Opinion
NO. PD-0183-21
01-26-2022
The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Leonardo Fabio GARCIA, Appellee
Melissa Hervey Stryker, for Appellant. Jani Maselli Wood, Elaine Morley, Houston, for Appellee.
Melissa Hervey Stryker, for Appellant.
Jani Maselli Wood, Elaine Morley, Houston, for Appellee.
Newell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keller, P.J. and Richardson, Yeary, Keel, Walker, Slaughter and McClure, JJ., joined.
Can the State appeal a trial court's order that grants post-conviction habeas corpus relief and vacates the conviction in a misdemeanor case? Yes. We have previously held that the State may appeal a trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief when the granting of habeas corpus relief results in one of the enumerated situations giving rise to the State's ability to appeal under Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this case, the trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief and vacating Appellee's misdemeanor conviction effectively granted a new trial. Under Article 44.01, the State may appeal a trial court's order granting a new trial. Consequently, the court of appeals erroneously held that the State lacked the ability to appeal from the trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to the court of appeals to consider the merits of the State's appeal.
See Alvarez v. Eighth Court of Appeals of Texas , 977 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ; State v. Young , 810 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a) (enumerating the orders that the State is entitled to appeal).
Background
The facts in this case are not in dispute. In November 1998, Appellee pleaded guilty to the offense of misdemeanor theft. In May 2007, he pleaded guilty to another misdemeanor theft charge. On that charge, he was sentenced to ten days in jail with three days credit for time served. At the time of both pleas, Appellee was not a United States citizen.
In November 2019, the United States Department of Homeland Security notified Appellee that he was subject to deportation as the result of his two prior misdemeanor theft convictions. In May 2020, Appellee filed an application for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article 11.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He alleged that his plea in his 2007 case was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court held a hearing and signed an order granting relief and vacating Appellee's 2007 conviction.
The order at issue in this case is a form order that provides two explicit choices for a trial court to grant habeas corpus relief.
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The first choice grants relief and further orders that bail be set. The second choice grants relief and further orders that the conviction be vacated. The second choice contains an additional order that applicant be discharged and released without delay. The trial judge selected the latter of the two options granting relief.
Appeal
The State appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting habeas corpus relief. Appellee argued to the contrary. Neither party addressed the issue of the State's ability to appeal the trial court's order. The court of appeals dismissed the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. According to the court of appeals, the State, as the respondent in a habeas action, could not appeal an order "discharging" Appellee. The court of appeals noted that Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically authorizes the State to appeal a grant of habeas corpus relief in a writ application filed pursuant to Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the court held that the State could not appeal the grant of habeas corpus relief in this case because Appellee had filed his writ application pursuant to Article 11.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than Article 11.072. Consequently, the court of appeals dismissed the State's appeal for want of jurisdiction.
State v. Garcia , 619 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021).
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 385.
On discretionary review, the State argues that Article 44.01 authorizes the State to appeal a trial court order granting a new trial. According to the State, the trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief and vacating the judgment is the functional equivalent of a new trial regardless of whether the trial court also ordered Appellee to be discharged from custody. We agree with the State and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
The State also argues even if the order discharging Appellee from custody does not constitute the functional equivalent of a new trial it acts as the functional equivalent of a dismissal of the information. Because we determine that the trial court's order granting post-conviction habeas relief and vacating the judgement was the functional equivalent of a grant of a new trial, we need not reach this argument.
Analysis
Article 44.01(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists several circumstances under which the State may appeal in a criminal case without reference to the nature of the proceedings. Under subsection (a)(3), the State may appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order grants a new trial. Under subsection (a)(1), the State may also appeal an order of a court in a criminal case that dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any portion of an indictment, information or complaint. Both statutory provisions focus upon the effect of the trial court's order rather than the particular proceeding that leads to the trial court's order.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(1) & (3) ; see also State v. Moreno , 807 S.W.2d 327, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ("An appellate court, in order to determine its jurisdiction, must look to the effect of any orders concerning an indictment or information, not what the trial court or the parties at trial have labeled such orders.").
We have previously held that the State may appeal a trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief when the order functionally creates one of the appealable scenarios that Article 44.01 specifically enumerates. For example, we held in State v. Young that Article 44.01(a)(1) authorized a State's appeal of a trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief that had the effect of dismissing the indictments pending against the defendants. Article 44.01 by its own terms allows the State to appeal "an order of the court" so long as that order meets specified requisites in its effects. Though Young dealt with a situation in which a grant of habeas corpus relief resulted in a dismissal of the charging instrument, the distinction between a grant of habeas corpus relief that results a dismissed charging instrument and one that results in a new trial is of no moment. Either type of order granting habeas corpus relief can be appealed by the State pursuant to Article 44.01(a).
Moreno , 807 S.W.2d at 330 (denying mandamus relief from a trial court's grant of habeas corpus relief that resulted in the dismissal of criminal complaints in a municipal court because the State had an adequate remedy of law through a State's appeal of the dismissal of the complaints); see also Alvarez , 977 S.W.2d at 593 ("We hold that if the granting of relief by a habeas corpus results in one of the enumerated situations within Art. 44.01(a), the State may appeal regardless of what label is used to denominate the proceeding which results in the order being entered.")
Young , 810 S.W.2d at 223.
Alvarez , 977 S.W.2d at 593.
In State ex rel. Holmes v. Klevenhagen , we rejected the argument that a grant of habeas corpus relief is the functional equivalent of the granting of a new trial. 819 S.W.2d 539, 541–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, we did so in the context of a trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief that merely discharged the defendant from custody when he was being held under a Governor's warrant that commanded his extradition to Louisiana. Id. at 541. We subsequently distinguished Klevenhagen from situations in which a grant of habeas corpus relief results in the functional equivalent of one of the appealable scenarios listed in Article 44.01(a) based upon our holding in Young . See Alvarez , 977 S.W.2d at 592 ; see also Young , 810 S.W.2d at 224 ; Moreno , 807 S.W.2d at 333.
We have also previously recognized, albeit outside the context of habeas corpus, the State's ability to appeal trial court orders that, despite their labels, are the functional equivalent of a grant of a new trial. For example, in State v. Evans , we held that the State could appeal a trial court's order granting a defendant's "Motion to Withdraw Plea of Nolo Contendere" because the order was functionally indistinguishable from an order granting a new trial. Even though the order at issue in Evans did not grant habeas corpus relief, the general principle of law that reviewing courts look to the effect of an order rather than its label applies equally in the situation presented in this case.
State v. Evans , 843 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ; see also State v. Boyd , 202 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd.) (holding that a pre-verdict motion for mistrial granted post-trial was the functional equivalent of a motion for new trial because it had the effect of returning the case to the posture in which it had been before trial.); State v. Kanapa , 778 S.W.2d 592 593–94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (holding that the State had the right to appeal a trial court order granting post-conviction habeas corpus relief in a misdemeanor case involving a claim that the defendant's plea to misdemeanor theft was involuntary).
The orders of the trial court in this case granting post-conviction habeas corpus relief and vacating Appellee's conviction had the effect of granting Appellee a new trial. A new trial means "the rehearing of a criminal action after the trial court has, on the defendant's motion, set aside a finding or verdict of guilt." Granting habeas relief to set aside a conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel results in the judgment being set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. The same is true for habeas relief granted on involuntary plea grounds. Consequently, the State was authorized to appeal the trial court's order under Article 44.01(a)(3), just as it would any order of a trial court granting a new trial.
Tex. R. App. P. 21.1(a) ; see also Evans , 843 S.W.2d at 577.
See, e.g. , Ex parte Overton , 444 S.W.3d 632, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (granting habeas corpus relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and ordering that the applicant's conviction be reversed and the case be remanded to the trial court for a new trial); Ex parte Bryant , 448 S.W.3d 29, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (granting habeas corpus relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the applicant was "entitled to a new trial[,]" and ordering that the applicant be remanded to the custody of the county sheriff); Ex parte Moody , 991 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (granting habeas corpus relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in a plea setting, setting aside the trial court's judgment, and remanding the case for the applicant "to answer the charges against him.").
See, e.g. , Moody , 991 S.W.2d at 859 ; Ex parte Zapata , 235 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (per curiam) (granting habeas corpus relief on the ground that the applicant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, setting aside the judgment, and remanding the applicant to the custody of the county sheriff).
This Court has consistently held, even outside the context of a State's appeal, that reviewing courts should look at the effect of a trial court's order rather than its label. See, e.g. , State v. Davis , 349 S.W.3d 535, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that trial court's grant of a motion entitled "Motion for Reconsideration or Reduction of Sentence" was functionally indistinguishable from a motion for new trial on punishment); State v. Savage , 933 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that trial court's order granting motion for judgement non obstante verdicto was functionally equivalent to the grant of a new trial for insufficient evidence because it accomplished the same outcome).
The court of appeals erred to focus solely upon the trial court's additional order discharging Appellee from custody. Articles 11.40 and 11.44 authorize a trial court to either remand a habeas corpus applicant into custody and set bail or release him after having heard an application for habeas corpus relief. This is in line with the historic understanding that a writ of habeas corpus can be used to secure a defendant's release from actual custody.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.40 ("The judge or court before whom a person is brought by a writ of habeas corpus shall examine the writ and the papers attached to it; and if no legal cause be shown for the imprisonment or restraint, or if it appears that the imprisonment or restraint, though at first legal, cannot for any cause be lawfully prolonged, the applicant shall be discharged"); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.44 ("The judge or court after having examined the return and all documents attached, and heard the testimony offered on both sides, shall according to the facts and circumstances of the case, proceed either to remand the party into custody admit him to bail or discharge him; provided, that no defendant shall be discharged after indictment without bail.")
See, e.g. , Klevenhagen , 819 S.W.2d at 542 (granting mandamus relief because order discharging a defendant from custody in order to facilitate his extradition was not the functional equivalent of a grant of a new trial); Ex parte Cooper , 136 Tex.Crim. 73, 124 S.W.2d 142, 142–43 (1939) (holding applicant for writ of habeas corpus was not entitled to be discharged "outright"—i.e., without bail—or to have bail reduced because there was no evidence showing her financial inability to make bond in the amount fixed by the trial court); Ex parte Guynn , 116 Tex.Crim. 121, 32 S.W.2d 187, 188 (1930) ("The habeas corpus is to discharge one who is restrained."); Ex parte Hensley , 24 S.W. 295, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (reciting that applicant was "discharged from custody" after making bail); see also Ex parte Porter , 16 Tex. App. 321 (1884) (considering a denial of habeas corpus relief in which the applicant argued he was entitled to discharge from custody due to the lack of a charging instrument).
But in this case, Appellee was not in custody. His habeas claim of illegal restraint was predicated upon the collateral consequences of his involuntary plea. In this context, the trial court's further order "discharging" Appellee only clarified that the trial court had released him from custody without bail pending a retrial of the 2007 misdemeanor theft charges.
The State also argues that if the discharge order can be interpreted as an order that terminates all proceedings against Appellee it is necessarily the functional equivalent of an order dismissing the charging instrument in Appellee's 2007 theft case, which is also an order appealable by the State. See, e.g. , State v. Stanley , 201 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that Article 44.01(a)(1) entitles the State to appeal any order, short of an acquittal, which has the effect of terminating the prosecution, regardless of how the trial court characterizes its order). We need not address this argument having determined that the order the State has appealed is the functional equivalent of an appealable order, namely an order granting a new trial.
While we have previously held that a respondent in a habeas corpus case cannot ordinarily appeal from a judgment discharging the applicant, we based that holding upon State v. Gonzales , a court of appeals case that pre-dated the legislative creation of the State's right to appeal in criminal cases. Moreover, the Gonzales court based its holding on cases that also pre-dated the State's right to appeal. And most importantly, we later retreated from that blanket prohibition when we explicitly stated, "We hold that if the granting of relief by a habeas corpus court results in one of the enumerated situations within Article 44.01(a), the State may appeal regardless of what label is used to denominate the proceeding which results in the order being entered." The court of appeals improperly relied upon this outdated and inapplicable legal theory.
Klevenhagen , 819 S.W.2d at 541 (citing State v. Gonzales , 459 S.W.2d 947, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1970, no writ) ); see also Moreno , 807 S.W.2d at 332 (discussing the Legislature's adoption of Article 44.01 in 1987). The court of appeals also relied upon two mandamus cases to support this proposition. Garcia , 619 S.W.3d at 382 (citing Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Ct. of App. Tx. Eighth Dist. , 910 S.W.2d 481, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (orig. proceeding) ; In re Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles , 495 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) ). Neither case dealt with a State's appeal of a grant of habeas corpus relief that was the functional equivalent of a grant of a new trial.
Gonzales , 459 S.W.2d at 947 (citing Arendt, Sheriff v. Carter, by Next Fr. , 146 Tex. 590, 210 S.W.2d 976 (1948) ; Dirks v. State ex rel. Jones , 33 Tex. 227 (1870) ; McFarland v. Johnson , 27 Tex. 105, 106 (1863) ).
Alvarez , 977 S.W.2d at 593.
Finally, the court of appeals erroneously relied upon Article 44.01(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to support its conclusion that the State's right to appeal a grant of habeas corpus relief is limited to applications brought under Article 11.072. The addition of this specific provision to Article 44.01 does nothing to otherwise limit the State's ability to appeal under other, pre-existing portions of Article 44.01, such as subsection (a). Rather, Article 44.01(k) was necessary to authorize the State to appeal in situations that are unique to Article 11.072 proceedings, such as when an Article 11.072 order grants relief only regarding the terms or conditions of the applicant's community supervision without otherwise impacting the judgement of conviction. And ultimately, the court of appeals’ reading of Article 44.01(k) fails to consider this Court's precedent recognizing that reviewing courts must look to the effect of the trial court's order rather than its label to determine whether the State has a right to appeal.
Garcia , 619 S.W.3d at 384. Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out procedures for applications for writs of habeas corpus in felony or misdemeanor cases in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgement of conviction ordering community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 2(b)(2) (permitting an applicant seeking habeas corpus relief to challenge the legal validity of "the conditions of community supervision").
See, e.g. , Alvarez , 977 S.W.2d at 593 ; Young , 810 S.W.2d at 223 ; Moreno , 807 S.W.2d at 333 ; see also Skinner v. State , 484 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ("[W]hen construing an order or motion, we consider the substance of the filing and not just the label attached to it.").
Conclusion
The trial court's order granting habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article 11.09 and vacating Appellee's conviction was the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial. Consequently, the State had the ability to appeal that order, and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the State's appeal. We vacate the court of appeals opinion and remand the case for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Hervey, J., did not participate.