Summary
holding that "the `scene of the accident' as contemplated by the legislature when drafting this statute does not include situation in which the arrest occurred at the scene, but only after the driver was required to return there by law enforcement"
Summary of this case from State v. SidesOpinion
No. 01C01-9308-CC-00278.
APRIL SESSION, 1994.
Filed March 3, 1995.
Williamson County, Hon. Donald P. Harris, Judge, (Rule 9 — D.U.I. Suppression of Statements and Test Results)
AFFIRMED.
For the Appellant: Charles W. Burson, Attorney General Reporter,
Kathy M. Principe, Assistant Solicitor General, Nashville, TN.
Joseph D. Baugh, Jr., District Attorney General.
Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, Franklin, TN.
For the Appellee: Lee Ofman, Attorney at Law, Franklin, TN.
OPINION
On November 4, 1992, Thad Thomas Folds, appellee, was arrested for driving under the influence. On June 14, 1993, after a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court suppressed appellee's statements to the arresting officer and the results of a chemical test determining appellee's blood alcohol level. This court granted the state's application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,
We are unable to determine whether Folds was given a breathalyzer test or a blood test. The state's brief refers to both. Appellee's brief refers to a blood test in the statement of the issue. In the body of his brief, appellee consistently refers to a "chemical" test. We will follow appellee's practice and refer to the test as a chemical test.
On appeal, the state contends that:
1. appellee's arrest was legal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-7-103 (6); and,
2. the officers's request that appellee return to the scene of the accident did not constitute an arrest and did not trigger the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. in the evening, Trooper Cash received a call to go to the scene of a one-car accident off Wilson Pike. When he arrived, he found a car in a ditch but found no one present. Shortly thereafter, Officer Fagan arrived to assist him. The officers determined that appellee owned the automobile. Trooper Cash remained with the vehicle while Officer Fagan drove to appellee's home.
Officer Fagan found Folds and his wife at home. Folds explained that they were attempting to locate a wrecking service used previously. According to Folds, the officer said that he was going to "take" Folds back to the wrecked vehicle. The officer, however, testified that he "requested" that Folds accompany him. When Folds asked if his wife could drive him, Officer Fagan said that he could ride either in the police vehicle or with his wife. Folds' wife drove appellee to the accident scene. At no time did Officer Fagan Mirandize the defendant.
Officer Fagan testified that if Folds had refused to accompany him, he would have informed Trooper Cash of that refusal, and Cash could then have decided whether to seek a warrant for leaving the scene of an accident.
When Folds stepped out of his wife's car, it was apparent to Trooper Cash that he was intoxicated. The trooper asked Folds if he had been drinking, and Folds admitted to having a few drinks at dinner. The trooper noticed a strong odor of alcohol. When Folds failed two field sobriety tests, Trooper Cash placed him under arrest for driving under the influence. After Cash read him the implied consent form, Folds signed the form and consented to undergo a chemical test.
At the hearing, Folds testified that he had dinner with a client at the Steak Ale. He claimed to have had three drinks containing vodka and grapefruit juice, but insisted he was not intoxicated when he left the restaurant. Folds testified that he was driving on Wilson Pike on a narrow stretch of road about three miles from his home. An on-coming car, rounding a sharp curve with its lights on bright, momentarily blinded him. He found himself very close to the ditch on the right side of the road, over-corrected by cutting "hard to the left, and swerved across the road, hitting a barbed wire fence and running into a ditch.
A passer-by called Folds' wife who picked Folds up and drove him home. Once he arrived home he drank a large tea glass full of Jack Daniels, ice, and a little water. According to his estimate, he arrived home approximately forty-five minutes before Officer Fagan arrived. By the time he was returned to his car, he definitely felt inebriated.
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Officer Fagan had placed Folds under arrest at his home rendering any statements made inadmissible since no Miranda warnings were given. Moreover, the trial court found that the warrantless misdemeanor arrest was illegal requiring that the results of the chemical test given appellee be suppressed.
To resolve the issues in this case we must determine whether the trial court's findings and conclusions were supported by the proof. A trial judge's findings of fact are afforded the same weight as a jury verdict and may be overturned only if the evidence in the record preponderates against the ultimate facts found by the trial court. State v. Aucoin, 756 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1988). In determining whether the evidence preponderates against the finding of the trial judge, this court may not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Archie Hill, No. 01C01-91201-CC-00041, slip op. at 4, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 18, 1992), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993). This court may not substitute its inferences for the inferences drawn by the trial court. Id. Questions of credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value of the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge. A successful movant is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at a suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See id.
The trial court heard the evidence, determined the credibility of the witnesses, resolved the conflicts in the evidence, and drew permissible inferences from the evidence. State v. Archie Hill, slip op. at 4. He heard the conflicting testimony of appellee and of the officers. Officer Fagan testified that appellee was not placed under arrest at his house. He stated that he merely requested that appellee accompany him, and that he would have returned alone had appellee refused. Although Folds responded "no" when the prosecutor asked him whether he was placed under arrest at his home, Folds also testified that the officer told him thathe was going to take him to the scene of the accident. According to Folds, the police officer gave him the choice of riding in the police car or tiding with his wife.
Whether an accused is "in custody" at a particular time is measured by an objective standard. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988);United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. Junior Loveday, No. 100 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 5, 1990). A person is said to be "in custody" if there has been "a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of a degree associated with a formal arrest."California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). The inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have believed that he or she was not free to leave, and thus "in custody." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
The officer's subjective intent is not controlling. See State v. Evetts, 670 S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1984). The standard is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she was in custody.
A trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses is granted "wide latitude of discretion" in determining whether a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation which requires Miranda warnings. Unless it appears that the trial judge has clearly abused discretion, appellate courts will not intervene. Childs v. State, 584 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Nakdimen, 735 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
In this instance, the trial judge resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of appellee. Thus, the court concluded that the officer intended to return Folds to the scene for questioning and communicated that to him. Courts have generally found that, if the police remove a suspect from home to the police station and retain the suspect there for investigative purposes, whether for interrogation or otherwise, such action constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); State v. Jimmy Winford May, No. 02C01-9109-CC-00214 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, March 18, 1992), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992).
In this case, appellee was not taken from his home to the police station. He was, however, removed from his home and taken to a place where he was interrogated. He was detained for some time by Trooper Cash and interrogated by him before he was formally placed under arrest. While the officer denied he arrested or restrained Folds, the officer's subjective and unarticulated intent is not determinative on whether a suspect has been arrested. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). The question is how a reasonable person would have understood the situation. Id. The trial judge concluded from appellee's testimony and the general circumstances in this case that a reasonable person would have felt deprived of freedom of action in a significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Under the applicable law and given the facts and circumstances presented here, we are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that appellee was subjected to an illegal arrest.
The trial judge excluded appellee's statements because no Miranda warnings were given. Since we find that the arrest was without probable cause, the question of whether Miranda warnings were required is moot.
In Tennessee, the general rule is that unless a misdemeanor is committed or threatened in the officer's presence, a warrantless arrest is not legal. Robertson v. State, 198 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tenn. 1947); State v. Duer, 616 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1981); State v. Floyd C. Wheeler, slip op., no number I in the original, (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 22, 1984). Driving under the influence of an intoxicant is a misdemeanor offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403(m)(1994 Supp.).
The legislature has created a statutory exception to this general rule. Paragraph (a)(6) of Section 40-7-103 states that:
(a) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(6) At the scene of a traffic accident who is the driver of a vehicle involved in such accident when, based on personal investigation, the officer has probable cause to believe that such person has committed an offense under the provisions of title 55, chapters 8 and 10. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to traffic accidents in which no personal injury occurs or property damage is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of such vehicle has committed an offense under § 55-10-401.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103(a)(6)(1994 Supp.).
We find that the provision is inapplicable to the circumstances of this arrest. See State v. Floyd C. Wheeler, no number in original, (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 22, 1984)(statute clearly inapplicable to arrest at defendant's home). Further, we find that, even if the statute applied, it would offer no solace to the state here since the arrest was without probable cause.
The trial court held, and we agree, that the "scene of the accident" as contemplated by the legislature when drafting this statute does not include this situation in which the arrest occurred at the scene, but only after the driver was required to return there by law enforcement. That rationale and the scope of the statute becomes clear when one considers the purposes served by the misdemeanor exception to the warrant requirement. When a police officer is called to the scene of an automobile accident, the officer usually finds a fait accompli. Even if one of the drivers were intoxicated, under the general warrant requirement, the officer could not make a warrantless arrest since the officer did not see the driver drive. Since an intoxicated driver is a danger to the driver's self and to others, the state has a genuine interest in restraining that driver until arrangements ensuring the safety of the public and the driver are made. Moreover, blood alcohol levels change over time. Chemical testing must be performed as soon as possible so that the results will reflect the driver's actual blood alcohol level at the time the accident occurred. Time spent seeking an arrest warrant would render the evidence unreliable and jeopardize public safety.
These same policy considerations do not exist at times remote from the actual occurrence. Appellee was not at the scene when the police arrived. He presented no danger to the safety of the motoring public. Approximately an hour had passed. The results of a blood alcohol test could not accurately reflect the level that existed at the time he drove off the road. The purposes for the statutory exception were no longer served by an immediate, warrantless arrest.
Further, even if the statute applied to circumstances in which the driver was returned to the scene of the accident to be arrested, the statutory prerequisites are not present here. The statute allows a warrantless arrest at the scene of an accident when the officer "based on personal investigation has probable cause" to believe that the driver committed the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Here neither officer personally observed any element of the offense; further, neither officer had probable cause to believe that Folds had committed D.U.I., based on personal investigation.
To establish probable cause for the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, facts or circumstances must warrant a reasonable person in believing that one probably operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Here the officers observed a car owned by appellee in a ditch. One officer found appellee at his home forty-five minutes later. When returned to the scene, one officer observed that appellee appeared to be intoxicated. These facts do not constitute probable cause, based on personal investigation, that appellee operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Consequently, no probable cause to arrest based on personal investigation existed. Therefore, the statutory exception of the warrant requirement could not apply.
We uphold the trial court's conclusion that appellee was not arrested "at the scene of the accident" as contemplated by Section 40-7-103(a)(6). We further hold that, even if the statute applied, the prerequisites to applicability are not present. Appellee's arrest was illegal and evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest cannot be used to help convict a defendant. Robertson v. State, 198 S.W.2d at 636. Therefore, the trial court's suppression of appellee's statements and the chemical test results is affirmed.
CONCUR: Gary R. Wade, Judge
David H. Welles, Judge