Opinion
No. 04-1187.
March 16, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wayne County, Carla T. Schemmel (presiding at trial) and Richard Morr (presiding at sentencing), Judges.
Robert Helton appeals from his conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David A. Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, and Alan M. Wilson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Robert Helton appeals from his conviction and sentence. We now affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
We conclude a rational jury could find the following facts from the record in this case. At approximately 9:51 on the evening of September 30, 2003, a deputy from the Wayne County Sheriff's Office conducted a routine check on the anhydrous ammonia storage tanks located at the MFA Farm Co-op (co-op) in Humeston. He noticed anhydrous vapors were escaping from one of the anhydrous tanks and discovered nearby propane tanks commonly used to collect the chemical when it is stolen. The propane tanks were covered in frost, indicating to the officer that he had interrupted someone's attempt to steal anhydrous ammonia, a chemical commonly used in methamphetamine production. Although no suspects were apprehended at the co-op site, very large footprints were discovered at the scene.
A Wayne County deputy, responding to a call for back-up, was en route to the co-op when he encountered a maroon Ford Explorer approaching from the direction of the co-op. The deputy stopped the Explorer in order to investigate. Its driver denied he possessed a driver's license and claimed to be Allen Helton, but was subsequently identified as Christopher Dykes. Dykes stood approximately six feet ten inches with a shoe size estimated by the deputy to be around fourteen or fifteen. The deputy sought and Dykes gave consent to search the vehicle. A cursory search revealed bicycle tubing, commonly used in the theft of anhydrous ammonia. However, while the deputy was conversing with his dispatcher, Dykes drove the Explorer away. The deputy gave chase, but ultimately lost the Explorer in the dust of the gravel roads.
The vehicle was discovered three days later in a farmer's field, and an inventory search revealed tools for the theft of anhydrous ammonia and other ingredients commonly used for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Further investigation disclosed the vehicle, which was registered in the name of a third party, also contained a check book and other documents belonging to Helton.
Meanwhile, at approximately 10:50 p.m. that evening, an employee from the Humeston Casey's General Store, who was outside the store getting gasoline for her vehicle, noticed a man appear from behind the store from the direction of the co-op's storage area. This sudden appearance frightened the employee, as she had noticed a number of police vehicles race by the store about an hour earlier, and had seen search lights from the co-op. The man later identified as Robert Allen Helton motioned to her, told her that his vehicle had a flat tire, and then asked if she would give him a ride south to Garden Grove. Though she repeatedly told Helton she was unable to comply with his request, he was persistent and indicated he would wait. Eventually Helton went into the Casey's store, where he was noticed by the store's cashier. Helton told the cashier that his vehicle had broken down, and asked to use the phone. A van then arrived at the store's parking lot, and the cashier observed Helton approach and talk to the van's occupants.
After Helton entered the van, an Iowa State Patrol vehicle arrived at the Casey's parking lot. The van immediately exited the area, heading north and away from Garden Grove, Helton's desired destination. At around noon on October 1, 2003, Helton reported to the Osceola Police Department that the Explorer had been stolen. The two Casey's employees later identified Helton as the man who appeared from behind the store on September 30th.
The State charged Robert Helton with Conspiracy to Possess Precursor Anhydrous Ammonia with Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(4)(d) and 706.1, 706.3 (2003). Trial commenced on May 5, 2004, during which Helton moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence of an agreement with Dykes to steal the anhydrous. Based on (1) Dykes's use of the Explorer that Helton claimed to own when he reported it stolen, and (2) Helton's unexplained and suspicious presence very near the crime scene shortly after the theft was interrupted by the sheriff's department, the district court overruled Helton's motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Helton moved to set it aside, again challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an agreement with Dykes. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Helton as a habitual offender to an indeterminate prison sentence not to exceed fifteen years.
Helton now appeals, alleging the record contains insufficient evidence from which the jury could have found he made an agreement with Dykes to steal anhydrous from the co-op and possess the chemical with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the conspiracy charge for correction of errors at law, and we will uphold the jury's verdict if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial where a rational jury could be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is not substantial, however, where it raises only suspicion, speculation or conjecture. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001). While direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative of guilt, the evidence when viewed in totality must allow the fact-finder to draw "a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime." Id. (citations omitted). And while we review the entire record, not just evidence supporting guilt, we must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377. "The possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the same body of evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Matter of Scott, 508 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 1993).
III. Discussion.
Helton concedes objects linked with the manufacture of methamphetamine and with the theft of anhydrous ammonia were discovered at the co-op and in the vehicle Helton claimed to own. He also concedes that he was observed just a few blocks from the scene of the crime shortly after the attempted theft was discovered. Helton maintains, however, that such circumstantial evidence, even when taken in the light most favorable to the State, does not amount to evidence of his agreement with Dykes to actively participate in, or otherwise aid in planning or committing the attempted theft or possessing a precursor with the intent to manufacturer methamphetamine. See Iowa Code § 706.1 (describing the elements of a conspiracy charge). We disagree, noting that proof of an agreement to commit the underlying crime may be proved by a person's actions as well as their words, and may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998).
A rational jury could have found Dykes committed the attempted theft based on the following facts: (1) the footprints found at the scene matched his physical description, (2) he was detained by officers in the vicinity of the co-op, (3) the vehicle he was operating upon detention contained tools for both the manufacture of methamphetamine and the theft of anhydrous ammonia, and (4) he fled from the officer in order to elude capture. We further find a rational jury could find from this record viewed in the light most favorable to the State that Helton formed an agreement with Dykes to commit or provide aid in the commission of the crime. In particular, the jury could find (1) Helton, a resident of Osceola, was observed coming out from behind the Humeston Casey's from the direction of the co-op's storage tanks less than an hour after the theft was interrupted; (2) Helton informed the Casey's employees that his vehicle had broken down or had a flat tire and that he needed to travel south to Garden Grove; (3) after asking to use the store's telephone, Helton entered a van; (4) the van immediately exited the parking lot upon the approach of a state trooper, and headed north away from Garden Grove; (5) the vehicle claimed to be owned by and stolen from Helton is the one in which Dykes evaded capture, prior to Helton's appearance at the Casey's claiming vehicular problems; and (6) Helton's stolen vehicle report was not given until noon the following day, giving Dykes ample time to inform Helton of the circumstances of his escape and abandonment of the Explorer.
A jury could on this record reject the notion that Dykes stole Helton's car and used it in the attempted theft without Helton's knowledge and agreement. Helton was in Humeston complaining of car trouble shortly after Dykes was eluding capture in the Explorer Helton claimed to own, and in which Helton's checkbook was found. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a jury could find Helton lied to the Casey's employees about having car problems and to the Osceola police when he reported the vehicle had been stolen. Moreover, we conclude the jury could have drawn an inference from Helton's professed ownership of the Explorer driven by Dykes, Helton's suspicious presence near the crime scene, his statements about having car trouble, and his report of a stolen vehicle, that Helton agreed to aid Dykes in an attempt to steal anhydrous ammonia from the co-op's storage tanks and possess it for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine.
There is ample precedent suggesting a defendant's false story constitutes evidence of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993).
Helton contends the record contains no more evidence suggestive of a conspiracy than was adduced in Speicher. In Speicher, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled there was insufficient evidence from which to infer an agreement existed between Speicher and Page to manufacture methamphetamine. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 743. Although Speicher's knowledge of the "cooking" operation could be presumed from (1) his presence in Page's garage where it was contained, (2) his flight from police, and (3) the smell of fumes associated with methamphetamine manufacture on his clothing, this circumstantial evidence was insufficient to draw the inference of an agreement with Page to manufacture methamphetamine and support Speicher's conviction for conspiracy. Id. at 742-43. We note, however, that Speicher was not shown to own any aspect of or any implement used in the methamphetamine manufacturing operation. We believe a defendant's ownership of property used in a criminal enterprise is an important factor in the determination of whether an agreement to commit the underlying offense may be fairly inferred by the fact-finder. When one knows the criminal nature of the enterprise to which they commit their property, they may be found to have agreed to provide aid to that criminal enterprise. See Scott, 508 N.W.2d at 655 (upholding the seizure of vehicle owned by Scott where evidence showed a conspiracy existed with her husband where Scott knew the vehicle was used in sale of methamphetamine).
In summary, Helton's claimed ownership of the vehicle used by Dykes to flee the crime scene, Helton's unexplained and suspicious presence very near the co-op crime scene, and his inconsistent statements to the Casey's employees about his claimed car problems constituted sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Helton was guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 804. The conviction and sentence are therefore affirmed.