Opinion
ID No. 0307008810.
Submitted: April 18, 2007.
Decided: July 9, 2007.
ORDER
This 9th day of July, 2007 upon consideration of the defendant's pro se motion for postconviction relief, it appears that:
1. Defendant has filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
2. On January 14, 2004, defendant Douglas Fields (Fields) was found guilty after a two day jury trial in Superior Court.
3. On January 30, 2004, Fields was declared a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and sentenced on the charge of Assault 1st to twenty-two years at Level V, suspended after twenty years for two years at Level III. On the charge of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), Fields was sentenced to twenty-five years at Level V, a mandatory sentence. On the charge of Burglary 2nd Fields was sentenced to eight years at Level V, a mandatory sentence. On the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (PDWBPP), Fields was sentenced to eight years at Level V, a mandatory sentence. On the charge of Resisting Arrest Fields was sentenced to one year at Level V suspended immediately for one year at Level II concurrent probation.
4. Fields filed a direct appeal of his conviction. The Supreme Court issued a mandate affirming the Superior Court convictions on December 14, 2005. 5. On December 8, 2006, Fields filed this motion for post-conviction relief alleging that:
(a) He should not have been sentenced as a habitual offender because the evidence presented to the trial court did not prove that Mr. Fields had committed the requisite criminal offenses,
(b) The trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury on Attempted Murder First,
(c) The trial court committed error by allowing the State to offer a gun as evidence in support of the charge of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony,
(d) Ineffective assistance of counsel,
(e) The charge of Burglary Second Degree should be dismissed because it failed to provide the specific crime intended to be committed in the dwelling,
(f) The State "dismissed" the only African American from the jury, and
(g) Prosecutorial misconduct.
6. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) provides that "any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interests of justice." Fields raised issues a-c and e-g in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. His conviction was upheld and the Supreme Court addressed the merits of each of Fields' claims. Fields has failed to demonstrate how the interests of justice warrant reconsideration of these claims.
7. To prevail on a postconviction relief claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to meet both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. That is, a movant must show both "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." In attempting to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must allege concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them. Moreover, any "review of counsel's representation is subject to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668.
Id. at 694.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990).
Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753.
8. Fields' ineffective assistance of counsel claim has three parts: (1) Fields did not want James A Bayard, Jr., Esquire, as his counsel; (2) trial counsel did not keep Fields abreast of how the case was progressing prior to trial or provide him with paperwork; and (3) trial counsel failed to make objections at trial or file for a suppression hearing. Fields' allegations are vague and conclusory. He wanted alternate counsel because, "[t]he defendant had received lack luster defense from him [Mr. Bayard] in a prior case and with the sensitivity and specifics of this case his matter of fact attitude would not be beneficial to the defendant." According to Fields, "[c]ounsel failed to issue defendant any copies of paperwork received from prosecution to keep him abreast of the case findings. No police reports, no forensic finding or medical reports. (Rule 16)." Finally, although he fails to point to any specific examples in the record to support his allegations, Fields asserts that:
[d]uring the trial Mr. Byard [sic] never made timely objections. He never argued any conflicting facts in the defendants favor. He never argued against items being entered as evidence. He never arranged for a suppression hearing. He never argued about his client's habitual offender status. He never saw to it that his client had a hearing for his habitual offender status. No! Why, because he did not have the defendant's best interest at hand. The defendant never had a fair opportunity for justice when he was assigned a burned out, state attorney whose primary focus was his own upcoming retirement plans.
Nowhere in connection with any of the three parts of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim does Fields address how he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness of defense counsel.
9. Although Mr. Bayard has retired from the Public Defender's Office, he has reviewed and responded to the allegations in Fields' motion. Mr. Bayard's response was incorporated into the affidavit submitted by Dean DelCollo, Esquire of the Public Defender's Office. The response is as follows:
(1) As with all clients in a criminal case, each have a limited choice for their trial counsel. A person can hire a private attorney, represent himself (with court permission) or accept the Public Defender assigned to the case. The defendant does not have a choice on which public defender will represent him. (2) Trial counsel had first direct contact with Mr. Fields on August 15, 2003. Counsel had subsequent direct contact with Mr. Fields. Counsel wrote to Mr. Fields on several occasions. Counsel did provide Mr. Fields with a copy of the indictment and affidavit of probable cause for this case. (3) It is within the trial counsel's discretion on whether objections should be raised during trial. It is within trial counsel's discretion to determine if a suppression hearing should be held prior to trial.
10. Applying the Strickland standards here, this Court does not find that Fields' counsel was ineffective. Fields was free to hire alternate counsel if he was not pleased with the assigned public defender. However, he was not entitled to choose the public defender assigned to him. Mr. Bayard's response to the motion shows that he had contact, both in person and through letters, with Fields throughout this case and that he provided him with Rule 16 materials. Fields' status as a habitual offender was established by a petition filed by the State on January 16, 2004. The petition details the Fields' prior criminal convictions which justify his status as a habitual offender. Defense counsel had no basis in law or in fact to challenge the petition. Fields does not cite to a specific example where Mr. Bayard should have objected to the admission of evidence. Fields has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Bayard's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Given this conclusion, and the fact that Fields fails to argue any prejudice, the Court need not consider any prejudice to Fields.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (stating that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim. . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one").
11. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal. . . ." Applying that precept here, the Court finds that Fields' claims do not entitle him to relief.
WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for post-conviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.