agreement with the verdict. On July 31, 2018, one of the jurors, D.M-W. engaged in a postverdict conversation with courthouse staff. In that conversation, D.M.-W. indicated that one of the other jurors had looked up the definition of the word "manslaughter" in a dictionary. The court was subsequently informed and a hearing was scheduled to determine whether the jury, or any member thereof, had looked up the definition of manslaughter in a dictionary, and what impact, if any, that action may have had upon the jury deliberations.
The jurors are referred to by their initials to protect their privacy interests. See State v. Williams, 108 Conn.App. 556, 558 n.2, 948 A.2d 1085 (2008).
By way of background to these proceedings, the court notes that during jury deliberations, on July 25, 2018, the jury sent out a note inquiring whether it was permissible to look up the word "manslaughter" in the dictionary. (Court Ex. No. 16.) The court instructed the jury that it should not look up anything in any outside sources, including the dictionary, and could only consider the definition of the specific charge of manslaughter, as explained by its elements, in the instructions provided by the court.
On September 4 and 6, 2018, a hearing was held in which each juror was questioned concerning whether, during deliberations, the dictionary definition of manslaughter was raised, and, if so, when this occurred, whether any outside information affected the juror’s ability to sit fairly and impartially, whether any outside information affected the juror’s ability to follow the court’s instructions, and whether the juror considered only the evidence presented in the courtroom and only the court’s instructions. Prior to the hearing, counsel agreed that these specific questions would be posed by the court to each juror initially. After each juror was questioned, counsel was given the opportunity to propose additional follow-up questions and on a number of occasions, additional questioning occurred.
The court first heard from juror D.M.-W., the juror who discussed the incident with courthouse staff. D.M.-W. testified that a dictionary definition was mentioned prior to the point at which the jury sent out its note asking whether it was permissible to look up the word manslaughter in the dictionary. She stated that no outside information affected her ability to sit fairly and impartially or her ability to follow the court’s instructions. D.M-W. stated that she considered only the evidence presented and the instructions of the court.
Next, the court heard from juror A.S, who similarly testified that a dictionary definition was discussed prior to the jury note. A.S. stated that no outside information affected her ability to sit fairly and impartially, that no outside information affected her ability to follow the court’s instructions, and that she considered only the evidence presented and the court’s instructions. A.S. also stated that no one physically brought in a dictionary definition or stated such a definition.
The court then heard from juror C.J., who stated that another juror, J., looked up the definition, but did not state it. This occurred before the jury note was sent out. C.J. further stated that no outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially, or to follow the court’s instructions, and that he only considered the evidence presented and the court’s instructions.
The next juror, T.K., testified that due to some recent medication, taken subsequent to the trial because he was having trouble sleeping, his short-term memory had been affected, but the meaning of manslaughter "could have been said at one point." He stated no outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially, or to follow the court’s instructions and that he considered only the evidence presented and the instructions of the court.
Juror B.L. testified that one of the other jurors had looked up a definition in the dictionary, and that another juror said he was not supposed to do that. B.L. did not recall if the definition was actually relayed, but stated that if such a definition had been relayed, he would have ignored it. B.L. further stated that no outside information affected his ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror or affected his ability to follow the court’s instructions, and that he was able to consider only the evidence presented in the courtroom as well as the court’s instructions during deliberations.
The next juror, B.B., testified that during deliberations a juror indicated that he had looked up the definition of manslaughter, but the other jurors indicated they were not supposed to do that, and that was the last she heard on the matter. This occurred before the note was sent out. She further indicated that no outside information affected her ability to sit fairly and impartially or to follow the court’s instructions. She also indicated that she considered only the evidence presented in the courtroom and the court’s instructions.
The court next heard from juror M.G. She indicated that the definition came up before the note was sent out by the jury. During a discussion, one juror, J., mentioned that he looked up the definition of manslaughter, but was stopped before he relayed the actual definition. Another juror said that the jury was not to look up any definition, and the other jurors voiced their agreement. M.G. indicated that no outside information affected her ability to sit fairly and impartially or to follow the court’s instructions, and that she considered only the evidence presented and the court’s instructions. M.G. further stated that there was nothing about the deliberative process that prohibited her from fulfilling her duties fairly and impartially as a juror.
The next juror, G.C., testified that he heard another juror indicate that he had looked up the definition, but that juror was "shut down" immediately after he began to relay it. This occurred before the jury sent out its note. G.C. further stated that no outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially or to follow the court’s instructions. Finally, G.C. stated that he considered only the evidence presented in the courtroom and the court’s instructions.
Next, juror W.O. stated that one of the jurors "told me they’d ask about a dictionary and right away, the jurors said you’re not allowed to do that." He stated " ... I didn’t hear anything on that particular subject because we said we’re not allowed to do that, so that’s as far as that went." This occurred before the jury’s note was sent out. W.O. stated that no outside information affected his ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror or to follow the court’s instructions. W.O. further stated that he considered only the evidence presented and the court’s instructions in deliberating.
The court then heard from juror D.C. who stated he did not recall any discussion of a dictionary definition. D.C. indicated that no outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially, or affected his ability to follow the court’s instructions, and that he considered only the evidence presented in the courtroom and the court’s instructions.
Juror J.B. testified that he was the juror who had looked up the dictionary definition of manslaughter, after having a general idea of the definition of manslaughter. He indicated that he had looked up the definition because the court’s definition seemed inconsistent with his understanding of the term. He stated that he mentioned this to the other members of the jury, and that this occurred prior to the jury’s note.
The court then asked J.B. whether any outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially as a juror in the case. J.B. responded: "Yeah it did. I mean, the- it wasn’t the outcome I wanted, I could tell you that but I mean, it is what it is, I think." Seeking clarification, the court inquired if J.B. followed the court’s instructions after the note was sent out, to which he responded: "I did." The court again asked whether he considered information outside of the evidence in the courtroom and the court’s instructions, to which he responded: "I don’t- I don’t believe so," and began to discuss how the deliberations unfolded. When questioned about whether any outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially, J.B. responded: "No." The court then questioned whether any outside information affected his ability to follow the court’s instructions, J.B. responded: "No, I mean I don’t know. I believe I settled. That’s what I believed." Finally, the court asked J.B. whether he was able to consider and limit his consideration only to evidence in the case, as well as the court’s instructions, to which he responded: "Yes."
At the request of counsel, the court inquired further as to what materials J.B. actually looked at, to which he responded that he consulted a Webster’s Dictionary which defined manslaughter as "taking a man’s life without forethought and malice." He stated that this definition seemed inconsistent with the definition provided by the court, but confirmed what he thought. The court asked if he followed the court’s instructions to which he responded: "I mean, basically I did."
Lastly, the court heard from K.K, who testified that there was heated debate between two jurors concerning a dictionary definition of manslaughter, which led to the jury sending out the note. K.K. stated that outside information did not affect his ability to sit fairly and impartially as a juror, nor did any such information affect his ability to follow the court’s instructions. K.K. further indicated that he considered only the evidence presented in the courtroom, as well as the court’s instructions.
The defendant filed this motion for a new trial on September 25, 2018. The state filed an objection on October 1, 2018. Arguments were heard by the court on October 2, 2018.
II. DISCUSSION
The defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to Practice Book § 42-53(a), which provides: "Upon motion of the defendant, the judicial authority may grant a new trial if it is required in the interests of justice. Unless the defendant’s noncompliance with these rules or with other requirements of law bars his or her asserting the error, the judicial authority shall grant the motion: (1) For an error by reason of which the defendant is constitutionally entitled to a new trial; or (2) For any other error which the defendant can establish was materially injurious to him or her."
Juror misconduct can form the basis for a new trial because "[j]ury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution ... [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors." State v. Centeno, 259 Conn. 75, 81, 787 A.2d (2002). It is well established that "if the trial court is directly implicated in juror misconduct, the state bears the burden of proving that misconduct was harmless error ... If, however, the trial court is not at fault for the alleged juror misconduct, we have repeatedly held that a defendant who offers proof of juror misconduct bears the burden of proving that actual prejudice resulted from the misconduct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman, 320 Conn. 400, 408-09, 133 A.3d 441 (2016).
In his motion for new trial, the defendant contends that juror J.B.’s misconduct caused him prejudice, entitling him to a new trial. Specifically, the defendant argues that J.B. equivocated as to whether his improper conduct, the consulting of a dictionary, affected his ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror, and prejudice resulted because it was evident that the juror wanted a different outcome, potentially inconsistent with the instructions of the court. The defendant contends that this misconduct may have tainted other jurors. As such, the defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial.
In opposition, the state contends that even if misconduct occurred, it did not result in any prejudice to the defendant. The state asserts that the jurors have unanimously indicated that outside information did not affect their ability to be fair and impartial, or their ability to follow the court’s instructions, and that they relied only on the duly admitted evidence and the court’s instructions in deliberations. In light of this, the state contends the defendant’s motion must be denied.
As set forth in State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435-36, 773 A.2d 287, 293 (2001):
Consideration [by the jury] of extrinsic evidence is presumptively prejudicial because it implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury ... It is well established, however, that not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial ... [D]ue process seeks to assure a defendant a fair trial, not a perfect one ... [T]he constitution does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation ... [because] it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote ... The question is whether or not the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial ... The defendant has been prejudiced if the misbehavior is such to make it probable that the juror’s mind was influenced by it so as to render him or her an unfair and prejudicial juror ... Ultimately, however, [t]o succeed on a claim of [juror] bias the defendant must raise his contention of bias from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435-36, 773 A.2d 287, 293 (2001).
In a postverdict setting, as in the present case, our Supreme Court has held that any inquiry must be narrow. State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236, 262-63, 951 A.2d 1257 (2008); State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 436-37, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). Within this analysis:
a trial court may inquire about whether the members of the jury observed the situation, whether they discussed it during deliberations, and whether they, as individuals, arrived at a fixed opinion as to the situation such that they were unable to deliberate with open and impartial minds ... Beyond that, however ... a court may not tread. A court may not inquire as to [e]vidence of the actual effect of the extraneous matter upon juror’s minds because such evidence implicates their mental processes ... We conclude that once a verdict has been reached, the proper inquiry does not involve a determination of what conclusions the jurors actually drew but, rather, of whether the jurors were aware of or actually exposed to [extrinsic material], whether it affected their ability to be impartial and whether it was of such a nature that it probably rendered the jurors unfair or partial. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote removed; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236, 262-63, 951 A.2d 1257 (2008).
As to whether bias exists, our Supreme Court stated: "Potential juror bias is considered akin to other misconduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartiality ... With respect to allegations that a juror potentially may be biased, [e]ven where a juror has formed some preconceived opinion as to the guilt of an accused, a juror is sufficiently impartial if he or she can set aside that opinion and render a verdict based on evidence in the case ... It is enough if a juror is able to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the case on the evidence presented and the instructions given by the court ... While we recognize that a juror’s assurances that he or she is equal to the task are not dispositive of the rights of an accused ... we are aware of the broad discretion of a trial judge which includes his determination of the credibility to be given a juror’s statement in this context." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 318 Conn. 495, 507, 122 A.3d 542 (2015).
In the present case, the court finds that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial. In making this finding, the court considers the exposure to the information at issue, the effect it had, if any, on the jurors’ impartiality, and whether the information at issue is of such a nature that it probably rendered the jurors unfair or partial. See State v. Johnson, supra, 288 Conn. 262-63.
First, the court determines that exposure to a dictionary definition of "manslaughter" was exclusively limited to one juror. The facts as set forth above reflect that as soon as an outside definition was mentioned, any discussion of it was immediately halted and the jury sought clarification by sending the note to the court. Due to this limited exposure, any prejudicial effect is limited. See generally State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 622-23, 682 A.2d 972 (1996) (fact that one juror drove past crime scene did not warrant finding of prejudice); Williams v. Salamone, 192 Conn. 116, 123, 470 A.2d 694 (1984) (fact that one juror had consulted map to establish location of accident could reasonably be found to have no probable prejudicial effect). In view of the credible responses of all the jurors, there is no merit to the claim that the other jurors were somehow "tainted" by J.B.’s actions.
Second, in considering whether this information affected the jury’s ability to be impartial, the jurors’ assurances dispel any concern. Indeed, all of the jurors testified credibly to the effect that their impartiality remained unaffected by any potential exposure to the extrinsic dictionary definition. "A juror’s own statements that they can remain impartial even after being introduced to extrinsic evidence are to be given some weight." State v. Anderson, supra, 255 Conn. 446. One juror’s expression of frustration with the outcome does not amount to an inability to be fair and impartial, particularly where that juror affirmatively agreed with the verdict when polled. Moreover, upon clarification by the court, that juror responded "No" when questioned about whether any outside information affected his ability to be fair and impartial.
"The trial court’s assessment of the juror’s assurances, while entitled to deference, must be realistic and informed by inquiries adequate in the context of the case to ascertain the nature and import of any potential juror bias ... The inquiry need not, however, be lengthy, so long as the questions, viewed in the context of the juror’s answers, are adequate for the trial court to determine that the juror can indeed serve fairly and impartially ... The nature and quality of the juror’s assurances is of paramount importance; the juror must be unequivocal about his or her ability to be fair and impartial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 318 Conn. 495, 507, 122 A.3d 542 (2015).
The defendant references J.B.’s initial response to the court’s inquiry as to whether outside information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially, which was: "Yeah it did. I mean, the- it wasn’t the outcome I wanted, I could tell you that but I mean, it is what it is, I think." This answer, while evincing the juror’s frustration, was essentially nonresponsive inasmuch as the juror responded that it was not the outcome he wanted, but "it is what it is ..." The answer reflects his ultimate agreement with the verdict reached consistent with his answer when the jury was polled. Any questions of impartiality dissipate in light of J.B.’s subsequent answers. After this initial question, J.B. later indicated that he did not believe he considered any outside information, and that no such information affected his ability to sit fairly and impartially or to follow the court’s instructions. Specifically, as to whether he followed the court’s instructions, limiting his consideration to the definition provided by the court, J.B. responded: "I did." On this point, he later also stated "I mean, basically I did." Similarly, as to whether he was able to consider and limit his consideration only to the evidence as well as the court’s instructions, J.B. responded "Yes." Considering all of J.B.’s answers together as a whole, the court views this testimony as credible and is not inclined to disregard it as "inevitably suspect." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Newsome, supra, 238 Conn. 631. See also State v. Dixon, supra, 318 Conn. 507 (trial court’s assessment of juror assurances generally entitled to deference). Accordingly, because of the entire jury’s credible representations as to their impartiality, and "[i]n the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, [the court] must presume that the jury followed [the court’s] instruction." State v. Asherman, supra, 193 Conn. 737-38.
Lastly, the nature of the information was not of the sort to necessitate a conclusion of prejudice. As to the propriety of dictionary definitions, State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 736-38, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985), is instructive. There, a juror read a dictionary definition of "inference" to the rest of the jury during deliberations. Our Supreme Court required a demonstration of prejudice, stating: "the definition of words in our standard dictionaries is taken as a matter of common knowledge which the jury is supposed to possess ... Therefore the fact that one juror tells another juror what the other is supposed to know does not qualify to raise a presumption of prejudice. Prejudice must be demonstrated." (Citation omitted.) Id. at 737. Here, as distinguished from the facts in Asherman, the definition was not actually provided to the others as the juror was "shut down" when he began to discuss the dictionary definition. In Klingeman v. MacKay, 25 Conn.App. 217, 220, 594 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 910, 597 A.2d 333 (1991), a dictionary definition for the term "proximate cause" was found in the jury room after the verdict was returned. No prejudice was found to have been established where the trial court "gave a complete and adequate instruction concerning proximate cause, which it repeated when requested to do so by the jury." Id. Where five of six jurors were questioned and all stated that they agreed to follow the court’s definition, the court found that the jury’s use of the dictionary definition did not prejudice the plaintiff. Id. In this case, the court cannot conclude that prejudice resulted from a single juror being aware of a dictionary definition of the term "manslaughter," particularly in light of the fact that the utilization of that dictionary definition would be inconsistent with the actual verdict reached.
One juror was out of state. Klingeman v. MacKay, 25 Conn.App. 217, 219, 594 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 220 Conn . 910, 597 A.2d 333 (1991).
J.B. stated that the dictionary definition he saw defined "manslaughter" as "taking a man’s life without forethought and malice." The defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in that, under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of another. Thus, the jury applied a definition of manslaughter completely distinct from the definition referenced by J.B. See General Statutes § § 53a-55a(a) and 53a-55(a)(3).
The cases relied upon by the defendant, which purport to show that the use of a dictionary ipso facto impacts a juror’s decision-making, are inaposite. In United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 551 (11th Cir. 1994), although a dictionary was used in deliberations, and a conclusion of misconduct was made, the court specifically noted that "[s]tanding alone, the jury’s use of [a] dictionary would not warrant a new trial." In light of the fact of other misconduct, however, including the jury’s disregard of the court’s instructions, the court concluded that prejudice resulted. In the instant case, after J.B. informed others he had looked up the definition, the jurors "shut him down," sent out a note, received appropriate instructions and, according to their testimony, followed the court’s instructions.
In Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1987), as a result of the use of the dictionary, prejudice was actually demonstrated. Unlike this case, the juror who received the definition held out against a verdict of guilty of murder for nearly thirty days, but changed his vote to guilty shortly after receiving the definition. Id. State v. Holmes, 522 P.2d 900, 905 (Ore.App. 1974), is also inapplicable in that the court actually provided a dictionary to the jury over the objection of both parties. Under those circumstances, the reviewing court assumed prejudice flowed from that unauthorized material. In this case, the actions of the court are not implicated.
Where, as here, a single definition was looked up by one juror and the jury thereafter was instructed to use only the definition provided by the court, no prejudice has resulted. "Jurors are presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to follow the court’s instructions." Klingeman v. MacKay, 25 Conn.App. 217, 219, 594 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 910, 597 A.2d 333 (1991), citing State v. Rouleau, 204 Conn. 240, 254, 528 A.2d 343 (1987). In this case, the jurors all indicated, as set forth above, that they followed the court’s instructions.
In view of the limited nature of the exposure to extrinsic material, the jurors’ assurances of impartiality, and the instructions given to the jury after the material was obtained, the court concludes that no actual prejudice resulted from the conduct. State v. Roman, 320 Conn. 400, 408-09, 133 A.3d 441 (2016).
In light of the foregoing, the defendant’s motion for a new trial is denied.
It is SO ORDERED.