Opinion
No. CR 05-0048266
July 14, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE
The defendant is accused of murder and related weapons offenses in connection with the March 19, 2005 death of one Mark Crenshaw. Basically, the state has alleged that the defendant was the front seat passenger in a white Chevrolet Malibu when it pulled up alongside an Infinity driven by one Chiereno Claxton. An argument between the two drivers ensued, and Crenshaw, a rear seat passenger in the Infinity, was shot. Immediately following the shooting, Claxton drove Crenshaw to the Hospital of St. Raphael Emergency Room, where Crenshaw was pronounced dead. The State contends that this defendant was the shooter.
The State has filed a Motion in Limine in an effort to preclude the defense from inquiring into the existence of a packet of cocaine found inside a wad of bloody napkins or paper towels in the parking area near the Emergency Room of St. Raphael's Hospital. The State also seeks to preclude the defense from inquiring into Claxton's role, if any, in attempting to conceal the existence of the cocaine packet. For the reasons that follow, the State's motion is granted.
From the evidence presented to date, the court understands that Claxton was the driver of the vehicle in which Mark Crenshaw was riding at the time he was shot. Claxton drove that vehicle to St. Raphael's Hospital and deposited Crenshaw at the Emergency Room. Although Claxton is unable to make an in-court identification of Evans as the shooter, he has testified that the shooter was the front seat passenger in the white Chevrolet Malibu. Another witness, Andrew Cole, has also testified that the front seat passenger was the shooter, and the court has been presented with evidence of a statement by the defendant himself that he was the front seat passenger.
The defendant seeks to impeach Claxton's credibility through the introduction of some blood-soaked napkins found near his vehicle and, in particular, through the introduction of a packet of cocaine found by police within the wad of bloody napkins. There has been evidence tending to show that following his having dropped off Crenshaw at the entrance to the Emergency Room, Claxton parked his car and went into the hospital where he obtained some paper towels. He then went back to his car, wiped blood off the rear passenger seat, and tossed the bloodied paper towels a couple of feet away, into an parking space that was either already empty at the time or under a car that was then parked in the adjacent space.
Video surveillance shows someone, perhaps Claxton, maneuvering around the open door next to the rear driver's side seat where Crenshaw had been sitting. Although the tape is far from clear, that person is arguably seen reaching into the car in a manner such that he well have been retrieving more than just bloody napkins. There is no indication that anyone other than Claxton wiped blood from the interior of the car, nor is there any reason to believe that the bloody napkins found by police are other than the ones discarded by Claxton. The upshot of all of this is that the trier of fact could reasonably draw an inference that, while cleaning the rear seat of his car, Claxton sought to conceal a packet of cocaine that had been on or near the back seat.
The court has been told that Claxton gave a statement to police in which he told them no one in the vehicle was using drugs. The defendant had argued that this evidence tends to believe that statement, but he seems appropriately to have abandoned the argument that Claxton's actions, as inconsistent with his statement to police, would be admissible for impeachment on that basis. He has apparently also recognized that evidence of cocaine possession by any of the occupants of the vehicle in which Crenshaw was riding would be totally irrelevant to the issues in this case. For that reason, the prior denial would not be admissible, and this evidence, which casts doubt on the truth of that denial would also be irrelevant. Nor is the defendant pursuing what the court at first understood to be an element of his claim, namely that the very presence of cocaine would be a form of misconduct that could be used to impeach Claxton's testimony.
The defendant argues that this act of concealment impeaches Claxton's credibility, and that since Claxton is one of only two or three witnesses who identify the front seat passenger of the white Malibu as the shooter, the defendant has the right to introduce both the tangible evidence (packet of cocaine) and the manner in which it was found, and also the right to cross examine Claxton about it.
There were four persons in Claxton's Infinity at the time of the shooting: Claxton, Crenshaw, Andrew Cole, who has also testified that the front seat passenger, whom he could not identify, was the shooter, and Jamal Edwards, who, as of this writing, the State has indicated it has been unable to locate.
The State argues, first, that the surveillance video of the vehicle at the time all this activity was taking place in the parking lot does not make it at all clear that it was Claxton who appears to be discarding the packet of cocaine. There seems to be no dispute, however, that cocaine was indeed found wrapped in bloody napkins or paper towels found in close proximity to the Infinity and that the blood on the napkins is Crenshaw's, and Claxton has testified that he obtained napkins from the Emergency Room for the purpose of cleaning his vehicle. The court will therefore assume for these purposes that the evidence tends to show that Claxton discarded cocaine along with bloody napkins and that his intention was that the cocaine not be found by police who were soon likely to investigate the shooting.
The State also argues, however, that the impeachment value of this line of inquiry is negligible or non-existent, as the presence of cocaine is collateral to any of the facts which the jury is being asked to determine. It contends that the sole probable effect of this line of inquiry will be to disparage the victim and his companions as possible drug users, and that drug use by anyone is not an issue in this case.
There are several well recognized bases for the impeachment of the credibility of a witness. These include lack of physical and or mental capacity, bias, conviction of certain crimes, reputation for untruthfulness, contradiction, and prior inconsistent statements. See, generally, Tait and LaPlante's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence, Second Edition (1988), Secs. 7-19 through 7-24. The defendant seems to concede that the evidence he seeks to introduce here falls into none of these categories. Rather, it is Claxton's alleged misconduct in concealing a packet of cocaine prior to his in-court testimony that the defendant argues undermines the credibility of that testimony. He contends that the right to confront witnesses against him includes the right to probe this alleged misconduct.
"In determining whether a defendant's right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 219-20, 690 A.2d 1370 (1997). "In order to comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." (Internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added.) State v. Beliveau, 237 Conn. 576, 585, 678 A.2d 924 (1996). On the other hand, the confrontation clause does not give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. "The court determines whether the evidence sought on cross-examination is relevant by determining whether that evidence renders the existence of [other facts] either certain or more probable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 562, 643 A.2d 854 (1994). In other words, the right to confront witnesses does not imply a right to ask any question that will simply make the witness look bad, independent of the propensity of that question to shed light upon the issue of the witness's credibility. See, also State v. Valentine, 255 Conn. 61, 71, 762 A.2d 1278 (2000).
Beyond these general principles, the right to cross-examine a witness pertaining to a specific act of misconduct is limited in three distinct ways. State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 60, 671 A.2d 323 (1996). "First, cross-examination may only extend to specific acts of misconduct other than a felony conviction if those acts bear a special significance upon the issue of veracity . . . Second, [w]hether to permit cross-examination as to particular acts of misconduct . . . lies largely within the discretion of the trial court . . . Third, extrinsic evidence of such acts is inadmissible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In addition, Section 6-6(b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence also provides:
(b) Specific instances of conduct. (1) General rule. A witness may be asked, in good faith, about specific instances of conduct of the witness, if probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness. (2) Extrinsic evidence. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of impeaching the witness' credibility under subdivision (1), may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
The Commentary to this section of the Code notes:
Under subdivision (1), a witness may be asked about his or her specific instances of conduct that, while not resulting in criminal conviction, are probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness. See, e.g., State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 60, 671 A.2d 323 (1996); State v. Roma, 199 Conn. 110, 116-17, 513 A.2d 116 (1986); Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 408, 198 A.2d 700 (1964). Such inquiries must be made in good faith. See State v. Chance, supra, 60; Marsh v. Washburn, 11 Conn.App 447, 452-53, 528 A.2d 382 (1987). The misconduct evidence sought to be admitted must be probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness, not merely general bad character. E.g., Demers v. State, 209 Conn. 143, 156, 547 A.2d 28 (1988); Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 675, 174 A.2d 122 (1961). Impeachment through the use of specific instance evidence under subdivision (1) is committed to the trial court's discretionary authority. State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 401, 497 A.2d 956 (1985). The trial court must, however, exercise its discretionary authority by determining whether the specific instance evidence is probative of the witness' character for untruthfulness, and whether its probative value is outweighed by any of the Section 4-3 balancing factors.
`The factors enumerated in Section 4-3 include "the danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Thus, even assuming that the proposed line of inquiry has some probative value with respect to Claxton's character for untruthfulness, such evidence is subject to a balancing test and should not be permitted where its prejudicial effect outweighs any possible probative value. State v. Periere, 186 Conn. 599, 608-09, 442 A.2d 1345 (1982)." The trial court has duty to exclude evidence which, "if admitted, would have a greater prejudicial than probative effect." State v. Mastropetre, 175 Conn. 512, 521, 400 A.2d 276 (1978), 175 Conn. 512, 521, 400 A.2d 276 (1978); As the State suggests, its sole probable effect of this line of inquiry will be to create a bias against Claxton, not by true impeachment but by rather making the witness appear unsavory. It would also tend to create a bias against Crenshaw, whose death might be viewed by the jury as a less significant event because of his possible connection to drug use.
The defendant has not been able to articulate a convincing theory by which an alleged effort to conceal a packet of cocaine, the presence (or concealment) of which on its own is indisputably irrelevant to this case, "bear[s] a special significance upon the issue of veracity" or could give rise to an appropriate inference regarding reliability. The critical issue in Claxton's testimony is the accuracy and honesty of his report that the front seat passenger was the shooter. The altogether collateral issue of whether he got rid of a packet of cocaine while cleaning up Crenshaw's blood has not been shown to bear any relationship to the accuracy or honesty of that testimony. As the State suggests, its probable principal effect will be to create a bias against Claxton, not by true impeachment but by making him, as well as Crenshaw, appear to be unsavory.
Because the proffered evidence relates to a collateral matter, bears no significant relationship to Claxton's credibility regarding the issues to which he has testified, gives rise to no appropriate inference concerning the reliability of his testimony and tends primarily to create an inappropriate bias against both that witness and the victim in this case, the Motion in Limine is granted