Opinion
No. 5-942 / 05-0020
Filed February 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D. Ackerman, Judge.
Douglas Grant appeals from his conviction, following a bench trial, for possession of five grams or less of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. AFFIRMED.
Martha M. McMinn, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Nicholaus D. Garwick, Legal Intern, and Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Douglas Grant appeals from his conviction, following a bench trial, for possession of five grams or less of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 24, 2003, Sioux City police officers Wagner and Tisher engaged in a consent search of Grant's residence. While in the house they noticed the obvious smell of marijuana and an ashtray appearing to contain marijuana residue. Grant appeared to be under the influence of a drug and admitted to having recently smoked marijuana in the residence. Given permission to search Grant's bedroom, the officers found an address book, which contained the names of two individuals whom the officers knew to be associated with manufacturing or selling methamphetamine. With suspicions further aroused, Officer Wagner asked Grant if there was any methamphetamine in his home. Grant admitted he might have a "couple of eight balls" of methamphetamine in the basement, and led the officers to the location of eight individually packaged portions of methamphetamine, seven of which were approximately the same weight.
Based on this discovery, the State charged Grant with possession of more than five grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Following a bench trial, at which the fighting issue was whether Grant intended to distribute the drugs, the district court found him guilty of possession of five grams or less of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2003). Grant appeals, contending there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict and the district court erred in denying his challenge to the weight of the evidence in his motion for new trial.
Sufficiency of the Evidence.
On this issue, we review for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 1995). The evidence is reviewed "in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions which may be fairly and reasonably deduced from the evidence in the record." Simpson, 528 N.W.2d at 632-33. We will uphold a finding of guilt if substantial evidence supports the verdict. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). "Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Because the element of intent to deliver is difficult to prove directly, it is often demonstrated with circumstantial evidence. State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985). For example, our case law has held intent to deliver may be inferred from the quantity of the substance and from the manner in which the substance is wrapped or packaged. State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Iowa 1976). Intent to deliver may also be inferred from the presence of large amounts of cash. See, e.g., State v. Dandridge, 213 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Iowa 1974).
Grant suggests that, without more, mere evidence of eight individually packaged "doses" of methamphetamine is insufficient to support a finding that he held an intent to distribute the drugs. He directs us to a variety of Iowa cases which, he maintains, establish that in addition to individual packaging, extra factors, indicating an intent to distribute must also be present. See State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Iowa 1976) (individually packaged drugs along with large quantity of such drugs); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974) (holding packaging, plus large quantity, and presence of scales sufficient); State v. See, 532 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (holding quantity of drugs along with notes indicating drug sales sufficient); State v. Ramirez, 485 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding individual packaging, plus large quantity of drugs and cash sufficient to support finding of intent to distribute).
We would first note that no Iowa authority appears to, as a matter of law, require more than simple packaging and quantity in order to support a finding of intent to distribute. However, in order to resolve this case, we do not believe we are required to conclusively hold that "something more" in addition to a quantity of individually packaged drugs must be present in order to support a finding of intent to distribute.
The officers' testimony as to their conclusion Grant intended to distribute the drugs, was based in large part on their substantial experience investigating drug-related crimes. When asked why he determined Grant intended to distribute the drugs, Officer Dane Wagner testified "the way it's packaged is the first indicator . . . [and] second . . . is that there were seven of them that were similar in weight." Sergeant Kirkpatrick, supervisor of Sioux City's drug task force, explained that the lack of packaging materials and scales was not significant because it is indicative of someone who is "closer to the street, more retail-level dealer." This was supported by Officer Wagner's testimony that the eight separate baggies appeared to be ready for "resale." As noted, the arresting officers located a notebook in Grant's bedroom containing the names of at least two individuals known to the officers to be involved in methamphetamine manufacturing or distribution. This, according to Sergeant Kirkpatrick, strengthened his opinion that Grant intended to sell the drugs. Finally, the trial court was not required to believe Grant's theory that the eight individually-packaged doses were for his individual use, in spite of a "tooter" found with the baggies as both Wagner and Kilpatrick testified that drug dealers are often also drug users. See e.g., State v. Garr, 461 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Iowa 1990).
A tooter, as defined by Officer Wagner, is a "straw used to suck the smoke off of burning methamphetamine in order to get intoxicated or high."
Here, we initially conclude that the quantity of the individually-packaged drugs is strongly indicative of Grant's intent to distribute the methamphetamine. We have also considered the address book containing the names of drug manufacturers or dealers and the nearly identical sizing of the drug doses. Cognizant of our standard of review that we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude this evidence is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Grant is guilty of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.
Weight of the Evidence.
Grant further claims the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial. We review a district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998). A district court should grant a new trial where a conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 659. The court should weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). The court should grant a new trial only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Id.
In denying the motion for new trial, the court relied on the internal consistency and unchallenged credibility of the officers who had opined at trial as to Grant's intent to distribute. It further noted its belief in the officers' testimony that had Grant bought the drugs for personal use "it wouldn't have been bought in these eight different baggies, it would have been bought as a bigger clump. It just wasn't consistent with a total individual use." We likewise conclude Grant's conviction withstands scrutiny under the weight-of-the-evidence standard, as well as the sufficiency standard, and therefore affirm his conviction and the denial of the motion for new trial.