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relying on Griffin and stating “[i]f the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt under any one of the theories instructed, the jurors are presumed to have relied on that theory”
Summary of this case from State v. ThorndikeOpinion
No. 2-666 / 01-1764.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, MARK D. CLEVE, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and conviction entered following a trial and jury verdicts of guilty of the offenses of first-degree murder, willful injury, domestic assault with injury, and obstruction of emergency communications. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Jerald Feuerbach, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and VAITHESWARAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
The defendant-appellant, Michael Eugene Horlas, attacked his father, who later died. Defendant appeals from the judgment and conviction entered following a trial and jury verdicts of guilty of the offenses of first-degree murder, willful injury, domestic assault with injury, and obstruction of emergency communications. He claims there was insufficient evidence to support the first degree murder and willful injury convictions. We affirm.
Background facts and proceedings
On December 18, 2000 defendant and his mother, Clara, went to the grocery store while William, his seventy-nine year old father, stayed home. After they returned Clara went to the living room and began crocheting. William was in the living room watching television. Defendant went outside to try to free his vehicle from a snow bank. When defendant came back inside, he went to the kitchen and began making a sandwich. Clara looked at him. Defendant responded by saying,"What are you looking at?" She responded, "Mike," and he "flew off the handle," knocking everything off of the kitchen table.
Defendant entered the living room, jumped at his father, and started to hit him while he was in the chair. Defendant struck William several times in the face and head with his fists. William put his hands and arms up in front of his face to protect himself, but could not get out of his chair. Clara got out of her chair and covered William with her body to protect him. Defendant struck her several times as he attempted to hit his father. He also tried to pull Clara off of William. Clara told him to stop. Defendant stopped, then began kicking the television and VCR.
Clara tried to use the telephone near her chair to call for help, but defendant yanked the cord out of the wall. Clara went into her bedroom and attempted to use the telephone there, but defendant again took the telephone from her and ripped it from the wall. Clara went to the porch, put on her coat, and went to a neighbor's house, where the neighbor dialed the police for her.
Clara returned home after the police arrived. They found William still in his chair with severe facial wounds, including bleeding and swollen eyes. Despite his injuries, William refused hospitalization. There was extensive damage to the furnishings and decorations in the house. Pictures had been knocked off of the walls; the kitchen table had been overturned and broken, all items on the dresser in the bedroom had been knocked off, the end tables in the living room had been destroyed, and William's walker was broken.
On December 20 William woke up feeling ill at 3:00 a.m. By 6:00 a.m., Clara knew something was seriously wrong. Paramedics took William to a local hospital. He was transferred to the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa City, where he died on January 12, 2001. An autopsy revealed the cause of death to be subdural hematoma from multiple blunt force blows to William's head.
District court proceedings
After his attack on his father, police arrested defendant and charged him with willful injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4 (1999), domestic assault with injury, in violation of section 708.2A(2)(b), and obstruction of emergency communication, in violation of section 727.5. After William's death, the State amended the trial information to add first-degree murder, in violation of section 707.2. Defendant gave notice of defenses of insanity and diminished responsibility.
After a jury trial the court instructed the jurors they could find defendant guilty if they found (1) he killed his father with malice aforethought, and (2) he (a) acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with a specific intent to kill, or (b) was participating in the offense of willful injury or assault causing serious injury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. Defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the willful injury and murder counts, arguing the State had failed to prove he had a specific intent to cause serious injury as required by section 708.4 or that he had acted deliberately, willfully, and premeditatedly with malice aforethought as required by sections 707.1 and 707.2 of the Iowa Code. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict on those counts. The court subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment on the first-degree murder conviction. The willful injury conviction merged into the murder conviction. Defendant received thirty-day sentences for the domestic assault with injury and obstruction of emergency communication convictions, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. He appeals.
Claim on appeal
Defendant asserts the State failed to present evidence to establish the acts he committed were done with malice aforethought or that he had acted deliberately and with premeditation. He argues he "exploded into a fit of violence and rage." He also argues there is no evidence he "had a fixed purpose to cause harm to his father until the instance of the attack itself."
Scope of review
Our review is for correction of errors of law. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 2001). A jury's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the finding. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001). Substantial evidence is evidence which could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, but consider all the evidence, not just the evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997). If the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt under any one of the theories instructed, the jurors are presumed to have relied on that theory and the evidence will be held sufficient to support the conviction. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-50, 59, 112 S.Ct. 466, 469, 474, 116 L.Ed.2d 371, 376-77, 382-83 (1991). The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime and must do more than raise suspicion, speculation, or conjecture. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002).
Discussion
Malice aforethought. First degree murder requires proof of malice aforethought (either express or implied) under any theory. Iowa Code §§ 707.1, 707.2. It also is a necessary element of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. Iowa Code § 707.1; State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993). It is "a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which exists prior to the act committed." State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 2000). Although malice need not exist for any specific period of time; it is sufficient if it existed for any time before the killing. Id, at 530. Defendant contends the evidence only supports a finding he "exploded into a fit of violence and rage," not that he had a fixed purpose to harm his father before the actual attack.
Malice may be inferred from the manner in which the crime was committed. State v. Berry, 549 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). The State suggests "the fact that the defendant struck the victim with his fists may be evidence of malice," citing State v. Baratta, 242 Iowa 1308, 1310-12, 49 N.W.2d 866, 868-69 (1951). However, Baratta cites to previous decisions concerning second-degree murder, and which involved other circumstances such as death threats or returning to a quarrel after departing. Id. at 242 Iowa 1313-14, 49 N.W.2d at 869-70. Although malice may be inferred from the use of a weapon, neither side argues defendant's fists were dangerous weapons. State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1986); cf. State v. Heinz, 223 Iowa 1241, 1259, 275 N.W. 10, 21 (1937) ("The hands and fists of the defendant violently used to strangle and beat to death this six-year-old child constituted an instrument likely to produce death and were dangerous weapons."). The State argues multiple blows is evidence of malice. See State v. Poyner, 306 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1981). It also points to malice as a permissible inference from the commission of a felony that results in death. State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 39 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). The jury found defendant guilty of willful injury, a felony.
Although the evidence could support a finding defendant "exploded into a fit of violence and rage," substantial evidence also supports the findings the jury actually made. "If a rational trier of fact could conceivably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is substantial." State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000). Substantial evidence exists in the record from which the jury could infer the requisite malice aforethought.
Premeditation and deliberation. Premeditation and deliberation are elements of first-degree murder under the theory of premeditated murder. Iowa Code § 707.2(1). To premeditate is to think or ponder upon such a matter before acting. State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975). To deliberate is to weigh in one's mind or to consider. Id. Like malice aforethought, premeditation need not exist for a specific period of time prior to the act. State v. Wilkins, 346 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1984).
Deliberation and premeditation may be shown by circumstantial evidence in one or more of three ways: (1) evidence of planning activity of the defendant which was directed toward the killing; (2) evidence of motive which might be inferred from entire relationships between defendant and victim; and (3) evidence regarding the nature of the killing.
State v. Khouri, 503 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Wilkins, 346 N.W.2d at 20). Defendant argues numbers one and two may be dismissed quickly because the record contains no evidence of planning or motive. The State focuses on the "appreciable" period of time it took defendant to move from the kitchen to the living room as "sufficient opportunity [for defendant] to weigh in his mind, contemplate, and consider the consequences" before attacking his father. See Wilkins, 346 N.W.2d at 20. In contrast, defendant describes the attack as a
"bizarre, impromptu act . . . while Michael Horlas was consumed with incoherent rage and passion." In Khouri, the defendant used a deadly weapon and "spent considerable time parked outside the [victim's] apartment." Neither circumstance is present here. Defendant asks the court to reverse and remand with instructions to enter a conviction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
Jury instruction 30 provided alternatives to the jury taken from Iowa Code section 707.2:
The defendant either:
(a) acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with a specific intent to kill William Horlas; or
(b) was participating in the offense of Willful Injury or the offense of Assault Causing Serious Injury to William Horlas.
Based on the general verdict form used by the jury, we cannot determine which alternative the jury used, but his conviction for willful injury satisfies the requirements of the latter alternative. If the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt under any one of the theories instructed, the jurors are presumed to have relied on that theory. See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49-50, 59, 112 S.Ct. at 469, 474, 116 L.Ed.2d at 376, 383 (1991). Deliberation and premeditation are not elements of willful injury. Iowa Code § 708.4. From the evidence adduced at trial, a reasonable jury could find defendant committed the offense of willful injury. A jury may presume a person intends the natural consequences of his act. State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1998). Finding defendant guilty of willful injury satisfies the requirements of the latter alternative of instruction 30 and supports his conviction for first-degree murder.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supports the first-degree murder and willful injury convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.