Opinion
No. (AC 25039).
The state appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in January, 2004, dismissing the state's petition for an order extending the acquittee's commitment to the psychiatric security review board. Held that the January, 2004 judgment having been opened by the trial court, that judgment stood as though it never had been rendered, and, therefore, the state's appeal from that judgment was void and had to be dismissed.
Argued May 31, 2005.
Officially released November 1, 2005.
Petition for an order extending the acquittee's commitment to the psychiatric security review board, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Miano, J., granted the acquittee's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the state, on the granting of permission, appealed to this court; thereafter, the court granted the state's motion to open and restated its judgment of dismissal. Appeal dismissed.
Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state). Monte P. Radler, public defender, for the appellee (acquittee).
Opinion
The state appeals from the January 6, 2004 judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of the motion of the acquittee, Gregory Gillespie, to dismiss the state's petition for an order of continued commitment. On appeal, both the state and the acquittee claim that the trial court's decision should be reversed in light of our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004). Although we agree that it must be reversed and have done so in State v. Gillespie, 92 Conn. App. 143, 884 A.2d 419 (2005), we disagree that it can be done in this appeal from the judgment rendered January 6, 2004.
The sole issue before us on this appeal is whether General Statutes § 17a-593 (c) is unconstitutional because it is violative of the due process and equal protection rights of acquittees. The appeal was taken from the January 6, 2004 judgment.
Because the court's order of May 21, 2004, was operative to open the judgment of January 6, 2004, the case then stood as though the judgment as originally entered had never been rendered. See Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, 137 Conn. 277, 279, 77 A.2d 80 (1950), citing Padaigis v. Kane, 125 Conn. 727, 728, 4 A.2d 335 (1939), and Simpson v. YMCA of Bridgeport, 118 Conn. 414, 418, 172 A. 855 (1934). Accordingly, any appeal from that judgment is void. See Milford Trust Co. v. Greenberg, supra, 137 Conn. 279; see also RAL Management, Inc., v. Valley View Associates, 88 Conn. App. 430, 872 A.2d 462 (2005), cert. granted, 274 Conn. 902, 876 A.2d 12 (2005).
In its May 21, 2004 decision, the court references the December 23, 2003 decision, which was filed on January 6, 2004.