Opinion
Nos. 58689-1-I; 59871-6-I.
June 16, 2008.
Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-1-02550-1, Nicole MacInnes, J., entered August 4, 2006.
Affirmed in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Generally, the trial court cannot order restitution for a defendant's acts that are not part of the charged offense. A jury found Staci Hadley guilty of vehicular assault involving one of the passengers in the car she was driving. Because precisely the same acts directly caused injuries to another passenger, the trial court did not err in ordering Hadley to pay restitution for those injuries. We also reject Hadley's additional grounds for review. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence and restitution order and remand only to permit correction of a minor calculation error.
FACTS
On the evening of October 19, 2005, Staci Hadley was driving on Orillia Road near Kent when she lost control of her car, crossed the center line, and crashed into two oncoming cars. Hadley and her three passengers were injured. One of the passengers, Roger Chamberlin, suffered broken vertebrae, fractured ribs, and lacerations of the liver and spleen. Bradley Johansen, another passenger, apparently suffered a broken neck. The third passenger, Hadley's 14-year-old daughter Shelby, suffered injuries caused by her seat belt.
Hadley told police officers that she had smoked methamphetamine earlier in the day. A blood analysis revealed a level of 1.74 milligrams of methamphetamine per liter of blood and .22 milligrams per liter of amphetamine, a level that the toxicology lab manager characterized as "extraordinarily high." Police accident reconstructionists estimated that Hadley was traveling at least 58 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone when she crossed the center line.
Hadley was charged with two counts of vehicular assault involving Chamberlin and Johansen. The jury found Hadley guilty of the charge involving Chamberlin and not guilty of the charge involving Johansen. The court imposed a 60-month standard range term and ordered restitution for Chamberlin's injuries in the amount of $14,655.37.
The State also sought restitution for Shelby's injuries. Hadley objected, arguing that she had not been convicted of any offense involving Shelby. The court found a sufficient causal connection between Hadley's offense and Shelby's injuries and ordered $1,085.58 in restitution.
DECISION
The trial court's authority to impose restitution is entirely statutory. State v. Moen, 129 Wn.2d 535, 543, 919 P.2d 69 (1996). RCW 9.94A.753 directs the court to order restitution "whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results in injury to any person." Generally, in order to impose restitution, the trial court need only find a causal connection between the defendant's crime and the victim's injury. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). A causal connection exists when "`but for' the offense committed, the loss or damages would not have occurred." State v. Enstone, 89 Wn. App. 882, 886, 951 P.2d 309 (1998), aff'd, 137 Wn.2d 675 (1999). But unless the defendant agrees, the court cannot impose restitution "based on a defendant's `general scheme' or acts `connected with' the crime charged, when those acts are not part of the charge." State v. Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. 373, 378, 12 P.3d 661 (2000) (quoting State v. Woods, 90 Wn. App. 904, 907-08, 953 P.2d 834 (1998)). "When the particular type of restitution in question is authorized by statute, imposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court." State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991).
Relying primarily on State v. Dauenhauer and State v. Osborne, 140 Wn. App. 38, 163 P.3d 799 (2007), Hadley argues that because she committed a vehicular assault against Roger Chamberlin, Shelby was not a victim of the offense and the trial court improperly imposed restitution for an uncharged offense. But Dauenhauer and Osborne are factually distinguishable.
In Dauenhauer, the defendant had burglarized three storage units when police responded to the scene. While attempting to escape, Dauenhauer drove his car through a fence and later crashed into a truck. Dauenhauer was later charged with and convicted of three counts of burglary, but the trial court imposed restitution not only for the burglaries, but also for damages to the fence and truck. On appeal, the Dauenhauer court concluded that the trial court lacked authority to order restitution for damages to the fence and truck because those acts were not part of the burglary. Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. at 379-380.
In Osborne, the defendant robbed and kidnapped a man and then stole the man's truck. Osborne then drove to a house and assaulted two occupants with a gun. Osborne eventually pleaded guilty only to the two assaults that occurred at the house. On appeal, the Osborne court held that the trial court could not order restitution for the robbery victim because those damages involved "conduct relating to the uncharged crimes of kidnapping and robbery." Osborne, 140 Wn. App. at 42.
In Dauenhauer and Osborne, the State sought restitution for actions occurring either before or after the charged crime. In each case, restitution was improper because the defendant's acts were not otherwise part of the charged offenses.
Here, unlike Dauenhauer and Osborne, the defendant's actions in committing the charged crime directly caused the injuries for which restitution was imposed. In order to convict Hadley of vehicular assault, the State had to prove that she drove in a reckless manner or under the influence of drugs and that her driving proximately caused Chamberlin's injuries. See RCW 46.61.522. A "victim" for purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act is "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged" (emphasis added). Former RCW 9.94A.030(47) (2005). The identical acts constituting Hadley's commission of the charged offense were also the direct cause of Shelby's injuries. Shelby was therefore a victim of the charged offense, and restitution was statutorily authorized. The trial court did not err by imposing restitution beyond the charged crime.
Hadley has submitted a statement of additional grounds for review as permitted by RAP 10.10. She alleges that the testimony by two of the State's witnesses was not credible. But issues of credibility are reserved solely for the trier of fact and cannot be reviewed on appeal. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
The State concedes that because of a calculation error, the trial court should have imposed restitution of $1,075.58 for Shelby's injuries, rather than $1,085.58. We accept the State's concession. We therefore affirm Hadley's judgment and sentence and the restitution order and remand solely for correction of the calculation error in the amount of restitution.