Opinion
NO. 2015 KA 0158
09-18-2015
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMICHAEL LASHAWN HUDSON
M. Bofill Duhe District Attorney Walter J. Senette, Jr. Assistant District Attorney Franklin, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks Abita Springs, LA Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, Jamichael Lashawn Hudson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the 16th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Mary State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2010-182637
Honorable James R. McClelland, Judge Presiding M. Bofill Duhe
District Attorney
Walter J. Senette, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
Franklin, LA
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Katherine M. Franks
Abita Springs, LA
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant,
Jamichael Lashawn Hudson
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND CRAIN, JJ. HIGGINBOTHAM
Defendant, Jamichael Lashawn Hudson, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of first degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30. Hudson entered a plea of not guilty on both counts, Hudson filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and, after a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. After a trial by jury, Hudson was found guilty of the responsive offense of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, on both counts. The trial court sentenced Hudson to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, on both counts, to be served concurrently. Hudson now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence, to the constitutionality of the sentences, and to the denial of a challenge for cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 4, 2010, officers of the Franklin City Police Department (FPD) were dispatched to a residence on a dead-end street at 6 Darce Lane in Franklin, Louisiana. FPD was called after the occupants of the home failed to respond to an attempted routine food delivery by Meals on Wheels. FPD patrol sergeant Cindy Viola, who responded to the call, realized that she actually knew the occupants of the home. Sergeant Viola suspected foul play, as the wood frame of the front door was visibly damaged and no one responded to knocks on the door and window. Sergeant Viola pushed the damaged front door open and initially observed a male subject, whom she recognized as Mr. Larry Guillory, lying in a pool of blood. From a distance, located further into the home, she observed another subject whose head was covered with a pillow. Sergeant Viola did not enter the residence at that time, but secured the scene and called for assistance.
According to the evidence presented during the trial, the murders in the instant case took place on February 3, 2010, the night before the police were summoned to the scene.
FPD detectives, including Detective Amy Guidroz, arrived on the scene and found there were two murder victims. Detectives began taking photographs of the victims and the scene. The detectives photographed the head injury of the first victim, Mr. Guillory, who had suffered large lacerations to his skull, forehead, and cheek. Detectives observed that one of the pockets of Mr. Guillory's coveralls had been turned inside out, so they collected the pocket as evidence. Mr. Guillory's wallet was located underneath his body, on the same side as the collected pocket. The second victim was identified as Ms. Audrey Picard. Detectives noted that Ms. Picard's lower extremities were initially visible, but the top portion of her body was covered with a blanket and a pillow. After removing the coverings, they observed and photographed Ms. Picard's injuries to her face and head that had left her facial features unrecognizable. The home was disheveled, and a lot of blood was splattered.
During the course of the investigation, the police canvassed the area, took statements, collected DNA samples, and ultimately formed suspects including Mr. Guillory's nineteen-year-old nephew, Randy Joseph. The police later learned that the defendant, Hudson, who was Joseph's fifteen-year-old cousin, had been with Joseph within the vicinity of the murder scene before and around the time of the murders. During an interview by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joseph admitted to his and Hudson's involvement in the offenses, but he limited their roles, indicating that they had waited outside of the victims' home during the preplanned robberies, and only went to the victims' home after the robberies did not go as planned. During a subsequent police interview, Hudson made statements consistent with Joseph, indicating that they went to the scene before and after the robbery and murders took place. Hudson specifically stated that the victims were still alive the first time they went to the residence that night, and that when they returned the door was slightly ajar and they saw the deceased victims.
While incarcerated, Joseph used the booking room phone to contact his girlfriend, Brooke Johnson, and Johnson conducted a three-way phone call with Hudson wherein Joseph informed Hudson of the "story" that he told to the police. The phone conversation was recorded.
The record contains two police interviews of Hudson, both in the presence of his mother, wherein he was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) at the beginning of the interviews.
The victim, Mr. Guillory was the major contributor to the DNA profile from his clothing pocket seized at the scene, but Hudson could not be excluded as a minor contributor to the DNA profile. Joseph could not be excluded as a minor contributor to one of the DNA profiles taken from Mr. Guillory's wallet. The cause of death as to both victims was blunt force trauma to the head with scalp lacerations, skull fractures, and hemorrhages to the brain. In pretrial statements, Joseph ultimately admitted that he and Hudson committed the robberies, implicated Hudson as the one who committed the murders, and pled guilty to both murders before the instant trial. At the trial, Joseph similarly admitted to committing the robberies and murders with Hudson.
An expert in DNA analysis, Bethany Harris of the Acadiana Crime Lab, testified that the percentage of the African American population that would be expected to be excluded as a contributor to the mixed profile is 99.997. Thus, approximately one in 33,000 of the African American population would be expected to be included.
Additional evidence included a cigarette pouch that was identified as belonging to the victim, Ms. Picard, and was located within the vicinity of Joseph's residence. Also, blood stains on Joseph's shorts matched Ms. Picard's blood sample.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In assignment of error number one, Hudson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized before a search warrant was obtained. Hudson notes that the United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that a "murder scene exception" applies to the Fourth Amendment warrant clause. In that regard, Hudson observes that Detective Guidroz admitted that she was instructed to collect evidence immediately after it was ascertained that both occupants of the residence were deceased. Hudson argues that there was no exigency to justify a search and seizure without a warrant under the circumstances and the police may not manufacture exigency to justify a search. Hudson contends that the trial court erred in accepting the State's argument that evidentiary items were at risk of being diminished due to water seeping through the front door due to rain. In that regard, Hudson specifically argues that closing the front door would have prevented seepage, and water trickled into the house when the door was left open by numerous investigators entering the home. Moreover, Hudson notes that none of the police officers testified that a warrant could not be applied for expeditiously. Finally, Hudson argues the trial court's conclusion that he had no privacy interest in the residence is not determinative of the issue.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Louisiana provides protection not only against unreasonable searches and seizures, but our Constitution explicitly protects against unreasonable invasions of privacy. La. Const. Art. I, § 5. A defendant may not assert the exclusionary rule unless his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, has been violated. Thus, if it is determined that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area invaded, neither a warrant nor an exception to the warrant requirement is needed for the seized evidence to be admissible. State v. Brumfield, 2005-2500 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/20/06), 944 So.2d 588, 592, writ denied, 2007-0213 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So.2d 353. The test by which a person's "expectation of privacy" is measured is twofold: first, the person must exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy and, second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id.
However, the Louisiana Constitution does not limit standing to challenge a search to those who live in the premises and thus have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 5 provides in pertinent part: "Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court." See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(A). There is no equivalent under Louisiana constitutional law to the federal rule that one may not raise the violation of a third person's constitutional rights. State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1205 (La. 1984).
The federal jurisprudential rule is that one has standing only if the search or seizure allegedly violated the defendant's own constitutional rights; and, the defendant's fourth amendment rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy rather than that of a third person. See U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85-86, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2549-50, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).
Generally, searches may be conducted only pursuant to a warrant which has been issued by a judge on the basis of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; La. Const. art. I, § 5; La. Code Crim. P. art. 162(A); U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07, 85 S.Ct. 741, 744-45, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). Searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. See State v. Warren, 2005-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1225-26. Warrantless searches will be allowed when police have a reasonable belief that exigent circumstances require immediate action and there is no time to secure a warrant. Id., 949 So.2d at 1224. To justify a warrantless entry, the exigent circumstances must be known to the officers "at the time of the warrantless entry" and cannot be based on evidence discovered during the search. Id. In order to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances, there must also be probable cause to enter the residence. Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. Id. This determination must be made from the totality of the circumstances, based on the objective facts known to the officer at the time. In determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless entry and search or seizure, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and the inherent necessities of the situation at the time. Further, the scope of the intrusion must be circumscribed by the exigencies that justified the warrantless search. Id. We note that the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed is an example of an exigent circumstance that would justify a warrantless entry. Id., 949 So.2d at 1224-25.
The State bears the burden of proof when a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D).
Exigent circumstances, however, do not meet Fourth Amendment standards if the government deliberately creates them. Warren, 949 So.2d 1225. The relevant focus is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed or removed before a warrant could be secured. Accordingly, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure when "police officers, acting on probable cause and in good faith, reasonably believe from the totality of the circumstances that (a) evidence or contraband will imminently be destroyed or (b) the nature of the crime or character of the suspect(s) pose a risk of danger to the arresting officers or third persons." The government bears the burden of showing specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent circumstances. Id.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress the evidence is entitled to great weight, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Jones, 2001-0908 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/02), 835 So.2d 703, 706, writ denied, 2002-2989 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So.2d 791. Correspondingly, when a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751. In evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, reviewing courts must undertake an objective assessment of an officer's action in light of the facts and circumstances then known to the officer. State v. Cooper, 2005-2070 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/06), 935 So.2d 194, 198, writ denied, 2006-1314 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 554. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the entire record, including the testimony presented at trial, may be considered. State v. Martin, 595 So.2d 592, 596 (La. 1992).
Regarding the motion to suppress the evidence, Officer Guidroz testified that at approximately 11:00 a.m., she was dispatched to the scene. Upon arrival, Officer Guidroz was greeted by Sergeant Viola, the initial officer on the scene. Officer Guidroz testified that after they walked onto the porch, they looked through the slightly ajar front door and observed a male subject and what appeared to be a female subject. The body of the male subject, Mr. Guillory, was located two and one-half to three feet away from the front door and was "obviously deceased." A lieutenant arrived on the scene and confirmed that the female subject, Ms. Picard, was also deceased. Thereafter, the scene was secured. The police knew the victims prior to the incident. According to Officer Guidroz, the residence belonged to Ms. Picard, and Mr. Guillory was her roommate or significant other.
A search warrant was sought and was signed at 2:12 p.m., however, some evidentiary items were recovered before the warrant was signed. Officer Guidroz explained that it had been raining for many hours prior to the police arrival on the scene, the house was old, and water was leaking from the porch area into the living room where the deceased victims were located. She added, "And there were certain items that we were concerned that would be, you know, lost if we didn't collect them immediately." A number of items were collected during the interim period before the search warrant was issued. The items included a black and yellow flashlight base recovered from the front porch, a DNA swab from blood observed on the threshold of the front door, the strike plate for the deadbolt to the front door located just inside the doorway on the living room floor (showing a forced entry), a flashlight lens (and other miscellaneous flashlight parts and a D cell battery), a burgundy and black wallet belonging to the male victim, Mr. Guillory, a lamp and lamp shade that was located across Mr. Guillory's leg and appeared to be part of the struggle, a stereo speaker, a gel-lifted footprint that appeared to be exiting the house and was located just inside the threshold of the living room,!and Mr. Guillory's front coverall pocket that was near the wallet and turned inside out was collected. Other evidentiary items were seized pursuant to the warrant.
On cross-examination, Officer Guidroz stated evidence was collected immediately because "everything was getting wet" and added, "water was starting to run into the living room." She further clarified that all of the items collected prior to the warrant being issued were located immediately inside the residence, just outside the door on the porch, and were possibly going to be destroyed by the weather. She stated that a judgment call was made due to the fact that it was still raining and that waiting for the warrant to be signed could have resulted in the destruction of the evidence. Once the items that were in danger of being compromised or destroyed were collected, the officers were instructed to discontinue the search until the warrant was signed.
We agree with the trial court's finding in this case that Hudson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the victims' residence. There is no showing that Hudson possessed any privacy interest at 6 Darce Lane; he did not reside there, was not an invited guest, and had no property there. See State v. Walker, 2006-1045 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So.2d 786, 790-91 (defendant had no objectively reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy when he retreated into the residence of a third person who had previously informed him that he was not allowed in her home); Terry v. Martin, 120 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1997) (temporary visitor with no connection to the premises other than criminal activity had no reasonable expectation of privacy and no standing to object to a search of the residence by police); State v. McKinney, 93-1425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/17/94), 637 So.2d 1120, 1126, writ denied, 97-1339 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So.2d 444 (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom where he was living because he lived there without the permission of the owner of the house). Thus, the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this case. See State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 557 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987); Brumfield, 944 So.2d at 593.
Regarding Hudson's potential standing under Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution (under the supposition that he has been adversely affected by the search of the victims' home), there must be an invasion of someone's rights to privacy before there can be an unreasonable search. See Perry, 502 So.2d at 558. It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people, not places. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). It is the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy that our society values and the constitution protects. Perry, 502 So.2d at 558. In this case, there was no living person who had a privacy interest in the house at 6 Darce Lane. While defendant relies on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) and Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (per curiam), those cases are distinguishable from the instant case.
In Mincey v. Arizona, the legitimacy of warrantless entries and searches involving law enforcement officers responding to persons they reasonably believed were in need of immediate aid was addressed. In Mincey, an undercover officer was shot and killed and the defendant was wounded during a narcotics raid at the defendant's apartment. Shortly after narcotic officers secured the scene, homicide detectives arrived and proceeded to conduct an exhaustive and intrusive four-day warrantless search of the apartment. The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not forfeit his expectation of privacy in his home where the shooting occurred, nor did his arrest lessen his right of privacy to justify the search of his home. The Court also found that the seriousness of the offense, alone, did not present exigent circumstances to justify the search, especially in the absence of a life or limb threatening emergency. Id., 437 U.S. at 393-94, 98 S.Ct. at 2413-14.
In Thompson v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that there was no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, and a search without a warrant was not permissible for the sole reason that a homicide has occurred on the premises. Thompson, 469 U.S. at 21, 105 S.Ct. at 411. Thompson was tried for the murder of her husband. Deputies were summoned to the house by the defendant's daughter, who reported a homicide. When the daughter admitted the deputies, they found the defendant unconscious and her husband dead of a gunshot wound. The defendant was transported to the hospital. Homicide investigators arrived thirty-five minutes later, entered the premises and searched the scene for two hours, locating incriminating evidence of the murder and attempted suicide. Id., 469 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. at 410.
In Mincey and Thompson, the defendant's home was searched. Herein, as stated, the entry of the house was not in violation of any living person's privacy interest. Moreover, while there is no general "murder scene exception" to the requirement for a search warrant, in Thompson and Mincey the Supreme Court recognized the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, which permits police officers to enter a building without a warrant if the officers reasonably believe the building contains people in need of assistance or that the perpetrator is still on the premises. See Thompson, 469 U.S. at 21, 105 S.Ct. at 411; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. The Court further noted that the seizure of evidence in plain view would be justified. Thompson, 469 U.S. at 22, 105 S.Ct. at 412; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413.
The burden of showing that the entry fell within the narrow confines of the emergency exception is on the State. State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073, 1076 (La. 1982).
Police may seize evidence under the plain view doctrine when: (1) there is prior justification for an intrusion into the protected area and (2) it is immediately apparent, without close inspection, that the items seized are evidence or contraband. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).
Herein, the officers had a duty to look into the home after being dispatched to the scene based on the report of a suspected forced entry and lack of response of the occupants. Before entering the home, the officers could see the victims, one obviously deceased and the other apparently deceased or injured. When the officers initially found both the deceased victims, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that a third person may be on the scene and pose a threat of harm. Further, we find exigent circumstances arose from the need to preserve evidence from destruction. There was no evidence or testimony to support Hudons's claim that the officers created or contributed to the exigency. During the course of legitimate emergency activities, the officers could seize evidence in plain view. The evidence seized at that time was near the area where the victims were located and the intrusion prior to the issuance of the warrant was limited and brief. Based on the foregoing conclusions, we find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress in this case. Assignment of error number one lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In the second assignment of error, Hudson contends that the life sentences without parole violate the U.S. Const. amend. VIII and La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson argues that the sentencing was arbitrarily imposed without recourse to objective standards governing the sentencing of a juvenile and without taking into account the sentencing factors mandated by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
Hudson notes that the trial court in this case considered the severity of the injuries to the two victims, stating that the injuries were the worst he had seen in his years in the district attorney's office and on the bench. Hudson argues, however, that neither victim was tortured or held in confinement, or suffered inhuman treatment for a period of time prior to their immediate deaths. Hudson further notes that the trial court considered, as presented by the State, his juvenile and incarceration records, which showed a downward spiral from the age of thirteen and a preference for life in the streets as opposed to home. In this regard, Hudson argues that his history of fighting and abysmal school record should not serve to make him within the category of the worst of youthful offenders. Hudson further notes that other than placement into alternative school, there did not appear to be any other services offered to control his anger or stabilize his home environment as his mother was dying of cancer. Hudson contends that the trial court, having the discretion to impose a sentence that included the possibility of parole, was without either objective criteria or sufficient information upon which to base the sentencing decision.
We note that the record before this Court does not contain a written motion to reconsider sentence; further, there was no objection after the sentencing. Failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the State or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review. La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(E). To the extent that Hudson is raising a general excessive sentence claim on appeal, such a claim is precluded. State v. Duncan, 94-1563 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/15/95), 667 So.2d 1141, 1143 (en banc per curiam). Nonetheless, in this case, Hudson invoked Miller at the sentencing hearing. Thus, this Court will address the Miller argument on appeal.
After a complete review of the record, including the transcript of the sentencing hearing, we find the trial court fully complied with the requirements set forth in Miller, as well as La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 and La. R.S. 15:574.4(E). In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders, finding instead that the sentencing court must first hold a hearing to consider mitigating factors, such as a defendant's youth and attendant characteristics, before imposing this severe penalty. Miller, 567 U.S. at —, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471 & 2475; see State v. Graham, 2011-2260 (La. 10/12/12), 99 So.3d 28, 29 (per curiam).
Citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), the Miller court stated that too great a risk of disproportionate punishment is created by making youth irrelevant to imposition of the harshest prison sentence. The Miller court further indicated that the Graham decision was sufficient to decide the case, and the Court did not consider the alternative argument that a categorical bar on life imprisonment without parole for juveniles was required. The Miller court further held that, although it was not foreclosing the sentencing court's ability to make that determination in homicide cases, it did require the trial court to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. Miller, 567 U.S. at —, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
After Miller was decided, the Louisiana legislature enacted La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 and La. R.S. 15:574.4(E), both of which provide procedural guidelines for parole eligibility regarding offenders who commit first or second degree murder when they are under eighteen years of age. In State v. Brown, 2012-0872 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 332, 335, the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that "the Miller holding permits the imposition of a life sentence without parole but only after an opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances."
Along with a victim impact statement, Hudson's juvenile record (including simple burglary and simple battery offenses), and Hudson's student record reflecting various discipline write-ups, the court further considered affidavits reflecting that while incarcerated, Hudson had been charged with aggravated second degree battery and simple battery for an incident that occurred in the law enforcement center. The defense attorney noted Hudson's youthfulness (fifteen years of age at the time of the offenses), lack of parental guidance or interference, the separation of his parents, the lack of evidence to show that Hudson himself inflicted the fatal injuries (noting that his cousin, Joseph, testified that he killed the victims), and the influence of Hudson's older (age nineteen at the time of the offenses) cousin. The defense attorney requested that the trial court recognize that Hudson could be rehabilitated and, pursuant to Miller, be spared a life sentence without parole.
As indicated in the bill of information, the defendant's date of birth is February 23, 1994. Thus, the offenses occurred before his sixteenth birthday.
Before imposing the sentences, the trial court noted that Joseph's testimony and various pretrial statements did not wholly indicate that he killed both victims alone. The trial court further remarked that Joseph only had Ms. Picard's blood on him, while Hudson's DNA was found on Mr. Guillory's coverall pocket. Before stating further factors, the trial court read the language of Article 878.1 (emphasizing that the article was adopted in response to Miller). The trial court noted that the case involved the worst injuries he had ever seen inflicted upon two victims, and stated in part, "[Ms.] Picard was bludgeoned so bad she didn't have a face left. You couldn't recognize her as a human being." The trial court further noted that Mr. Guillory had suffered massive head injuries, and "in fact his skull had been shattered and a large section of it had been displaced such that his brain was exposed." The trial court also stated that it would consider the mitigating circumstances that were argued, though not introduced as evidence.
Considering the trial court's careful review of the circumstances, and the nature of the crimes, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The trial court provided ample justification in imposing life sentences without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the sentences imposed are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and, therefore, are not unconstitutionally excessive. The second assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In the third assignment of error, Hudson contends that the trial court erred in failing to excuse potential juror, Deputy Christopher Lee Detiveaux, for cause during the voir dire, compelling the defense to use a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury. Hudson notes that Deputy Detiveaux appeared for jury duty in uniform, was actively employed by the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office, and candidly admitted that he knew the prosecutor and State witnesses from law enforcement and had worked with them on cases. Hudson further notes that while Deputy Detiveaux stated that he was capable of evaluating the testimony of law enforcement personnel as any other witnesses, he also believed that anyone he had ever arrested had committed a crime.
In an effort to distinguish this case from State v. Ballard, 97-0233 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/14/98), 718 So.2d 521 (en banc), affirmed, 98-2198 (La. 10/19/99), 747 So.2d 1077, Hudson notes that Deputy Detiveaux was employed in the same parish where the offense occurred, where the offense was prosecuted, and where the trial was held. Hudson acknowledges that most of the police officers were from the FPD, but he underscores that Deputy Jimmy Broussard, whom he contends was a key witness, was from the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office and assigned to FPD to regulate the processing of the scene. Hudson argues that the record does not support the prosecutor's assertion during voir dire that Deputy Detiveaux was not employed at the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office at the time of the offense, noting that the deputy did not specify whether he was working there in 2010. Hudson notes that he used all of his peremptory challenges.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797 provides, in pertinent part, that the State or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that the juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797(2). Further, a defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the grounds that the relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797(3).
A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Martin, 558 So.2d 654, 658 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 564 So.2d 318 (La. 1990). However, a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike jurors for cause is afforded broad discretion because of the court's ability to get a first-person impression of prospective jurors during voir dire. State v. Brown, 2005-1676 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/06), 935 So.2d 211, 214, writ denied, 2006-1586 (La. 1/8/07), 948 So.2d 121. The law does not require that a jury be composed of individuals who are totally unacquainted with the defendant, the prosecuting witness, the prosecuting attorney, and the witnesses who may testify at trial. Rather, the law requires that jurors be fair and unbiased. State v. Stewart, 2008-1265 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/26/09), 15 So.3d 276, 288, writ denied, 2009-1407 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So.3d 1003.
In Louisiana, prejudice is presumed when a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and the defendant ultimately exhausts his peremptory challenges. State v. Kang, 2002-2812 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 649, 651. This is because an erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. Kang, 859 So.2d at 652. To prove there has been an error warranting reversal of a conviction, a defendant need only show: (1) the trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all of his peremptory challenges. See Id.
Since the defendant in this case exhausted all twelve peremptory challenges, we need only consider the issue of whether the trial judge erroneously denied the defendant's challenge for cause contested herein. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 799.
When the prospective juror at issue in this case, Deputy Detiveaux, introduced himself, he indicated that he was an officer in the Warrants Division of the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office. Among other prospective jurors, when asked if anyone knew or had any connection with one of the parties of the case, Deputy Detiveaux responded positively. He also indicated that he knew the assistant district attorney, "from court." After the State's potential witness list was read, Deputy Detiveaux stated that he knew most of the people on the list, specifically, "[a]11 the law enforcement." He responded positively when asked if he had the ability to judge the testimony of law enforcement just as he would judge a lay witness that he did not know, fair and impartially to both the State and defense. Deputy Detiveaux was not among the prospective jurors who indicated that they were familiar with the events that led to the charges in the instant case. Further, Deputy Detiveaux was among the jurors who accepted the fact that people are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the prospective jurors indicated that they would evaluate the witnesses fairly without any preconceived notions, and would not give law enforcement officers any advantage over other witnesses.
When questioned by the defense attorney as to how long he had been a sheriff's deputy, Deputy Detiveaux stated that he had recently been re-hired by the Sheriff's office two years before the trial and had worked for the office for four years before his initial departure. Deputy Detiveaux explained that he served and executed arrest warrants as a part of his duties but he did not analyze evidence. He confirmed that he worked alone, executing most warrants by himself. When asked how he knew most of the officers who were potential witnesses in this case, Deputy Detiveaux responded, "I either knew them before, or just knew them from the department[,]" but Deputy Detiveaux could not recall the types of cases he worked on with any of them. He confirmed that he would be able to separate his police duties from any duty as a juror, and he would evaluate the evidence in this case to render a fair verdict.
Other officers on the panel included prospective juror, Willie Rack, a retired policeman from Franklin, and Daniel Dossett, a former police officer for thirty-one years who retired as Chief of Police in Morgan City. Dossett also knew the police officers who were potential witnesses, and his wife worked for the Morgan City Police Department. Dossett indicated that he read about the instant case in the newspaper. Rack was also among many prospective jurors who indicated that they knew the assistant district attorney and most of the potential witnesses. Rack retired as a criminal detective for the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office. When asked if he would believe a patrolman who said he believed a crime had been committed, Dossett responded, "Well certainly I wouldn't have any reason not to." When the defense attorney asked how many of the active and former police officers would believe a police officer over a non-police officer, Rack responded, "Well I guess that depends on what it's in reference to. Most policemen are trained ... . That's why I would go with the policeman until I investigate, but I would go on what he says." Dossett, on the other hand stated, "I suppose it would be in each individual instance, what the context was." In that regard, Deputy Detiveaux stated, "[E]very case is different, so you have to wait until you hear both sides to make your final decision."
Prospective juror Daniel Charpentier was a reserve officer. The defense did not challenge Charpentier, and the State ultimately exercised a backstrike to remove him from the jury. --------
Regarding statements under oath, however, Dossett stated, "I happen to believe an officer making a statement under oath is pretty much going to be truthful." After Rack agreed, Dossett added that he would probably lend more weight to an officer's testimony over a non-officer. In this regard, Deputy Detiveaux stated, "Just like any other time, if you catch them in a lie, then they lose their credibility. I mean officers are human too. The trial court subsequently instructed the prospective jurors that if they were selected as a juror, they must determine whether a fact has been proven and give witness testimony the credibility it deserves based on careful scrutiny. All of the prospective jurors indicated that they understood the instructions.
As the prospective jurors were further questioned by the defense attorney regarding the treatment of officer versus non-officer testimony, Deputy Detiveaux stated,
I mean everybody that's been sworn in is supposed to tell the truth. But, like you say, either way there are some people that might stretch the truth or not tell the whole truth. So I mean, both of them are credible until you figure out who's not and what's not ... . I want to hear everybody else, then make my decision then. There's three sides to every story ... . [Y]ou've got to pick out what's the truth.The officers, including Deputy Detiveaux, confirmed that they never arrested anyone who they did not believe committed a crime. None of the prospective jurors negatively alerted the defense attorney when asked if any of them believed Hudson committed a crime based on the fact that he was facing trial. The defense attorney further explained the State's burden of proof before the selection for the jury panel began.
The defense attorney challenged all three police officers for cause, and the trial court denied each challenge. As previously noted, Hudson only challenges the denial of Deputy Detiveaux on appeal. In challenging Deputy Detiveaux below, Hudson specifically argued as follows: "He indicated that he would take the credibility of a police officer over a non-officer as well as he believes that he would be impartial." While Hudson correctly notes that the State indicated that Deputy Detiveaux did not work in the Sheriff's Office at the time of the offense, the State also noted that the deputy stated that he would fairly weigh and evaluate the credibility of witnesses and not give more weight to the testimony of a police officer. The trial court agreed with the State's assessment.
A juror's association with law enforcement agencies or personnel will not alone disqualify him from service. Even where a prospective juror's affiliations raise an issue regarding his ability to be impartial, if, after voir dire examination, the trial court is satisfied the prospective juror can render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence, it is the trial court's duty to deny the challenge for cause. The fact that a prospective juror is "friends" with, or related to, law enforcement officials or the district attorney is not grounds for automatic exclusion for cause. State v. Manning, 2003-1982 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044, 1078, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 1745, 161 L.Ed.2d 612 (2005).
In Ballard, 718 So.2d at 527, the defendant argued that a police officer cannot serve as an impartial juror, relying in part on the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980). This Court convened an en banc panel in Ballard to reconsider older jurisprudence that relied on Simmons. The majority of this Court determined as follows:
Although Simmons broadly states "an actively employed criminal deputy sheriff is not a competent criminal juror" and that "[a]ny jurisprudence to the contrary is expressly overruled," it is evident from the authority relied upon that the holding presumes the actively employed criminal deputy sheriff who is a potential juror be from and work within the same jurisdiction as the complaining witness for the prosecution. In other words, it was the master-servant (i.e., the employer-employee) relationship between the potential juror and the prosecution's complaining witness (the sheriff of Caddo Parish, the same parish in which defendant was being tried) that established the presence of bias. [Citation omitted.]Ballard, 718 So.2d at 526. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in Ballard and unanimously overruled Simmons, holding that if a law enforcement officer indicates during voir dire that he can be an impartial juror, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether or not a cause challenge is warranted. Ballard, 747 So.2d at 1080. Considering the well-established jurisprudence on this issue, it is now clear that the fitness of a prospective juror, including an actively employed law enforcement officer, should rightly be determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of the grounds to support a challenge for cause set forth in La. Code Crim. P. art. 797. Manning, 885 So.2d at 1080; Ballard, 747 So.2d at 1080.
Herein, there is no indication that Deputy Detiveaux was either not impartial or pro-prosecution merely by virtue of his status as an active police officer or any relationship with law enforcement officials or the district attorney. As indicated above, a trial court's ruling on whether to seat or reject a juror for cause will not be disturbed unless a review of the voir dire as a whole indicates an abuse of the great discretion accorded to the trial court. Martin, 558 So.2d at 658. Thus, only where it appears, upon review of the voir dire examination as a whole, that the trial court's exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, resulting in prejudice to the accused, will the ruling of the trial court be reversed. See State v. Lee, 93-2810 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 102, 108. If a prospective juror is able, after examination by counsel, to declare to the court's reasonable satisfaction that he is able to render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence, it is the trial court's duty to deny a challenge for cause. See State v. Claiborne, 397 So.2d 486, 489 (La. 1981).
Potential juror Deputy Detiveaux's responses as a whole clearly indicated an ability to be fair and unbiased and render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence. Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court under the circumstances of this case. Having failed to establish bias on the part of Deputy Detiveaux, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Hudson's challenge for cause of prospective juror Deputy Detiveaux. Assignment of error number three is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, we find no merit in the assignments of error raised by the defendant, Jamichael Lashawn Hudson. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.