Opinion
2022 CA 0114
09-16-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LAWRENCE HAYNES
Marcus J. Plaisance Mark D. Plaisance Prairieville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant Kim L. Dunn Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Joy Reeves Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, STATE OF LOUISIANA NUMBER 186360, DIVISION C HONORABLE TONI HIGGINBOTHAM, JUDGE AD HOC
Marcus J. Plaisance Mark D. Plaisance Prairieville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant Kim L. Dunn
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Joy Reeves Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
Appellant, Kim L. Dunn, the mother of a minor child, appeals the family court's judgment, sustaining exceptions of no right of action and res judicata and dismissing, with prejudice, her petition for modification of child support, which effectively sought to intervene in the child support enforcement proceeding instituted by appellee, the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish on behalf of the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), against Lawrence Haynes, the father of the minor child. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DCFS filed a child support enforcement proceeding in June 2004, averring that Dunn, as the complaining witness, had applied for child support collection services and identified Haynes as the father of the minor child. In February 2006, the family court issued a stipulated judgment ordering, among other things, that Haynes pay $250.00 per month for the child's support.
On November 26, 2014, DCFS filed a rule for modification of the amount of monthly child support for which Haynes was responsible. On November 30, 2016, the family court judge, "accepting the stipulation of the parties," signed a judgment stating that Haynes "owe[d] no monetary child support at this time due to the child receiving a portion of [Haynes'] disability benefits which exceeds the recommended child support guideline order." Haynes was also ordered to pay liquidated arrears at the rate of $250.00 per month.
A worksheet attached to DCFS's pleading established that Haynes' monthly child support obligation was $166.02 and that the child received social security disability payments on behalf of his father in the amount of $214.00 per month.
Thereafter, on December 10, 2018, Dunn filed a pleading entitled "PETITION TO ESTABLISH CHILD SUPPORT," in the DCFS proceeding, seeking an increase in the amount of monthly child support that Haynes was obligated to pay. Although the caption stated her pleading was filed "[i]n consolidation with" a family court proceeding entitled "KIM DUNN vs. LAWRENCE HAYNES," neither a case number nor a division of the family court were included. In response, DCFS filed a peremptory exception, raising the objection of no right of action. After a hearing on July 24, 2019, the family court signed a judgment on January 30, 2020, sustaining DCFS's exception and dismissing Dunn's petition. That judgment was not appealed.
Although DCFS raised the objection of no right of action, in dismissing Dunn's claims, the January 30, 2020 judgment stated that it sustained "the Exception of No Cause of Action."
On May 10, 2021, Dunn filed another petition, this time for "MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT," averring "Haynes is presently making substantially and materially more income" than he had been when the November 30, 2016 judgment was rendered and that, therefore, an increase in the award of child support was warranted. She expressly sought an order directing Haynes to provide current financial information as to his income. Attached to the petition were interrogatories and requests for production of documents directed to Haynes.
See La. Dist. Ct. Rules, Rule 47.1(c) ("At all hearings to initially set support or modification of an existing order, both the defendant and the person seeking the order of support or modification shall bring with them to court a copy of their two most recent state and federal tax returns, two months ['] worth of the most recent paycheck stubs with a year-to-date gross earnings, or receipts and expenses if self-employed, proof of the cost for medical insurance premiums to insure the child or children only, and proof of child care expenses, or certification/evidence of state or federal benefits.").
DCFS responded to Dunn's petition for modification with peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and res judicata, the latter directed solely to the issue of whether Dunn had a right of action in this DCFS-initiated child support enforcement proceeding in the family court. After a hearing on July 15, 2021, the family court sustained both exceptions. A judgment in conformity with the family court's rulings was signed on August 5, 2021, dismissing Dunn's petition for modification of child support with prejudice. Dunn appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, urging that her petition for modification of child support may properly be considered a petition for intervention, Dunn contends that because she only assigned to DCFS the right to collect payments - not her right to modify Haynes' monthly support obligation - she has a right of action allowing her to intervene in the proceeding to ensure Haynes is paying the proper amount. According to Dunn, she has reasonable grounds to believe that Haynes has misrepresented his income to DCFS and, therefore, has been paying an inappropriately low amount of monthly child support.
No Right of Action:
Except as otherwise provided by law, an action can only be brought by a person having a real and actual interest that she asserts. La. C.C.P. art. 681. The peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action tests whether the plaintiff has any interest in judicially enforcing the right asserted. Pearce v. Lagarde, 2020-1224 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/7/21), 330 So.3d 1160, 1166-67, writ denied, 2022-00010 (La. 2/22/22), 333 So.3d 446. See also La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6) ("The objections which may be raised through the peremptory exception include ... [n]o right of action, or no interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit."). Absent the admission of evidence to support or controvert the exception, a family court's ruling maintaining an exception of no right of action is generally reviewed de novo on appeal because it involves a question of law. See Pearce, 330 So.3d at 1167.
Pursuant to federal mandate, each state is required to have a program for child support enforcement. Louisiana enacted La. R.S. 46:236.1.1 et seq. to establish a state child support enforcement program. Federal funding for state welfare programs, including IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq., are dependent upon compliance with the federal mandate that each state must operate a child support enforcement program and follow the regulations therein. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). Boudreaux v. Boudreaux, 2015-0536 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 1245, 1253.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 46:236.1.2(A)(1) & (4), DCFS was authorized to develop and implement a program of family support cases where the State is required by federal law or regulation to provide services designed to enforce, collect, and distribute the support obligation owed by any person to his child. Additionally, DCFS may take direct action to obtain and modify family and child support orders, and La. R.S. 46:236.1.2(B)(1) requires that DCFS provide such services to any individual upon receipt of an application and payment of an assessment fee for the services, regardless of whether the individual has ever received public assistance.
Here, it is undisputed that Dunn sought and obtained the services of DCFS in collecting support for the minor child for which she is the custodial parent. DCFS has a "separate and distinct cause of action" that "need not be ancillary to or dependent upon any other legal proceeding." La. R.S. 46:236.1.2 D(1); Ambrose v. Ambrose, 2007-0106 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/2/07), 977 So.2d 24, 26. Although the legislature explicitly gave DCFS an independent cause of action, it chose to leave undisturbed the rights of the parents to modify a support order on behalf of the child. Boudreaux, 180 So.3d at 1257.
La. R.S. 46:236.1.9 states in relevant part:
A. The agencies, courts, and persons in Louisiana carrying out provisions of this Subpart and of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and related portions of Title IV-A of such Act shall have the
affirmative responsibility to act in the best interest of the individual on whose behalf action is taken....
C. ... In any proceeding concerning paternity, a support obligation, or arrearages owed [DCFS] shall be an indispensable party to any proceeding involving a support obligation or arrearages owed under this Subpart. [Emphasis added.]
This statute specifies that DCFS is acting on behalf of the best interest of the child and is an indispensable party to any proceeding involving child support. This means that no action can be taken without DCFS's participation, but it does not take away any rights of either parent. Boudreaux, 180 So.3d at 1257.
Moreover, La. R.S. 9:311, providing for the modification or suspension of support, states:
A. (1) An award for support shall not be modified unless the party seeking the modification shows a material change in circumstances of one of the parties between the time of the previous award and the time of the rule for modification of the award....
C. For purposes of this Section, in cases where [DCFS] is providing support enforcement services ...
(3) (a) [DCFS] shall request a judicial review under any of the following conditions:
(i) If the best interest of the child so requires, [DCFS] shall request a judicial review upon request of either party or on [DCFS's] own initiative. If appropriate, the court may modify the amount of the existing child support award every three years if the existing award differs from the amount which would otherwise be awarded under the application of the child support guidelines. [Emphasis added.]
The legislature's use of "the party" and "one of the parties" in Subsection A(1) and "either party" in Subsection C(3)(a)(i) shows a clear intent to maintain the rights of at least three parties, namely: the two parents and DCFS. Thus, in order to reconcile La. R.S. 9:311 with the IV-D laws, the statutes must be interpreted as no parent losing standing. Accordingly, there is no positive statutory language that strips either parent of their rights to participate in support matters. Boudreaux, 180 So.3d at 1257.
Nothing prevents a custodial parent from filing an intervention, seeking to increase the amount of child support owed by the noncustodial parent in the DCFS proceeding. See Boudreaux, 180 So.3d at 1257. See also State, Dep't of Children &Family Servs. v. D.J.P., 2015-1409 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/5/16), 199 So.3d 654, 658 (Although a custodial parent had the right to participate in the child support proceedings and appeared at the hearing to establish the amount of monthly child support owed by the noncustodial parent, because the custodial parent neither intervened in the DCFS proceeding nor filed any pleadings requesting any relief on her own behalf, redirection of child support payments to her rather than DCFS was error.). In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Boudreaux explaining that nothing prevents a custodial parent from intervening in a proceeding in which DCFS is the proper payee, we conclude that Dunn, who filed a pleading seeking modification of the amount of monthly child support Haynes is obligated to pay, has a right of action and may intervene in this child support enforcement proceeding. Thus, the family court erred in sustaining the exception of no right of action.
Courts are obligated to look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their substance. Every pleading is to be construed so as to do substantial justice, and regardless of the parties' interpretation of the caption of a pleading, courts will look to the import of a pleading and will not be bound by its title. Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2021-0433 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/29/22), 341 So.3d 669, 675. Thus, we construe Dunn's pleading seeking a modification of child support as a petition for intervention. See La. C.C.P. art. 1091. See also Stevens Constr. & Design, L.L.C, v. St. Tammany Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 2019-0955 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/8/20), 308 So.3d 724, 729-30, writ denied, 2020-00990 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 652 (Article 1091 and the jurisprudence construing it establish that the requirement for intervention is two-fold: the intervenor must have a justiciable interest in, and a connexity to, the principal action. A "justiciable interest" is defined as the right of a party to seek redress or a remedy against either the plaintiff or defendant in the original action or both, and where those parties have a real interest in opposing it. The right, if it exists, must be so related or connected to the facts or object of the principal action that a judgment on the principal action will have a direct impact on the intervenor's rights. An intervenor takes the proceedings as she finds them and cannot change the issues between the parties or raise new ones.).
Res Judicata:
Res judicata bars the re-litigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence of a previous suit. Landry v. Town of Livingston Police Dep't 2010-0673 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/10), 54 So.3d 772, 775. See also La. R.S. 13:4231. The chief inquiry is whether the second action asserts a cause of action that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Id. at 776.
La. R.S. 13:4231 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
DCFS asserted that Dunn's claim for modification of the amount of Haynes' support obligation was subject to a plea of res judicata because the January 30, 2020 judgment, rendered after a hearing on DCFS's exception of no right of action, resulted in the dismissal of her claim to establish child support. In so asserting, DCFS expressly acknowledges that the issue of modification of the amount of child support cannot form the basis of an objection of res judicata but focuses instead only on the issue of whether Dunn can state a right of action in this DCFS-initiated child support enforcement proceeding before the family court.
The January 30, 2020 judgment did not indicate whether the dismissal of Dunn's suit was with or without prejudice. When a judgment is silent as to whether it has been dismissed with or without prejudice, the dismissal must be without prejudice. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Louis, 2020-0717 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/13/21), 326 So.3d 904, 908 n.3. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff when the judgment in the first action dismissed the first action without prejudice. La. R.S. 13.'4232(A)(2). And such a judgment cannot form the basis for a plea of res judicata. See Collins v. Ward, 2015-1993 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/16/16), 204 So.3d 235, 239. Accordingly, the family court erred in sustaining DCFS's exception of res judicata.
Although the January 30, 2020 judgment states the family court "sustained the Exception of No Cause of Action," see n.2, infra, because we have concluded that the objection of res judicata is without merit and reversed the dismissal of Dunn's claim, we pretermit a discussion of any effect the dismissal on the basis of an objection of no cause of action may have had on DCFS's exception of res judicata in this proceeding.
DECREE
For these reasons, the family court's judgment sustaining the peremptory exceptions, raising objections of no right of action and res judicata, and dismissing with prejudice Dunn's claim for modification of the amount of child support Haynes owes is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings. Appeal costs in the amount of $1110.00 are assessed against the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish on behalf of the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.