State v. Hill

Full title: THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HILL, APPELLANT

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Apr 16, 1997

78 Ohio St. 3d 174 (Ohio 1997)

677 N.E.2d 337

Opinion

No. 96-2370

Submitted March 4, 1997 —

Decided April 16, 1997.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-920497.

Appellant, Jeffrey D. Hill, was convicted of the aggravated murder of his mother and sentenced to death. He was also sentenced to prison terms for several associated felonies. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. State v. Hill (Dec. 22, 1993), Hamilton App. No. C-920497, unreported, 1993 WL 538902. On direct appeal as of right, we also affirmed. State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 653 N.E.2d 271, certiorari denied Hill v. Ohio (1996), 516 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 788, 133 L.Ed.2d 738. Subsequently, we issued a stay of execution to allow Hill to file a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Hill (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 1428, 667 N.E.2d 412.

On or about July 2, 1996, Hill filed an application for reopening with the court of appeals pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel before that court. The court of appeals noted that Hill's application was untimely under App.R. 26(B) for not having been filed within ninety days from the journalization of the decision of the court of appeals.

Hill argued before the court of appeals that good cause existed for the late filing because one attorney, who represented him initially before the court of appeals on his direct appeal, also represented him in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The court of appeals, however, noted that another attorney who also represented Hill before the Supreme Court on direct appeal had not represented him before the court of appeals. Further, Hill had already raised in his appeal to the Supreme Court his claim of alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel before the court of appeals. Thus, the court of appeals found no good cause for the late filing and denied Hill's application for reopening the appeal. Hill now appeals that decision to this court.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Gary W. Crim, for appellant.

Per Curiam.

We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals for the reasons stated in its journal entry, which is appended hereto.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

ENTRY DENYING APPLICATION FOR REOPENING.

State v. Hill State v. Williams 74 Ohio St.3d 454 455 659 N.E.2d 1253 1254 res judicata State v. Murnahan 63 Ohio St.3d 60 66 584 N.E.2d 1204 STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. JEFFREY D. HILL, Defendant-Appellant. No. C-920497 This cause came on to be considered upon the application of defendant-appellant Jeffrey D. Hill for reopening the appeal wherein judgment was entered by this court in (Dec. 22, 1993), Hamilton App. No. C-920497, unreported, and the memoranda filed by the parties in connection therewith. App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires a showing of good cause for filing an application to reopen more than ninety days after journalization of the appellate judgment. Appellant argues that there is good cause for filing this application approximately two and one-half years after this court's judgment was journalized because the same attorney participated in representing appellant in the direct appeals of his capital case to this court and to the Ohio Supreme Court (and, apparently, in subsequent motions). In (1996), , , , , the court held that: "[I]ssues of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be raised at the first opportunity to do so. Thus, in capital cases in which the death penalty has been imposed for offenses committed before January 1, 1995, such issues must be raised in the first appeal as of right in this court, unless, because of unusual circumstances, applying the doctrine of would be unjust. See [(1992), , , , 1209]." Considering that appellant also received new counsel on appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, that such counsel did raise in the Supreme Court the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel before the Court of Appeals, and that many of the issues appellant now attempts to raise have already been addressed in the Supreme Court's decision, we find no injustice in applying the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, appellant's application for reopening is denied.