Opinion
No. 2-417 / 01-0270
Filed August 28, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, James Blomgren and Phillip Collett, Judges.
David Hill appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance and three counts of possession of a precursor with the intent to manufacture.
AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria Siegel, County Attorney, and Ed Harvey, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Hecht, JJ.
David Hill appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance and three counts of possession of a precursor with the intent to manufacture in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999) and 124.401(4) (Supp. 1999). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
Hill was arrested and charged with these offenses following a routine traffic stop and search of the car he was driving. Prior to trial Hill moved to suppress evidence, claiming the warrantless search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Hill challenged the existence of probable cause supporting both the stop and subsequent search of his car. The State resisted, citing the arresting officer's knowledge that Hill's driver's license was suspended as probable cause for stopping Hill. The State also argued that the resulting warrantless vehicle search was validly made as an incident to Hill's arrest. The State further argued that the toxic smells emanating from the inside of Hill's car and the need to inventory its contents provided additional and independent cause for the search.
The district court determined the warrantless search of Hill's car was valid because it was made incident to a lawful arrest. Citing this determination, the court found it unnecessary to address the State's exigent circumstances and inventory theories. Hill's motion was overruled, and he was subsequently convicted of the crimes earlier referred to resulting in this appeal.
On appeal Hill does not challenge the validity of the stop of his vehicle or his initial arrest for driving while suspended. Rather, he argues that the search of his car was not a valid search incident to arrest because it was not conducted contemporaneously with his arrest. Hill also argues that the search could not be justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because there was no probable cause to believe any offense necessitating the search had been committed. Finally, Hill contends that the vehicle inventory search exception also does not apply because police did not have statutory authority to seize and impound his vehicle.
II. Scope of Review .
Because the issues raised implicate Hill's constitutional rights, our review is de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
III. The Merits .
It is well settled that when a police officer "has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Iowa 1981) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 774 (1981)); see also State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Iowa 1996) ("when a valid custodial arrest occurs, a search incident to arrest is automatically permissible."). The contemporaneous element may be fulfilled even if the arrestee has been taken from a vehicle and handcuffed. State v. Derifield, 467 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). The underlying rationale for this exception includes the need to disarm the person arrested as well as preservation of evidence. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116, 119 S.Ct. 484, 487, 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 498 (1998) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 439-40 (1973)). This authority to conduct a "full field search" as an incident to arrest, including an automobile search, does not depend, however, on the presence of either concern. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118, 119 S.Ct. at 488, 142 L.Ed.2d at 499.
The relevant record indicates that Hill got out of his car after it was stopped and locked the doors, leaving the keys in the ignition. The resulting one to one and a half hour delay between his arrest and search of the car was attributable to the time necessary to secure the assistance necessary to open Hill's car. Hill contends this delay and his removal from any access to the car defeats the necessity for a warrantless search. Neither of the search incident to arrest exception's underlying rationales (safety and preservation of evidence) is, he argues, implicated under these circumstances.
We find no merit in Hill's argument. The fact-based analysis required to resolve the contemporaneousness issue he raises is exactly that which the court rejected in Belton as incompatible with the application of this bright line rule. Moreover, Hill's argument is irreconcilable with our court's decision in State v. Derifield noting the established principle allowing a warrantless automobile search under this exception after the defendant was handcuffed and removed from his car. Derifield, 467 N.W.2d at 299. The district court correctly applied the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and we accordingly affirm on this issue.
Because the foregoing is dispositive, we need not address the remaining issues raised on appeal.
AFFIRMED.