Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0525-PR
04-10-2014
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER WALTON HOPTON, Petitioner.
Christopher Hopton, Eloy In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2009168514001SE
The Honorable John R. Hannah Jr., Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Christopher Hopton, Eloy
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Espinosa concurred. ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner Christopher Hopton was convicted of two counts of attempted molestation of a child, a dangerous crime against children. In March 2010, the trial court sentenced him to a ten-year prison term to be followed by lifetime probation. More than two years later, Hopton filed a pro se notice of and a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., and also filed, inter alia, motions to vacate his convictions and leave to file a delayed notice of appeal. The court summarily denied post-conviction relief as well as Hopton's motions, and also denied what it deemed a motion for rehearing.This petition for review followed. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court clearly abused its discretion. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). We find no such abuse.
Hopton filed a "Response to Minute Entry/Orders Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief/Petition for Review," which the trial court treated as a motion for rehearing.
¶2 In his ninety-nine page petition for post-conviction relief, Hopton raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and maintained that his sentence, which was set forth in detail in the written plea agreement and explained to him by the court at the change-of-plea hearing, was excessive. Hopton also asserted claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct, and suggested there were defects in the grand jury and indictment proceedings.
¶3 In a document attached to his Rule 32 notice, entitled "Reason for Untimely Appeal," Hopton stated that when he had contacted trial counsel in June 2010, just before the ninety-day deadline to file the notice of post-conviction relief, he was "unaware" of the ninety-day filing requirement and "was under the impression defense counsel had filed a Direct Appeal." Notably, Hopton made this assertion despite having signed in March 2010 a form entitled "Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure." This document indicated he had received a copy of the notice, which alerted him that he was not entitled to a direct appeal and expressly informed him of the Rule 32 deadline.
¶4 The trial court summarily denied relief, finding Hopton's notice untimely and concluding that the claims he had raised were, in any event, without merit, specifically noting he had not challenged whether his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See State v. Quick, 177 Ariz. 314, 316, 868 P.2d 327, 329 (App. 1993) (by entering guilty plea defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those relating to validity of plea). The court also denied Hopton's motions to vacate his convictions and for leave to file a delayed notice of appeal.
Although Hopton marked a box in the petition for post-conviction relief form indicating he is eligible for relief, inter alia, based on "[a]n unlawfully induced plea of guilty," he did not avow to this fact in the affidavit he attached as an exhibit to his petition, nor did he present meaningful arguments to support such a claim.
¶5 On review, Hopton argues "he is entitled to the relief requested in his petition for post[-]conviction relief, as well as the motions and or requests submitted with the petition." He asserts counsel was ineffective, the state conceded error by failing to respond to the petition, and his sentence was imposed by "illegal means." We conclude the trial court thoroughly and correctly analyzed Hopton's claims, properly found his notice untimely, and correctly dismissed his other motions; there is no need to repeat that analysis here in its entirety, and we therefore adopt that portion of the court's minute entry in which it found Hopton's notice untimely and denied all of his motions. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993) (recognizing circumstances when "[n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court's correct ruling in a written decision").
Although the trial court mistakenly referred to Hopton's convictions as class two rather than class three felonies in its ruling denying post-conviction relief, it is clear from the record this is a typographical error.
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¶6 We further observe that on review, Hopton raises arguments suggesting he mistakenly believes he is entitled to a direct appeal. However, as the trial court correctly found, as a pleading defendant he waived the right to appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e) (pleading defendant "may seek review only by filing a petition for post-conviction relief"). We also note that, although the court reviewed Hopton's claims on the merits, it was not required to do so in light of his untimely notice. Therefore, to the extent he argues on review that the state's failure to file a response to his petition constituted a confession of error and thus requests we review "all issues" and correct "all mistakes of law and procedure," we decline to do so.
¶7 Therefore, we grant the petition for review, but deny relief.