Opinion
Appellate Court Case No. 28766
10-05-2020
STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellant v. ROGER DEAN GILLISPIE Defendant-Appellee
Copies to: Andrew French 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Appellant, State of Ohio Michelle Berry 114 East 8th Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie and Michelle Berry 3584 Mooney Avenue Cincinnati, Ohio 45208 Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie Mark Godsey P.O. Box 210040 University of Cincinnati College of Law Cincinnati, Ohio 45221 Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie Todd Raskin Jeffrey Kay Frank Scialdone Cara Wright 100 Franklin's Row 34305 Solon Road Cleveland, Ohio 44139 Attorneys for Appellee, Matthew Scott Moore Edward Dowd Dawn Frick Christopher Herman 8163 Old Yankee Street, Suite C Dayton, Ohio 45458 Attorneys for Appellee, Miami Township, Ohio Hon. Steven K. Dankof Montgomery County Common Pleas Court 41 N. Perry Street Dayton, Ohio 45422
Trial Court Case No. 1990 CR 02667
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
PER CURIAM:
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on the State of Ohio's March 26, 2020 motion for leave to appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(C), and Roger Dean Gillispie's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to proceed.
{¶ 2} The State of Ohio, through the prosecuting attorney, seeks leave to appeal an order regarding the anticipated disclosure of grand jury testimony given in a resolved criminal case against Gillispie. The 1990 case was resolved in 2016, when this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment against Gillispie, and after the federal district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus in his favor. See State v. Gillispie, 2d Dist. No. 26965, 2016-Ohio-7688, 65 N.E.3d 791, appeal not accepted, 150 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2017-Ohio-6964, 78 N.E.3d 909.
{¶ 3} The State's appeal is taken pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and App.R. 5(C). The statute provides:
A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case, * * * which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or information, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized property or grants post conviction relief pursuant to sections 2953.21 to 2953.24 of the Revised Code, and may appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case * * *.(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2945.67(A).
{¶ 4} A discretionary appeal by the prosecuting attorney must satisfy the procedural requirements of App.R. 5(C). State v. Jones, 2017-Ohio-5758, 94 N.E.3d 971, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.). App.R. 5(C) was recently amended and now provides, in relevant part:
Motion by Prosecution for Leave to Appeal. When leave is sought by the prosecution from the court of appeals to appeal an order of the trial court, a motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals within thirty days from the entry of the order sought to be appealed (or, if that order is not a final order, within thirty days of the final order into which it merges) and shall
set forth the errors that the movant claims occurred in the proceedings of the trial court.App.R. 5(C).
Leave is Required
{¶ 5} Initially, Gillispie argues that the matter before the trial court is "civil in nature and not * * * part of any criminal prosecution or case," and that App.R. 5(C) therefore does not apply. However, the statute governing a prosecuting attorney's appeal speaks in terms of decisions entered in "a criminal case." The order on appeal was, in fact, entered in a criminal case: Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Case No. 1990 CR 02667. It was entered there because that is where Gillispie filed the motion it addresses. Even if the grand jury matter were considered civil, similar to post-conviction proceedings, it would not necessarily mean that leave is not required. R.C. 2945.67(A) expressly allows the prosecuting attorney to appeal certain post-conviction orders, which are considered "civil" matters. We decline to hold that the State need not seek leave under these circumstances. Compare In re: January 27, 2017 Order Releasing Grand Jury Materials, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27435 (April 11, 2017) (granting the State's motion for leave to appeal) and In re: Application for Sealing of Records of Conviction of K.T., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28718 (April 9, 2020) (overruling State's motion as unnecessary in a civil case).
According to the 2003 Staff Notes to App.R. 5, "[t]he title of this rule was changed from Appeals by Leave of Court in Criminal Cases to Appeals by Leave of Court as a consequence of the amendment to division (A)" that "made App. R. 5(A) apply to delinquency and serious youthful offender proceedings," which are civil matters.
A Final Appealable Order is Required
{¶ 6} Gillispie's main argument is that the order on appeal is interlocutory and cannot be appealed by the State. While R.C. 2945.67(A) permits the prosecution to seek leave to appeal "any other order," App.R. 5(C) anticipates that the prosecution's appeal of interlocutory orders will be filed after the trial court has issued the final appealable order into which the interlocutory order merges. The rule now says: "a motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals within thirty days from the entry of the order sought to be appealed (or, if that order is not a final order, within thirty days of the final order into which it merges)." This court has also held that the entry of a final order starts the clock for discretionary appeals. Jones at ¶ 25. Implicit in this holding and the new language of App.R. 5(C) is a recognition that the State cannot take a discretionary appeal until the trial court issues a final appealable order. Jones at ¶ 24 (acknowledging some authority to the contrary but declining "to read R.C. 2945.67(A) and App.R. 5(C) to permit immediate appeals of 'any other decision' in a criminal case before the ultimate decision has been reached"). In other words, the order before us must be a final appealable order or have merged into a final appealable order for this court to have jurisdiction to proceed. See also State v. Harvey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-165, 2019-Ohio-4022, ¶ 20 (holding that "when the State * * * is seeking leave to appeal an order pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and App.R. 5(C), the order must be a final order so as to vest this court with jurisdiction").
The March 16 Entry on Appeal
{¶ 7} The March 16, 2020 Entry on appeal here is entitled "Entry (1) Finding Preliminary Showing of Particularized Need; (2) Ordering In Camera Review; (3) Granting Motion to Intervene; and (4) Setting Telephone Scheduling Conference." It partially resolves, and partially defers resolution of Gillispie's Motion for Disclosure of Grand Jury Testimony pertaining to four witnesses.
{¶ 8} The trial court had previously ordered the State to have all grand jury witness testimony transcribed and delivered to the court for an in camera inspection. See Entry and Order (Sep. 26, 2019). Upon the court's in camera review of the testimony, the court issued the March 16 Entry detailing its findings and setting out the next steps. With respect to three of the four witnesses' testimony, the trial court found "that Mr. Gillispie has made a preliminary showing of particularized need for the Grand Jury testimony of the three rape victims, namely S.C., C.S. and B.T."
{¶ 9} With respect to the fourth witness, the trial court said:
The Court will permit Mr. Gillispie to argue for disclosure of Det. Moore's Grand Jury transcript at this Court's future hearing as to "particularized need" for Det. Moore's Grand Jury transcript as it relates to the State Law claims.March 16 Entry, p.1. The court continued:
Having met the threshold "particularized need" requirement for disclosure of the Grand Jury testimony of the three rape victims and the likelihood Mr. Gillispie can do so with respect to Det. Moore's Grand Jury testimony as it relates to Mr. Gillispie's State Law claims, the Court hereby sets a TELEPHONE CONFERENCE with counsel for the parties on MARCH 26, 2020 AT 10:45 A.M.
The courtroom will be closed to the public during the hearing. During the hearing, the Court will allow counsel for the parties to review the four transcripts. Thereafter, the Court will hear arguments on the issues of: (1) any
particularized need for Det. Moore's Grand Jury testimony as it relates to Mr. Gillispie's State Law claims or exceptions, if any, to Det. Moore's apparent Federal Immunity from disclosure of his Grand Jury testimony for purposes of the 1983 claims; (2) whether the particularized need for the Grand Jury testimony of the four witnesses outweighs the need for secrecy; and (3) what protective orders, if any, the Court should fashion regarding the Grand Jury testimony.(Emphasis added.) March 16 Entry, p. 3-4 (footnotes omitted). The closed hearing was scheduled for June 4, 2020, but was stayed by this court.
Provisional Remedy
{¶ 10} The State argues that the March 16 Entry is final under the provisional remedy definition contained in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) and (B)(4). A provisional remedy is defined as "a proceeding ancillary to an action." R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). "A proceeding 'ancillary' to an action is 'one that is attendant upon or aids another proceeding.' " State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189, 2006-Ohio-4253, 852 N.E.2d 711, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 446, 449, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (other citations omitted).
{¶ 11} This court has held that the main action must exist when the ancillary proceeding is sought. See State v. Pierce, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25199, 2013-Ohio-1372, ¶ 16 (holding that defendant's "motion requesting the release of the grand jury transcripts is not a 'provisional remedy' as defined by R.C. 2505.02(A)(3)" where the "motion is not ancillary to any action or court proceeding currently in existence"). Additionally, according to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the action to which the provisional remedy is ancillary must be the "attendant, underlying action," and not a different case. Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 26.
{¶ 12} In Gehm, a third-party sought "to intervene for the purpose of establishing a record in a separate action." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The Court found that this did not qualify as a provisional remedy:
Westfield cites no authority for the assertion that an ancillary proceeding for the purposes of a provisional remedy may be used to aid a case other than the attendant, underlying action. Indeed, the law is the opposite.Gehm at ¶ 26-27.
The examples of an ancillary proceeding listed in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) include "preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, suppression of evidence." All these examples pertain only to the underlying action. We therefore hold that a motion to intervene for the purpose of establishing a record in a separate action is not an ancillary proceeding to an action and does not qualify as a provisional remedy for the purposes of R.C. 2505.02.
{¶ 13} We similarly question whether the dispute currently before the trial court qualifies as a provisional remedy, in that it appears to have been filed to aid in Gillispie's federal case, rather than the underlying, closed criminal case. See Petitioner's Motion for Disclosure of Grand Jury Test[i]mony (May 30, 2019), p.1-2 (explaining how he intends to use the transcripts in his federal case). Gillispie has not made an argument that the current proceedings are in aid of the criminal case against him.
Gillispie asserts: "Petitioner has filed a federal lawsuit, in which he alleges that his wrongful prosecution, conviction, and incarceration were caused by the individual and municipal defendants' misconduct, which includes withholding exculpatory evidence, manipulating the victims into falsely identifying him as the perpetrator, and causing him to be confined without probable cause. Amend. Compl., Gillispie v. The City of Miami Township, 3:13-cv-416 (S.D. Ohio), ECF 18. * * * Petitioner seeks to attack the grand jury indictment in his federal suit. Petitioner now seeks an order permitting him to obtain a copy of the grand jury transcripts from his criminal proceedings, which he seeks to use in support of his claims." --------
{¶ 14} Both parties cite the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Daher v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., which appears to accept the proposition that an attempt to obtain grand jury materials can produce a provisional-remedy order when the materials are ordered to be provided to the requestor. Daher, 155 Ohio St.3d 271, 2018-Ohio-4462, 120 N.E.3d 830, ¶ 14. In Daher, however, the attempt to obtain grand jury materials was ancillary to the case then pending before the trial court: a civil action in which Daher sued his former employer for employment discrimination, retaliation, and malicious prosecution. Id. at ¶ 2. Daher sought to obtain grand jury materials from his dismissed criminal prosecution for unauthorized use of property by sending a subpoena (from his civil case) to the court reporter in the criminal grand jury proceedings. Id. at ¶ 3. He sought to use the materials to prove that civil case. Daher represents the typical conception of a provisional remedy: a proceeding that happens aside and along the way to judgment in a pending case, which produces an order that has such an impact that the legislature decided it can be appealed when entered, rather than waiting until a final judgment at the end of the case. The parties have not pointed us to any cases where a provisional remedy was found after judgment.
{¶ 15} If this court were to accept for the purpose of argument that the proceeding for release of grand jury materials in a closed criminal case fits within the definition of a provisional remedy, the remaining statutory elements must also be met. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d at 450, 746 N.E.2d 1092. "An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy" is final if:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy [and]R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Thus, the prosecuting attorney here must show three things: "that (1) the order grants or denies a provisional remedy, (2) the order in effect determines the action with respect to that provisional remedy, and (3) [the State] would not be afforded meaningful review of the decision if [it] had to wait for final judgment." Daher at ¶ 7, citing State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 42.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{¶ 16} The March 16 Entry does not grant or deny the request for grand jury transcripts that is currently before the trial court. In his motion, Gillispie asked the trial court "for an Order allowing him to inspect and copy documents and transcripts obtained during certain grand jury proceedings," and "an order permitting him to obtain a copy of the grand jury transcripts from his criminal proceedings, which he seeks to use in support of his [federal] claims." Motion for Transcripts, p.1, 2. The court has decided that Gillispie's counsel (and apparently all other counsel) will be allowed to review the transcripts in a closed hearing to argue whether Gillespie should to be allowed to obtain a copy for use in his federal lawsuit. While the court has taken a step toward deciding whether to grant or deny the motion by allowing counsel to inspect the transcripts in advance of argument, the ultimate request for release and use has not been granted or denied. This element is not satisfied.
{¶ 17} The second element - that the order in effect determines the provisional remedy proceeding and prevents a judgment in favor of the State - is also not satisfied. The March 16 Entry does not determine the provisional remedy, i.e., whether the grand jury transcripts will be released. We note that this is not a question of whether the trial court has ordered some preliminary step to be taken or whether the order is correct. Daher at ¶ 9-10. The question is whether the proceeding has been effectively determined. See Muncie at ¶ 447-448 (a provisional remedy is defined "as a type of proceeding" not an order entered in that proceeding). As discussed above, this ancillary proceeding has not yet been determined.
{¶ 18} Daher is instructive on this element. There, the Supreme Court distinguished between an order for disclosure and an order for in camera review, noting that the "trial court's in camera review does not cause the materials to be disclosed to the parties, the attorneys, or the public." Id. at ¶ 11. "Only after the trial court denies the motion to quash and orders its court reporter to comply with the subpoena and disclose the sought-after materials to Daher would appellate review be available to the court reporter as an avenue to seek relief." Id. at ¶ 14. The court noted that the court's in camera review " 'is only a minimal first step' * * * in a procedure culminating in a decision to grant or deny a provisional remedy; it is not the provisional remedy itself." Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Gorman, 51 Ohio St.3d 94, 95, 554 N.E.2d 1297 (1990).
{¶ 19} The March 16 Entry before us does not fit neatly into either of the categories described in Daher. It is not strictly an order for court-only in camera review; that is, it is not an order that "does not cause the materials to be disclosed to the parties, the attorneys, or the public." Id. at ¶ 11. The Entry provides that counsel for the parties will get to review the grand jury transcripts, too. But the order also does not resolve the ultimate question of whether the transcripts will be released, either. We conclude that this latter point is the relevant one for R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a). The ultimate question raised in the proceeding before the trial court will be resolved after a hearing, after Gillispie's counsel has reviewed the transcripts, and after the court has heard argument from all parties and possibly fashioned a protective order. Because the ultimate question has not yet been resolved, we conclude that the March 16 Entry does not in effect determine a provisional remedy.
{¶ 20} Nor does the March 16 Entry "prevent[] a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy." R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a). After the hearing, the trial court here could still enter a judgment in favor of the prosecuting attorney, the Detective, and the Township and deny Gillispie a copy of the transcripts for use in his federal lawsuit. That decision is yet unmade.
{¶ 21} We are cognizant of the State's argument and the dissent's concerns that once the transcripts are made available to counsel, the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings will have been irreparably breached. This is a credible argument that R.C. 2502.02(B)(4)(b) - lack of meaningful review after final judgment - is satisfied. But this concern alone is not enough; all parts of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) must be satisfied.
{¶ 22} The concerns of the dissent in this respect are very real - regardless of whether our analysis of the final order statute is an ill-advised academic exercise (however legally correct) and soon to be mooted by the release of the transcripts to Gillispie's counsel. The question we address (whether there is a final appealable order) is the threshold issue and the only issue before us on the motion to dismiss.
{¶ 23} We also have concerns about the March 16 Entry and the procedure therein that allows possible premature disclosure without appellate review and without other protections in place to safeguard the grand jury testimony. See, e.g., State v. Glenn, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28736 (Decision and Final Judgment Entry, Mar. 6, 2020) (dismissing appeal while expressing concern about correctness of the order on appeal). But, as the majority in Daher recognized, the jurisdictional inquiry must be answered before reaching the merits. Daher, 155 Ohio St.3d 271, 2018-Ohio-4462, 120 N.E.3d 830, at ¶ 16 ("We are bound by R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), which controls our jurisdiction regardless of any process-based contentions at this juncture"). Without jurisdiction, we cannot review the merits at this time.
{¶ 24} And while it is true that the trial court has indicated it will consider some procedures for safeguarding any released testimony, those have not been formalized and are not before us on the pending motions. Whether there is a process, perhaps similar to protections afforded in litigation involving trade secrets or arguably-confidential or privileged communications is a matter for the trial court in the first instance.
{¶ 25} In this matter, we conclude that the March 16 Entry is not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Even if we were to accept for the sake of argument that the proceeding below fits within the definition of a provisional remedy, the trial court has not yet determined (that is, granted or denied) the provisional remedy (that is, the motion for release and use of grand jury transcripts), and could still determine it in the State's favor. The underlying matter is simply not yet complete. State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 20 ("A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a final appealable order" (internal quotation omitted)).
{¶ 26} The State has not convinced us that the order before us is final and appealable at this time. We have no jurisdiction to review an order or judgment that is not final, and this appeal must therefore be dismissed. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989).
{¶ 27} We find Gillispie's motion to dismiss well-taken and SUSTAIN it. The State's motion for leave to appeal is OVERRULED for lack of jurisdiction. David Owens's motion for leave to appear pro hac vice is OVERRULED as moot. This matter, Montgomery Appellate Case No. 28766, is DISMISSED.
{¶ 28} Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), it is hereby ordered that the Clerk of the Montgomery County Court of Appeals shall immediately serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the mailing. Costs taxed pursuant to App.R. 24.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
MARY E. DONOVAN, Judge
/s/_________
JEFFREY E. FROELICH, Judge Hall, J., dissenting.
{¶ 29} In my opinion this court's failure to accept and decide the appeal at this juncture is plainly wrong and I dissent.
{¶ 30} The trial court has determined that the Gillispie "has made a preliminary showing of particularized need for the Grand Jury testimony of the three rape victims, namely S.C., C.S. and B.T." March 16 Entry, p.1. The court has also determined that there is a "likelihood" that Gillispie will be able to show a particularized need for release of the grand jury testimony of Det. Moore. Id., p.3. In that regard, the trial court has ordered a hearing and "[d]uring the hearing, the Court will allow counsel for the parties to review the four transcripts." Id.
{¶ 31} The majority's apparently unresolved query about whether the trial court's order is appealable because it involves disclosure for a federal civil case after judgment in the underlying docketed criminal case under appeal is a distraction. Assume for the moment that the trial court's order was for the release of grand jury testimony to Gillispie (which in my opinion it is). There would be no question that such an order should be and is appealable. Grand jury testimony and materials are secret and if an order for their release is not appealable, before the release actually occurs, then the entire history of Ohio jurisprudence on the subject might as well be ignored. Whether the release is for the ongoing criminal case, or another criminal case, or some potential Ohio civil case, or a pending federal case does not matter. See, e.g., In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence Presented to Franklin County Grand Juries in 1970, 63 Ohio St.2d 212, 218-219, 407 N.E.2d 513 (1980) (in an application to release Ohio grand jury testimony for use in a civil case in Colorado Federal District Court that had been transferred from Ohio Federal District Court: "We hold that a petition to the court which supervised a grand jury is the proper means of obtaining release of grand jury materials.* * * Initially, this decision should be made by the trial court, subject to review.").
{¶ 32} The majority concludes that allowing Gillispie's counsel to peek at the transcripts does not determine the action. I disagree. That is a release of the information nonetheless. If it's not, then every applicant for release of grand jury testimony should be entitled to peek at the transcript to determine whether their pursuit of the testimony is worth pursuing further, and the well-protected secrecy of grand jury testimony will be compromised. The majority suggests that Daher, 155 Ohio St.3d 271, 2018-Ohio-4462, 120 N.E.3d 830, held that an order for an in camera inspection of grand jury testimony is not a final order. I do not disagree. But there the Supreme Court was referring to an in camera inspection by the court, not a review of the transcripts by all counsel. Nothing in Daher indicates that inspection of grand jury transcripts by the Gillispie's counsel is not a final appealable order.
{¶ 33} Justice O'Donnell, in his dissent in Daher, recognized the risk associated with production of grand jury transcripts and inspection even with in camera inspection by the court. I repeat his sentiment that is more applicable here where the ordered secondary inspection is by counsel. "And, it is the hope of the majority that the trial court would be able to maintain the secrecy of the grand jury. Good luck with that!" Id. at ¶ 20 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting.)
{¶ 34} Because I believe that allowing counsel for Gillispie to inspect grand jury testimony is tantamount to release of that testimony, the trial court's order effectively determines the action and is an irretrievable step that we should accept for appeal and measured consideration.
/s/_________
MICHAEL T. HALL, Judge Copies to: Andrew French
301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor
Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Appellant, State of Ohio Michelle Berry
114 East 8th Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie
and Michelle Berry
3584 Mooney Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45208
Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie Mark Godsey
P.O. Box 210040
University of Cincinnati College of Law
Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
Attorney for Appellee, Roger Gillispie Todd Raskin
Jeffrey Kay
Frank Scialdone
Cara Wright
100 Franklin's Row
34305 Solon Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44139
Attorneys for Appellee, Matthew Scott Moore Edward Dowd
Dawn Frick
Christopher Herman
8163 Old Yankee Street, Suite C
Dayton, Ohio 45458
Attorneys for Appellee, Miami Township, Ohio Hon. Steven K. Dankof
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court
41 N. Perry Street
Dayton, Ohio 45422 Courtesy copies to: David Owens
Michael Kanovitz
311 N. Aberdeen Street, 3rd Floor
Chicago, IL 60607 Leon Daidone
Anne Jagielski
301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor
Dayton, Ohio 45422 CA3/KY