Opinion
No. 25465-8-III.
September 27, 2007.
Appeal from judgments of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 06-1-00353-9, Carrie L. Runge and Cameron Mitchell, JJ., entered August 10 and September 5, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, J., concurred in by Schultheis, A.C.J., and Stephens, J.
Eric Allen Hamilton appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. A police officer paced Mr. Hamilton's vehicle and stopped him for speeding. Mr. Hamilton asserts the speedometer of the patrol car should have been authenticated and he challenges whether there was probable cause for the stop. The officer had probable cause to stop Mr. Hamilton and then to arrest and search him pursuant to an outstanding warrant. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 15, 2006, at 2:28 a.m., Officer Eduardo Garcia, from the Richland Police Department paced a van going 33 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone and activated his lights. The van immediately pulled over. The driver identified himself as Eric Allen Hamilton.
Officer Garcia had observed the vehicle two weeks prior and ran the license plate. He found that the van was owned by Ronald Carder, whose license was suspended. During the stop, Officer Garcia commented on the fact that the van belonged to Ronald Carder. Mr. Hamilton said he borrowed the van from Mr. Carder.
Officer Garcia ran a WASIC check and found that Mr. Hamilton had an outstanding warrant. Officer Garcia arrested Mr. Hamilton. He searched Mr. Hamilton and found a baggie that contained methamphetamine.
At the CrR 3.6 hearing, the court concluded the stop for speeding was lawful and the officer had probable cause for the arrest. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered on September 5, 2006. The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts and Mr. Hamilton was found guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine. On appeal, Mr. Hamilton asserts his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence obtained from the unlawful search.
ANALYSIS
Speedometer Authentication
Traffic stops are constitutional if the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has violated the traffic code. Probable cause exists if the officer's knowledge of the facts and circumstances are "sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed." Clement v. Dep't of Lic., 109 Wn. App. 371, 375, 35 P.2d 1171 (2001).
Mr. Hamilton was stopped for speeding, a violation of the traffic code. Mr. Hamilton argues that the speed measuring device — here, the patrol car's speedometer — must be authenticated before evidence of its speed readings are admissible. He is correct if the offense that must be proved is speeding. City of Bellevue v. Mociulski, 51 Wn. App. 855, 859, 756 P.2d 1320 (1988). However, when the offense that must be proved is not speeding, the State only has the burden to prove that the stop was valid based on probable cause, authentication is not necessary. The burden then shifts, and the defendant must show that the stop was not valid. See Clement, 109 Wn. App. at 376. Here, the State satisfied its burden of showing that the stop was valid. The evidence supporting the stop was the officer's testimony.
Here, the officer testified that he paced Mr. Hamilton's vehicle with his patrol car and the patrol car's speedometer showed that Mr. Hamilton was exceeding the speed limit. Mociulski, 51 Wn. App. at 860. Mr. Hamilton does not contend that the officer's testimony was in error or that the stop was based on a pretext.
Thus, Officer Garcia had probable cause to stop Mr. Hamilton, and the evidence obtained regarding Mr. Hamilton's unlawful possession of a controlled substance was properly admitted. State v. Brown, 119 Wn. App. 473, 475-76, 81 P.3d 916 (2003).
Mr. Hamilton also asserts that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the admission of the speed pace testimony without authentication of the speedometer. However, because we conclude that authentication was not necessary to establish probable cause, Mr. Hamilton's counsel's failure to object to the lack of authentication was not ineffective assistance.
Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Schultheis, A.C.J., Stephens, J., Concur