Opinion
No. SC19-1366
05-19-2022
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. John GARCIA, Respondent.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael W. Mervine, Bureau Chief, and Asad Ali, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, for Respondent
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael W. Mervine, Bureau Chief, and Asad Ali, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, for Respondent
LAWSON, J.
In the decision on review, Garcia v. State , 276 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), the Third District Court of Appeal held that the evidence was insufficient to support John Garcia's convictions for second-degree murder and second-degree grand theft. In so holding, the Third District applied the special standard for reviewing convictions based entirely on circumstantial evidence—a standard of review that we abandoned while Garcia was pending review in this Court. See Bush v. State , 295 So. 3d 179, 200-01 (Fla. 2020) (holding that "in all cases where the sufficiency of the evidence is analyzed" the proper standard of review is "whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict"). We have jurisdiction based on the express and direct conflict between Garcia and Bush , see art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., quash the Third District's decision in Garcia , and remand with instructions that the Third District reconsider Mr. Garcia's appeal applying the competent, substantial evidence standard of Bush .
Before the State noticed Bush as supplemental authority supporting our jurisdiction, it sought discretionary review based on misapplication of prior decisions of this Court. In relevant part, the State argued that, irrespective of the standard of review, the Third District misapplied decisions establishing that lies or inconsistent statements by the defendant can be sufficient to allow a jury to reject a defendant's version of events or theory of defense and thereby uphold a jury's determination of guilt consistent with other evidence. See, e.g. , Finney v. State , 660 So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995) ("In light of Finney's inconsistent statements concerning his interactions with the victim and his activities on the day of the murder, the jury was free to reject Finney's version of events as unreasonable."). Here, Mr. Garcia made inconsistent statements, including about never having driven the victim's vehicle and the manner in which he obtained the victim's money, relevant to the sufficiency analysis. See Simpson v. State , 562 So. 2d 742, 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (explaining that a voluntary "false statement would have been admissible in the State's case as substantive evidence tending to affirmatively show a consciousness of guilt on [the defendant's] part"); see also United States v. Holbert , 578 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[F]alse exculpatory statements may be used ... as substantive evidence tending to prove guilt."). However, because we are remanding for reconsideration in light of Bush , which will necessarily require the Third District to examine sufficiency anew, we decline to reach the merits of the State's original jurisdictional argument that the Third District's decision misapplies decisions such as Finney .
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
I adhere to my dissent in Bush v. State , 295 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned the long-applied heightened standard of review for wholly circumstantial evidence cases. However, recognizing that the standard has been abandoned, I concur with the majority to the extent that it remands this case to the Third District Court of Appeal for reconsideration using the competent, substantial evidence standard.