Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 12-0366
01-07-2014
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JAIME GARCIA-OJEDA, Appellant.
Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix By Robert A. Walsh Counsel for Appellee Robert J. Campos & Associates, P.L.C., Phoenix By Robert J. Campos Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2011-118867-001
The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix
By Robert A. Walsh
Counsel for Appellee
Robert J. Campos & Associates, P.L.C., Phoenix
By Robert J. Campos
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Chief Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined. WINTHROP, Presiding Judge:
¶1 The trial court convicted Jaime Garcia-Ojeda ("Appellant") of two counts of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, each a class two felony; two counts of misconduct involving a weapon, each a class four felony; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class six felony. Appellant argues the court erred in denying his pre-trial motions (1) to suppress evidence, (2) for a Franks hearing, and (3) to compel discovery of the identity of the State's confidential informant ("CI"). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The record indicates Appellant is also known as Juan Hujardo Salceda, Juan Hurtado Salceda, Juan Garcia Ojeda, and Jaime Garcia Ojeda.
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 201, 953 P.2d 1252, 1254 (App. 1997).
¶2 On April 14, 2011, Appellant's Chevy Tahoe was stopped by a patrol officer at the direction of Phoenix Police Detective Macias minutes after the undercover detective observed an apparent drug transaction between Appellant and a woman in the parking lot of a grocery store. When Appellant could not produce a valid driver's license, he was arrested. An inventory search of his vehicle before it was towed led to the discovery of a pouch containing seven baggies of methamphetamine between the driver's seat and center console. The police then obtained a search warrant for Appellant's home, where they found and seized methamphetamine, cash, weapons, and drug paraphernalia.
¶3 Following his indictment, Appellant filed motions to suppress and to compel disclosure of the CI. After an evidentiary hearing on October 14 and December 16, 2011, the trial court denied the motions.
¶4 A bench trial resulted in the court finding Appellant guilty of all counts as charged. After his sentencing, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).
Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, the statutes cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Suppress
¶5 In his pre-trial motion to suppress, Appellant argued the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle on April 14 (and thus lacked probable cause to search his vehicle or home, based on a "fruit of the poisonous tree" theory). At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from undercover Drug Enforcement Bureau ("DEB") Detectives Macias and Chavez, who were involved in the investigation of Appellant's activities, as well as from Officer Vine, who conducted the traffic stop of Appellant's vehicle. The court denied the motion to suppress after finding the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's vehicle and, ultimately, probable cause to search his vehicle. The court also found that, even if the vehicle search was illegal, the drugs would inevitably have been discovered through an inventory search.
Appellant does not challenge the hearing testimony that the Phoenix Police Department's policy requires officers to inventory the contents of all vehicles that are to be towed following the driver's arrest.
¶6 On appeal, Appellant argues that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's reasonable suspicion finding. He maintains the information the CI provided to detectives did not constitute reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and, other than Detective Macias's reliance on his training and experience, there was "absolutely no evidence" he conducted a drug transaction on April 14. We disagree.
¶7 We review a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for clear and manifest error. State v. Walker, 215 Ariz. 91, 94, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 220, 223 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. Id. (citations omitted). We accord great deference to the trial court's credibility determinations because that court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of the testifying witnesses. See State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, 252, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 228, 230 (App. 2007). We review de novo, however, the ultimate question whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop. See State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 632, 925 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1996).
¶8 When a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, the officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). "While 'reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Id. (citation omitted). Although a mere inchoate hunch or unparticularized suspicion is insufficient, the Fourth Amendment requires only that police officers have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal wrongdoing drawn from their experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might elude an untrained person. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23-24, ¶¶ 25-26, 170 P.3d 266, 272-73 (App. 2007) (citations omitted).
¶9 On appeal, we consider the "whole picture," or the "totality of the circumstances," in deciding whether police officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a person was engaged in criminal activity. State v. O'Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 295-96, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d 325, 326-27 (2000) (citation omitted). Rather than parsing out each individual factor, categorizing it as potentially innocent, and rejecting it, we "look at all of the factors, (all of which would have a potentially innocent explanation, or else there would be probable cause), and examine them collectively." Id. at 296, ¶ 10, 9 P.3d at 327. We also accord deference to a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious activity based on the officer's experience and training. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 26, 170 P.3d at 273.
¶10 In this case, testimony from the suppression hearing supports the trial court's finding that, based on a totality of the circumstances, Detective Macias had reasonable suspicion to order the stop of Appellant's vehicle. Approximately two months before the April 14 stop, DEB detectives began surveillance of Appellant's home based on information obtained from a CI, who told Detective Chavez that a large quantity of drugs were stored at and/or being trafficked from Appellant's home. Although Detective Chavez had previously determined the CI was reliable based on the CI's work with the police in other cases, Detective Chavez required the CI to conduct a "reliability buy" to further test the veracity of the information provided. To facilitate the reliability buy, Detective Chavez provided the CI with funds, which the CI used to purchase drugs directly from Appellant. At that time, the CI specifically pointed out Appellant as the drug trafficker.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Chavez refused to reveal the CI's identity or affirm whether he witnessed the actual transaction during the reliability buy, assertedly to protect the CI. The court did not require the detective to answer questions that might have identified the CI.
¶11 Detective Macias testified he had been with the DEB for eleven years, had observed perhaps more than one hundred drug transactions in vehicles, and had purchased illegal drugs in a vehicle on "numerous" occasions while undercover. In his training and experience, mid-level drug dealers often conduct transactions from inside vehicles in the parking lots of busy stores because it is easy for them to avoid police detection among other parked cars. Also, such transactions tend to occur quickly - with one party jumping in and out of a vehicle for a quick exchange before each goes his or her own way - because the details are usually prearranged before meeting at the pre-designated spot.
¶12 Approximately two weeks before Appellant's arrest, Detective Macias witnessed Appellant engage in what the detective believed was a drug transaction. On that occasion, Detective Macias observed Appellant drive from his home to the parking lot of a nearby Home Depot. The detective knew that particular parking lot was used frequently by drug dealers for transactions because he had previously been involved in several surveillances and witnessed numerous drug deals at that location. After Appellant parked his Tahoe near the middle of the parking lot, a male carrying a bag walked up, opened the Tahoe's rear passenger door, jumped into the back seat of the Tahoe without closing the door, dropped the bag, immediately exited, and hastily walked away. Appellant quickly drove away toward his residence. Both Detective Macias and Detective Chavez, who was also involved in the surveillance, attempted to contact a patrol unit to conduct a traffic stop, but they were unable to do so before Appellant arrived home.
The detective explained that, from his training and experience, he believed he had witnessed a typical "drop-off and out" delivery of a quantity of new drugs to Appellant.
¶13 On April 14, Detective Macias again followed Appellant's Tahoe and watched him turn into the parking lot of a small shopping complex, stop momentarily, exit the lot, and drive back into traffic northbound before later turning into a Food City parking lot. Because he feared Appellant might still be checking for surveillance, Detective Macias continued northbound and made a U-turn to enter the parking lot.
The detective believed this evasive maneuver was a type of "heat run," a preemptive counter-surveillance technique used by drug traffickers to determine if any vehicles are following them.
¶14 Appellant parked his Tahoe near the middle of the parking lot, and stayed inside the vehicle with the driver's side window halfway down. Detective Macias drove past Appellant in his unmarked vehicle and parked two or three rows behind Appellant, where he had an unobstructed view of the Tahoe. A Toyota pickup truck soon arrived and parked just south of the Tahoe. A female passenger exited the Toyota and jumped into the passenger side of Appellant's Tahoe. The female and Appellant leaned toward one another while looking downward toward the center console area of the Tahoe for approximately ten to twenty seconds. The female then exited the Tahoe and reentered the Toyota, which immediately drove away. Seconds later, Appellant drove out of the parking lot southbound until he was stopped by Officer Vine.
¶15 Detective Macias acknowledged he could not see either Appellant's or the woman's hands while they were inside the Tahoe, and therefore did not directly observe whether drugs or money were exchanged. Nevertheless, given his training and experience, he believed their behavior was consistent with a drug transaction. His belief was also informed by his observations at the Home Depot parking lot two weeks before. Based on the information from the CI and his various observations of conduct consistent with drug dealing, Detective Macias concluded he had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's vehicle. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court agreed, and so do we.
¶16 The trial court found credible the testimony of Detectives Macias and Chavez - based on their extensive knowledge of, and experience with, drug trafficking and drug traffickers. See Olquin, 216 Ariz. at 252, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d at 230. The court gave weight to the fact that the Home Depot parking lot was known to Detective Macias as a location for frequent drug transactions and to his testimony that mid-level drug dealers often conduct transactions in the parking lots of busy stores to blend in with the general activity and avoid police detection. The court further reasoned that "Food City, like Home Depot, has a lot of activity and would be a probable place for drug transactions." We find that inference supported by the evidence. See generally Walker, 215 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d at 223. The trial court also found significant that Detective Macias had observed conduct by Appellant consistent with drug dealing on two separate days because, on each day, Appellant had driven to the parking lot of a busy store, never exited his vehicle, had a brief encounter with a single individual while in his vehicle, and appeared to conduct no other business at the location before leaving.
¶17 Appellant maintains that, in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, the trial court abused its discretion by treating as reliable the CI's tip that Appellant stored or sold drugs in his home. Appellant argues the court could not properly assess the CI's reliability because (1) the State did not reveal the CI's identity to the court, fully develop the CI's track record, or explain how the CI obtained knowledge about Appellant; (2) Detective Chavez was unwilling to provide the court with details about the reliability buy in order to protect the CI; and (3) unlike in some other cases, the CI in this case had not provided the police with detailed, predictive information regarding the April 14 drug transaction. See generally United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2006).
¶18 Appellant's argument is not supported by the record, which shows the trial court considered the CI's reliability at some length. Detective Chavez testified that the CI had previously been arrested on drug charges and provided information to the police to obtain a better deal and "work off" the charges. Although no longer working off charges, the CI had signed a contract to provide further information in exchange for payment, and was providing information related to several investigations. The CI had been deemed reliable based in part on the multiple times the CI had assisted the police by providing dependable information. Also, after the CI provided information pointing to Appellant as a drug trafficker, Detective Chavez interviewed the CI to further ascertain the CI's drug trade knowledge, including the CI's familiarity with drug prices and the daily activities of drug dealers, and arranged the reliability buy approximately two months before Appellant's arrest. Before the reliability buy, the CI provided a physical description of the person who would arrive and sell methamphetamines to the CI. The actual reliability buy occurred while Detectives Chavez and Macias were conducting surveillance, and led to the identification of Appellant as a possible trafficker by not only Detectives Chavez and Macias, but other detectives in the area involved in surveillance. With regard to the reliability of the CI, the court found:
While the informant may have a criminal record and likely received an incentive or benefit from his work on this case, his general reliability was established through Detective Chavez's testimony. Detective Chavez utilized his normal methods for determining the informant's reliability: interviews, prior work and a reliability buy. And, while the Court finds that the State did not establish that the informant bought drugs from the defendant at the reliability buy (due to the lack of any first-hand witness testimony), it nonetheless finds that the State did show that the informant bought drugs from someone, thereby bolstering his general reliability. In light of all these factors, the Court believes the informant to be sufficiently reliable to consider it a factor favoring the State in a "totality of circumstances" analysis.The court also noted that the CI's reliability was bolstered by Detective Macias's observations on two separate days of conduct consistent with drug dealing, and concluded that the combination of the CI's reliable tip and Appellant's prior conduct consistent with a drug transaction gave the police reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's vehicle after they had observed his conduct on the day of his arrest.
¶19 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, see O'Meara, 198 Ariz. at 295-96, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d at 326-27, we cannot say the trial court erred in finding the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's vehicle on April 14. Detective Chavez explained why he believed the CI was reliable from their prior work together and from the reliability buy he set up with the CI, even if Detective Chavez did not ultimately testify whether he personally viewed the drug transaction with Appellant in order to not jeopardize the CI's safety. Detective Macias explained why drug transactions often occur inside vehicles parked in the parking lots of active businesses, where parties can meet under cover of the surrounding legitimate activity to quickly complete their prearranged exchange. Detective Macias knew the parking lot of the particular Home Depot as a location for such drug transactions from past surveillances and numerous deals he had witnessed there. On two separate occasions, Detective Macias observed Appellant drive to the parking lot of a busy store (including the Home Depot known for drug activity) without entering either store, only to meet briefly with a single individual in his car before immediately leaving. These factors, when viewed together in the light of Detective Macias's knowledge and experience, see id. at 296, ¶ 10, 9 P.3d at 327, support the finding that the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant had engaged in a drug transaction on April 14 and to detain him. The trial court did not commit clear and manifest error in denying Appellant's motion to suppress based on the reasonableness of the stop. See Walker, 215 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d at 223.
Appellant makes no argument regarding his subsequent arrest for failure to provide a valid license or challenging the validity of the Phoenix Police Department's inventory search policy. Consequently, we do not address the trial court's additional findings that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the drugs would inevitably have been found because of the inventory search before towing.
II. Motion for Franks Hearing
¶20 When he drafted the affidavit to obtain the search warrant for Appellant's residence, Detective Macias based his probable cause argument on his undercover surveillance of Appellant's activities, the stop of Appellant's Tahoe on April 14, and the resulting seizure of methamphetamine from the vehicle. The affidavit did not cite the CI's tip or the reliability buy, although the affidavit's initial paragraph stated:
On April 14th, 2011 I began surveillance on [the address of Appellant's residence] (as previously described) based on information that Detective Chavez [] had received. The information was that this residence was being used as a methamphetamine distribution location.The remainder of the affidavit recited Detective Macias's observations of Appellant's conduct while at the Food City parking lot, details surrounding the subsequent stop and arrest of Appellant, including the seizure of seven baggies of methamphetamine in his vehicle, and a detailed description of the detective's experiences and familiarity with the practices of drug dealers.
¶21 As part of his motion to suppress, Appellant requested a Franks hearing, arguing the search warrant of the house was invalid because Detective Macias did not explicitly name the CI or detail the CI's involvement in the case, source of knowledge, or record of credibility or reliability. Appellant maintained that Detective Macias intentionally or recklessly withheld the information from the magistrate and that, by omitting the information, Detective Macias "flat out lied to the judge" and prevented the magistrate from independently assessing whether the CI's information was sufficiently reliable to support a probable cause finding. The State responded that Detective Macias had neither lied nor intentionally withheld essential information from the magistrate, the paragraph in question was nothing more than a preliminary statement explaining how the investigation began, and the probable cause claimed for the search warrant derived from the drugs found in Appellant's vehicle on April 14.
¶22 The trial court heard oral argument on the Franks motion at the time of the hearing on the motion to suppress. Responses to defense counsel's questioning during the hearing established that the CI provided no information specifically related to the events occurring on April 14. Detective Macias testified he received no information from the CI indicating Appellant was going to engage in a drug transaction on that particular date and his decision to conduct surveillance that day was purely random. Nonetheless, defense counsel argued Detective Macias's failure to note that the CI's initial tip was the catalyst for the investigation established that the detective withheld material information that would have caused the reviewing magistrate to question the overall reliability of the detective's claim of probable cause. The State countered that nothing in the initial paragraph was false, and Appellant's arrest and the seizure of the drugs in his vehicle were the primary basis (along with the detective's knowledge and experience) for requesting the court to find probable cause that police would also find drugs at Appellant's residence.
This argument was premised on defense counsel's contention that, other than the CI's information, there was "nothing at all suspicious or criminal in what Detective Macias saw." Because we address this argument in our reasonable suspicion analysis, we do not address it again.
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¶23 The court denied the requested hearing after concluding that Appellant had not satisfied the prerequisites for a Franks hearing because he had not shown that (1) Detective Macias "acted knowingly, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth in completing his affidavit" and (2) "the omitted information - that a confidential informant was used for the initial tip - was material to the finding of probable cause." See 438 U.S. at 155-56. In reaching its conclusion, the court found as follows:
The Court disagrees that Detective Macias knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, omitted information about the confidential informant to avoid any scrutiny by [the Commissioner] of the reliability of that informant. Detective Macias logically devoted the majority of his affidavit to the conduct he observed by [Appellant], the stop and the subsequent search of the car because these are the facts he used to support probable cause. Further, as noted above, Detective Macias advised [the Commissioner] that he began surveillance based on information Detective Chavez received that drugs were being sold out of [Appellant's] home. If [the Commissioner] wanted more information about the source of the initial tip, she could have followed up.The court also found that omission of the CI's information was not material to the finding of probable cause because that was established by Detective Macias's observations of Appellant's conduct, which had led to a stop and search of Appellant's vehicle, where the drugs were found.
¶24 On appeal, Appellant maintains the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that he failed to make a sufficient showing to obtain a Franks hearing. We find no abuse of discretion.
¶25 "A presumption exists in favor of the validity of search warrants." State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 430, 690 P.2d 145, 149 (App. 1984) (citation omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court held in Franks that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained by false statements can violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 245, ¶ 42, 25 P.3d 717, 733 (2001) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 274 P.3d 509 (2012). A court must suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth made a false statement to obtain the warrant and the statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause. Id. Innocent or negligent mistakes made in an affidavit will not satisfy the first prong of the Franks test. State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 109, 700 P.2d 488, 496 (1985).
¶26 If a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and the statement was necessary to finding probable cause, the defendant is entitled to a hearing. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 279, 645 P.2d 784, 794 (1982). To require an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's attack must be more than conclusory and supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
¶27 To demonstrate an affiant acted with reckless disregard for the truth, a defendant must offer some proof that the affiant entertained serious doubts about the truth of the affidavit. See id. The trial court is in a unique position to judge the credibility of the affiant and determine whether he was on notice of material facts that he misstated or omitted from his affidavit. State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 555, 810 P.2d 178, 183 (1991). Unless clearly erroneous, a court's finding on whether an affiant deliberately included misstatements or excluded material facts is a factual determination that will be upheld on appeal. Id. at 554, 810 P.2d at 182 (citations omitted).
¶28 In this case, the issuance of the search warrant for Appellant's home was predicated on the discovery of drugs in his vehicle, and as the trial court noted, Detective Macias logically devoted the majority of his affidavit to delineating the facts surrounding his surveillance of Appellant's activities on April 14 and to the fact that a search of Appellant's vehicle uncovered seven baggies of methamphetamine. Appellant's activities in the Food City parking lot and the discovery of the drugs inside his vehicle were the primary basis for probable cause to believe police officers would find additional drugs in Appellant's residence, regardless of any tip they might have received about that possibility in the past. See State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. 466, 473, 679 P.2d 489, 496 (1984) (recognizing that there is a nexus between a drug dealer, his vehicle, and his home, making it reasonable to infer that drugs may be found on his person, in his vehicle, or in his home (citing United States v. Spearman, 532 F.2d 132, 133 (9th Cir. 1976))). Detective Macias's affidavit correctly disclosed that the investigation began due to information Detective Chavez received, but after the April 14 seizure, Detective Macias had developed independent probable cause to believe drugs would be found at Appellant's residence. The trial court correctly ruled that Appellant failed to establish either prong of the Franks analysis by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 245, ¶ 42, 25 P.3d at 733. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for a Franks hearing. See Poland, 132 Ariz. at 279, 645 P.2d at 794.
III. Motion to Compel Disclosure of CI
¶29 Appellant also moved to compel disclosure of the CI's identity before trial, arguing inter alia that the CI was (1) the person who had tied Appellant to alleged methamphetamine sales, (2) the reason for the random surveillance of Appellant's residence, and (3) likely to have evidence pertinent to whether Appellant was guilty of the charged crimes. The trial court ruled that disclosure of the CI's identity was not necessary to a fair trial because the CI "would have no evidence to offer" regarding whether Appellant was guilty of the charged crimes.
¶30 On appeal, Appellant relies on Resnick v. State, 24 Ariz. App. 513, 514, 540 P.2d 132, 133 (1975), to argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion because disclosure should be mandatory when the issue is the existence of probable cause to determine whether a search or arrest was justified. He reiterates his argument that there was no valid finding of probable cause because Detective Macias failed to inform the magistrate about the existence of the CI in obtaining the search warrant and thus the detective "acted solely on an unsupported hunch, based on information he allegedly received from an untested, unreliable confidential informant." Insofar as we have previously rejected these latter arguments in our discussion of the trial court's rulings on the Franks hearing, we do not address them again.
¶31 Moreover, disclosure of a confidential informant is subject to limitations. Although the Due Process Clause requires the government to disclose an informant's identity at trial provided the identity is relevant and helpful to the defense, it has never been held to require the disclosure of an informant's identity at a suppression hearing. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980). Further, although disclosure of an informant's identity or the contents of his communications may be appropriate when such disclosure "is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause," mere speculation as to an informant's knowledge regarding peripheral aspects of a case is insufficient to require disclosure. Resnick, 24 Ariz. App. at 514, 540 P.2d at 133 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)).
¶32 As in Resnick, the CI here was the one who pointed the finger of suspicion at Appellant, but the CI played no part in the criminal act for which Appellant was ultimately arrested. See id. Consequently, Appellant fails in his attempt to meet the burden of proof necessary to compel disclosure of the CI on this basis. See id.
¶33 Here, Detective Macias testified the CI played no part in his decision to place Appellant under surveillance on the specific date of April 14 and, consequently, in Appellant's arrest and the subsequent seizure of the drugs. Other than having pointed the finger of suspicion at Appellant before April 14, the CI provided no information that indicated Appellant planned to engage in a drug transaction on that date. Probable cause to search the house arose from Detective Macias's observations of Appellant's conduct, his training and experience, and the discovery of the methamphetamine in Appellant's vehicle. Under these circumstances, disclosure of the CI would not have aided Appellant in defending against the crimes with which he was charged. Because the trial court properly balanced the State's need to protect the CI's identity against the relevance of that identity to Appellant's rights to a fair trial, see id., the court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to compel disclosure of the CI's identity.
CONCLUSION
¶34 Appellant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.