Opinion
No. 4-846 / 04-0265
Filed December 22, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, J.G. Johnson, District Associate Judge.
Jeffrey Euans appeals from his sentence for possession of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, W. Wayne Saur, County Attorney, and Nathan Lein, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Jeffrey Euans appeals from his sentence for possession of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
According to the trial court's findings of fact, on August 19, 2003, Officer Ronald Voshell of the Oelwein Police Department stopped a vehicle driven by Euans when he determined the vehicle's license plate had expired. Voshell had just observed Euans leave a house known for drug activity. When Voshell ran Euans driver's license, he discovered it was suspended. Euens was then placed under arrest. While Euans was in the back seat of Voshell's squad car, his wife, Mary Burgin, spoke with him through the rear window. The squad car's audio/video equipment recorded Burgin say "a couple of grams," and Euans responded by stating, "I just got `em." A search of Euans's vehicle uncovered a total of 2.16 grams of methamphetamine.
On September 23, 2003, the State charged Euans by trial information with possession of methamphetamine. Thereafter, Euans filed a motion to suppress evidence alleging the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, and his conversation with his wife was privileged. The court denied the motion.
On January 13, 2004, the court found Euans guilty after a stipulated trial on the minutes of testimony. Euans was sentenced to serve one year in jail, with all but sixty days suspended. Work release was permitted. The court further placed Euans on one year of probation with the requirement of obtaining a substance abuse evaluation, ordered him to pay a $250 fine plus various surcharges, and revoked his license for 180 days. Euans appeals this sentence.
On appeal, Euans raises the following issue for review:
I. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING SENTENCE.II. Standard of Review
We review sentencing challenges for errors at law. State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2003). "A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation omitted).
III. Improper Sentencing Factors
Euans contends the court erred in sentencing him according to "a fixed policy of a jail sentence without exercising the court's discretion based upon the specific circumstances of the case and the particular defendant." He cites the following language used by the court as evidence it abused its discretion by focusing solely on the nature of the offense.
But the Court is concerned with the fact that it's methamphetamine, which is an increasing problem, and that it appears from the record that the Defendant had just purchased the methamphetamine, and that information is before the Court. And so the Court does not find that minimal punishment is appropriate.
A sentencing court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)( d). "A statement may be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, so long as the brevity of the court's statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion." State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). In exercising its discretion, the court should weigh all pertinent information including the defendant's age, the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's character, and the chances of reform. State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (citing State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)). "Each sentencing decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor alone is determinative." State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). The nature of the offense alone cannot serve as the basis of a discretionary sentence. State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982).
In determining whether the trial court considered all pertinent factors, we look to all parts of the record to find support. State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The record includes the reasons stated during the sentencing hearing and also those given in the written judgment entry. State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001).
Based on our review of the record, including the sentencing hearing and the court's written order for jail sentence, we find the court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Euans. See Bolt, 542 N.W.2d at 11 (finding sentencing colloquy supplemented the court's reasons for its sentence and provided sufficient basis to review its exercise of discretion). During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recommended Euans serve one year in jail with all but 180 days suspended, followed by a one-year term of probation. The prosecutor further recommended work release, revocation of Euans's driver's license for 180 days, a substance abuse evaluation, and a fine of $500 plus court costs and surcharges. Counsel for Euans recommended a couple days in jail, along with a fine of $250 plus surcharges based on his clean driving record, and because this was Euans's first drug offense. Although the sentencing decision was succinct, the court referenced the nature of the offense, and noted that it had examined Euans's driving record and criminal history. Additionally, under the reasons section of the written order for jail sentence, the court underlined "[n]ature of the crime committed," and "past record," and crossed out "plea bargain." The court specifically considered the facts presented by Euans when it suspended all but sixty days of his one-year jail sentence and ordered him to pay a $250 fine. The failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered. Id. Moreover, the court is not required to specifically address each claim of mitigation raised by the defendant. Id. We disagree with Euans's assertion that the court exhibited a fixed pattern in determining his sentence. The court's sentence is affirmed.