Opinion
No. 5-039 / 04-1153
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Michael J. Moon, Judge.
The State appeals the dismissal of the charges against Antonio Rodregus Hart. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor And Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorneys General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and James Scheetz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The State appeals an order dismissing its indictment of Antonio Rodregus Hart for possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c)(3), 124.413, and 901.10(1) (2003) and prohibited acts in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.402(1)(e) and 124.402(2)(a). As the State failed to bring Hart to trial within ninety days of its indictment and further failed to prove that this delay was attributable to the defendant, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 23, 2004, the State filed its trial information. On March 26 Hart filed a combined waiver of arraignment in open court and a plea of not guilty, specifically demanding his right to speedy trial. The district court filed an order on the written arraignment on March 29, noting Hart's speedy trial demand, setting a deadline for motions of May 18, scheduling a pretrial conference for May 21, and setting trial for June 2.
Depositions were held on April 29 and again on May 18. However, on May 18 two of the State's witnesses failed to appear, causing Hart to file an application to extend motion and discovery deadlines. Also on May 18, Hart filed a motion to sever, an application to disclose a confidential informant, and a motion to suppress. On May 21 an order was entered scheduling a further pretrial conference for June 1. It was also agreed that only part of the motions set for hearing on June 1 would be addressed on that day because the court's ruling on the application to disclose the State's confidential informant would impact the arguments made on the motion to suppress.
At the June 1 hearing, the district court took up only the application to disclose confidential informant and application for extension of deadlines. Following the arguments on the application to disclose, the parties addressed the application for extension of deadlines whereby the State informed the district court that,
[T]he State has no objection to these extensions, other than noting we have speedy trial deadlines . . . of June 21st, and the next trial date is June 22nd. We obviously can't try this case tomorrow, with the pending motions, and the pending motions that haven't even been addressed.
The district court then responded by stating,
Okay. Well, I understand you are going to need some additional time to take those depositions and address some of the other issues we have here before us, but I will try and issue a ruling on this motion [to disclose confidential informant] in the next several days.
Further depositions were then scheduled for June 11. On June 10 the district court filed its ruling denying the application to disclose the State's confidential informant. On June 11 the State advised the district court that a hearing needed to be set on Hart's motion to suppress. In response the district court issued an order stating,
Both defendants remain in custody, and have demanded speedy trial, which will run on or about June 21, 2004. Separate Jury trials remain scheduled for June 22, 2004. . . . [t]he Defendants' Motions to Suppress Evidence will be heard on the 14 [sic] day of June, 2004.
This order addressed Hart's case as well as a corresponding case operating on the same timetable.
On June 14 a hearing on Hart's motion to suppress was held and the district court took the motion under advisement. On June 15 Hart filed a motion to withdraw his motion to suppress. Following the withdrawal the State, realizing the speedy trial deadline was quickly approaching, made an oral motion to impanel the jury on June 21. The district court denied this motion because, according to the State, "it was already a fully packed motion day with two judges fully scheduled."
On June 21, the ninetieth day, Hart filed his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State failed to bring him to trial prior to the expiration of the ninety-day speedy trial deadline. On June 22, the day set for trial, a hearing was held on this motion where the district court stated,
[I]n . . . Antonio Hart's case, all of the deadlines were met with the exception of one and that was bringing of the case within 90 days. Motions were timely filed. Hearings were held granted the motions to suppress were held late in the game, but it was because of the nature of the orderly flow of business of a criminal case. . . .
. . . .
. . . I think the judges in this district and those who come to Marshall County are flexible in scheduling but sometimes we get up against deadlines where there just simply is not enough time left to accommodate everybody. I understand the frustration of the County Attorney's Office. Mr. Scheetz in this case has done everything within his power to get this case tried. I know that he has made requests on at least two occasions . . . to at least impanel the jury prior to the expiration of June 21, 2004.
He was not successful in getting juries in here for a variety of reasons. . . . The State of Iowa did everything within its power to get these cases resolved.
Despite this reasoning, the district court concluded the delay was not attributable to Hart and that the State failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay. The court dismissed the charges against Hart and the State appeals.
II. Scope of Review
In deciding indictment and speedy trial questions, our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991)). Because our review is at law, we are bound by findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. Finn, 469 N.W.2d at 693. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to prevail only if its evidence was so strong the trial court was compelled to rule for it as a matter of law. Id. III. Issue
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b) provides:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be found.
Pursuant to this rule, a criminal charge must be dismissed if trial does not commence within ninety days from the filing of the charging instrument "unless the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) `good cause' for the delay." State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005) (citations omitted). In this case Hart did not waive his right to speedy trial. Thus, the district court was required to dismiss the charges against Hart unless the State proved either that the delay in bringing Hart to trial was attributable to Hart or that there was otherwise "good cause" for the delay. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). On appeal, the sole issue presented by the State for our review was whether the district court erred in not finding that Hart's filing of motions caused a delay that should be attributed to him.
"`Delay attributable to the defendant' may include whatever passage of time is `reasonably necessary' to act upon a defendant's motion." Id. (citations omitted). However, "that is not to say a defendant who files a timely motion thereby forfeits the right to be tried without lengthy and unexplained delay." State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1999). "[T]he general press of court business is insufficient to avoid dismissal under [our] speedy trial rule, even for the busy judge sitting in a high volume court." Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205 (quoting Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 602).
In State v. Miller, the "trial slipped only one day past the deadline before the court was faced with a motion to dismiss." Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. In denying the motion, the district court concluded that "a number of days" must be attributed to the defendant based on the time necessary for ruling on the motion to dismiss. Id. Our supreme court reversed this decision. Id. at 206. In so doing the supreme court determined the district court erred in attributing any delay to the defendant, noting that all the defense motions had been timely filed and heard with reasonable promptness and that the final ruling on these motions was made a week prior to the expiration of the speedy trial deadline. Id. at 206 (finding it significant that the district court's ruling came down with a week to spare). Moreover, the supreme court took issue with the district court's deference to the established trial schedule for Marshall County stating that such deference disregards the important distinction between "chronic court congestion," which does not justify extending the ninety day speedy trial deadline, and "circumstances arising out of unique, non-recurring events which create a particular scheduling problem," which does. Id.
Turning now to the facts before us, the record reveals that Hart's situation, like that in Miller, was not one where defense motions were filed on the eve of the speedy trial deadline. Cf. State v. Searcy, 470 N.W.2d 46, 47 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991) (filing of motion to suppress occurred just three days prior to trial); State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Iowa 1991) (filing occurred one week before trial). All of Hart's motions were timely filed and were heard and ruled upon with reasonable promptness. In addition, similar to the facts of Miller, the final defense motion was resolved nearly a week before the speedy trial deadline. Finally, we note the record reveals that the scheduling problems to which the district court deferred were not "unique, non-recurring events" but were instead "chronic court congestion." Accordingly, we conclude the record before us furnishes no reason attributable to the defendant for a delay beyond the ninety-day deadline. The district court was correct to dismiss the trial information for violation of the speedy trial requirement of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( b).
The record is replete with references to scheduling problems caused by "a full calendar" or a "full court motion day." Moreover, as referenced above, the State believes its oral motion to impanel a jury on June 21 was denied because "it was already a fully packed motion day with two judges fully scheduled." Moreover, the district court specifically found that the delays were caused by "the nature of the orderly flow of business of a criminal case. . . ."