Opinion
A19-2007
12-14-2020
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Anthoney Micheal Fugalli, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018). Affirmed
Ross, Judge Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-18-1461 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Anthoney Fugalli directly or indirectly sold heroin to a confidential informant four times and pleaded guilty to first-degree sale of ten grams or more of a controlled substance. Fugalli unsuccessfully moved the district court to withdraw his guilty plea on the theory that, although he had made deals to sell a large-enough quantity to meet the statute's ten-gram threshold, the amount he actually delivered turned out to be less than that. Because Fugalli's admission to offering to sell at least the threshold amount of heroin acknowledges that he violated the statute regardless of the amount he actually delivered, the district court had a sufficient factual basis to accept Fugalli's plea. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Rice County sheriff's deputies suspected Anthoney Fugalli of dealing heroin and arranged for a confidential informant to attempt controlled buys from him. After the informant purchased heroin from Fugalli four times—twice directly from Fugalli and twice indirectly through a runner whom Fugalli employed—the State of Minnesota charged Fugalli with first-degree controlled-substance sale under Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 1(3) (2018), which criminalizes the sale of ten or more grams of heroin. Fugalli agreed to plead guilty.
Fugalli admitted at his plea hearing that, in total, he had offered to sell the informant nearly 13 grams of heroin. After the district court accepted his guilty plea but before his sentencing, Fugalli moved the district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Fugalli to 78 months in prison.
Fugalli appeals.
DECISION
Fugalli appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Our standard of review depends on the nature of the plea-withdrawal argument. When a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, the district court may, in its discretion, permit him to withdraw the plea "if it is fair and just to do so." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. But whether the defendant brings the withdrawal motion before or after sentencing, the district court must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea if doing so is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists if the guilty plea is invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). And the plea is invalid if it was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. The record here is muddy regarding the basis of Fugalli's plea-withdrawal motion.
Fugalli asserts that he brought his motion under both theories. But if the record bears that out, it does so only very loosely. Fugalli made his written withdrawal request before sentencing, not specifying whether his motion rested on the discretionary fair-and-just standard or the nondiscretionary manifest-injustice standard. And during the motion hearing, counsel for both parties referenced only the fair-and-just standard. Fugalli's counsel never asserted that allowing the withdrawal request was necessary to avoid a manifest injustice or that the plea was invalid due to its being inaccurate or for any other reason. Indeed, he never even used the phrase, "manifest injustice." He did respond to the state's legal arguments, however, about the sufficiency of evidence necessary to support a plea, and we will construe the proceedings accordingly.
We therefore address Fugalli's only argument on appeal, which is that a plea withdrawal is necessary to avoid an injustice because his plea is invalid. We review this challenge de novo. Id. Fugalli argues specifically that his plea in invalid because it was inaccurate. A guilty plea is inaccurate if the record lacks sufficient facts establishing the conduct necessary to violate the charged statute. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). Fugalli asks us to hold the factual basis of his plea insufficient because he did not admit that he actually sold ten or more grams of heroin by testifying merely that he offered to sell that amount while delivering only about eight grams. The charged statute undermines his argument.
To accept Fugalli's argument, we would have to conclude that Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 1(3), authorizes a first-degree controlled-substance conviction only if a defendant actually delivers, rather than merely offers to sell or deliver, drugs of the requisite, ten-gram quantity. But we could so conclude only by ignoring the defining statutory language. The statute sets the first-degree level on the unlawful selling of heroin totaling ten grams or more, but it broadly defines "sell" so as to mean not only, "to sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange, distribute or dispose of" the drugs, but also "to offer or agree to" do any of those things. Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a (2018); see also State v. Lorsung, 658 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Minn. 2003) (recognizing that selling includes offering even with no delivery). Fugalli's first-degree crime was completed by his offer to sell the specified quantity, and although his actual delivery of a lesser amount than was bargained for might suggest that he is imprecise with his buyers during his drug dealing, it does not reduce the degree of his drug-dealing criminality. Fugalli testified that he offered to sell about 13 grams of heroin to a confidential informant. This admission meets the straightforward statutory definition of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.
Affirmed.