Opinion
No. 5-584 / 04-1698
Filed August 31, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon Fister and K.D. Briner, Judges.
Walter Junior Hoskins, III appeals the order of the district court denying his motion to suppress. He also argues trial counsel was ineffective. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
Walter Junior Hoskins, III appeals the order of the district court denying his motion to suppress. He also argues trial counsel was ineffective. First, he contends that the district court failed to suppress evidence obtained in an illegal search of his vehicle. Second, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing both to request the disclosure of a confidential police informant and to make a specific objection to the sufficiency of the state's evidence. We reverse the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and, therefore, do not reach the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Officers arrested Hoskins as the result of a tip by a confidential police informant. Early on September 5, 2003, Waterloo Police Department Sergeant Mark Meyer received information from a confidential paid informant who claimed to have seen Hoskins in possession of crack cocaine. Sergeant Meyer knew that Hoskins had been arrested and convicted for several previous drug offenses. The informant gave Sergeant Meyer three pieces of information: (1) Hoskins was located in a particular downtown bar; (2) Hoskins's vehicle was parked outside the bar; and (3) Hoskins had cocaine on his person. The informant is well known to Sergeant Meyer, and has provided the police with information many times in the past.
As a result of the tip, Sergeant Meyer sent officers to the bar. The officers did not enter the bar, but did observe Hoskins's vehicle parked outside. When Hoskins left the bar with a passenger, the officers followed, stopping him after they saw him drive through a red light. Hoskins consented to a search of his person. At that time, Hoskins was not under arrest, and officers had neither found contraband on him nor seen any inside the vehicle. Hoskins refused to allow a search of his vehicle. After finding that a K-9 unit was temporarily unavailable, Sergeant Meyer instructed the officers to proceed with a search of Hoskins's vehicle. Folded inside a white towel under the driver's seat, the officers found two plastic bags each containing smaller plastic bags. Nine of the smaller bags contained rocks of crack cocaine while ten contained powder cocaine. The officers then arrested Hoskins and took him to the police station.
On October 17, 2003, Hoskins was charged by trial information with possession of cocaine. On August 19, 2004, the information was amended to charge Hoskins with Count I: possession of a controlled substance, cocaine base with the intent to deliver and being a second offender and an habitual offender, a class C felony; and Count II: possession of a controlled substance, salt of cocaine with the intent to deliver and being a second offender and an habitual offender, a class C felony, both counts in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c), 124.411, 902.8, and 902.9 (2003). Prior to trial, Hoskins submitted a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the police search of his vehicle. The motion was overruled by the district court. A jury trial commenced on August 24, 2004. The jury found Hoskins guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to thirty years on each count on October 18, 2004. Hoskins appeals.
II. Merits
A. Motion to Suppress
We review alleged constitutional violations de novo. State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2005). We are to evaluate the totality of the circumstances found in the record, including evidence from both the suppression hearing and the trial. Id.; State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2003). We look to all of the evidence combined, "regardless of whether or not each component would support a finding of probable cause." State v. Maddox, 670 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Iowa 2003). Deference is given to the credibility determinations of the district court, but we are not bound by their findings. State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004).
The constitutional reasonableness of a search is determined by an objective standard. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280-81 (Iowa 2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n. 2 (Iowa 2001). Probable cause exists where the facts are sufficient to support a prudent person's belief that "contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983). In reviewing a law enforcement officer's determination of probable cause, we are to "look to the totality of the circumstances and `give due weight to the inferences that can be drawn from the officer's general experience.'" United States v. Wilson, 964 F.2d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986)).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 281. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090. Evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is inadmissible. State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Iowa 2005). We have found no distinction between the protections offered by the two provisions with regard to the facts of this case, and therefore the discussion of the merits of Hoskins's motion to suppress are applicable under both state and federal grounds. See Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82.
Hoskins argues that both the initial stop and the subsequent search of his vehicle were unlawful. We conclude the initial stop of his vehicle was proper. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996). Officers observed Hoskins driving through a red light, a clear traffic violation. This violation alone provided officers with enough probable cause to stop his vehicle. Id.
Following the stop of a motor vehicle, additional probable cause must exist to search that vehicle. The courts have recognized that automobiles may be searched without a warrant under circumstances that would not allow such a search of a home or office. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-50, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1979-80, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 426 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543, 541 (1925). For a warrantless search of a vehicle to be justified, the facts must be sufficient to support probable cause. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 988, 940, 518 S. Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031, 1036 (1996) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more."); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2013-14, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442, 445 (1999) (finding the automobile exception requires no further exigency requirement as long as the facts are sufficient to support probable cause); Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 38 (upholding warrantless search of vehicle).
This is admittedly a close case. We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine probable cause, and in this case, find ourselves wanting more. Both Hoskins's history of drug convictions and the informant's history of reliability certainly weigh in favor of probable cause. The problem, however, is with the tip itself. The only information the informant gave police was that (1) Hoskins was in a bar; (2) his vehicle was parked outside; and (3) he had cocaine on his person. The informant's statement to Sergeant Meyer is largely conclusory. The informant gave the police no information, innocuous or otherwise, that they could use to corroborate the reliability of this particular tip. Once again, the informant simply told Sergeant Meyer that Hoskins was in the bar, his vehicle was parked outside, and he had cocaine on his person. Specifically, Sergeant Meyer testified at the suppression hearing as follows:
Q. And what information did you obtain regarding Walter Hoskins at that time? A. That Walter Hoskins was in the Uptown Lounge in the 500 block of Mulberry, that he had driven his car there, or the one that he was driving, which was a silver Mercury Grand Marquis, I think the plate on it is 629 MCY, that he would be — that he drove up to the — to the bar there that night in that car and that the car was parked out front.
. . . .
Q. Did the confidential informant give any further information regarding narcotics and Walter Hoskins that night? A. The informant just advised that Walter Hoskins had crack cocaine on his person that he had for sale and that he was in the bar that night.
Additionally, on cross-examination, Sergeant Meyer was asked if the informant observed a sale. Sergeant Meyer testified:
I don't specifically know if I asked the person. The information I got, that the person had seen Mr. Hoskins with the stuff. Now, whether he had the — the dope out looking at it or whether he was makin' a sale, I don't know.
It is clear from the record the informant gave no specific details about the cocaine. It is also clear the informant never advised police that he observed Hoskins selling the drugs. We have already concluded above that the initial stop of Hoskins's vehicle was proper. Thus, the crucial issue before us is whether the warrantless search of Hoskins's vehicle was supported by probable cause. The only information corroborated by law enforcement prior to the search of Hoskins's vehicle was that (1) he was present at the Uptown Lounge and (2) his vehicle was parked outside. There was no independent corroboration of Hoskins's possession of cocaine because the officers never entered the bar. Following the traffic stop, Hoskins was searched and no drugs were located on his person, in contravention of what the informant told Sergeant Meyer. Officers discussed employing a K-9 unit, but discovered that such a unit was unavailable. In addition, the officers did not seek issuance of a search warrant. Instead, Sergeant Meyer authorized the search of Hoskins's vehicle. In discussing his authorization for the search, Sergeant Meyer testified at the suppression hearing as follows:
Trial testimony indicates that a large sum of money was seized from Hoskins after his arrest. The officers who searched Hoskins at the scene made no mention of any money found on his person. Therefore, the money may not be used to bolster probable cause to search Hoskins's vehicle.
It was based upon they had searched Mr. Hoskins and hadn't located anything on him, he'd refused consent to search the car, and I advised him with the reliable information that I'd received from the confidential informant to go ahead and search the vehicle.
As stated above, we find ourselves wanting more. The state argues the totality of the circumstances allows an inference of probable cause based solely on the informant's tip and Sergeant Meyer's knowledge of Hoskins's criminal history, citing State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 1996). We disagree. In Randle, law enforcement had several citizen complaints concerning crack sales at the location to be searched. In addition, law enforcement conducted "controlled buys" at the address using the informant. Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 670.
We conclude there was insufficient probable cause to uphold the search of Hoskins's vehicle.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Based upon our ruling with respect to the motion to suppress, we do not reach Hoskins's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.