Summary
reprimanding an attorney for drafting a will, disinheriting his uncle's wife and daughter, in favor of his mother, from whom he might inherit
Summary of this case from Attorney Grievance v. LanochaOpinion
November 5, 1965. —
November 30, 1965.
ORIGINAL ACTION upon the complaint of the Board of State Bar Commissioners, seeking the discipline of defendant, Donald S. Eisenberg, an attorney. Adjudged, defendant's conduct merits discipline. Discipline, imposed.
For the plaintiff there was a brief and oral argument by Rudolph P. Regez of Monroe.
For the defendant there was a brief by Anderson, Bylsma Eisenberg and Clarence G. Bylsma, all of Madison, and oral argument by Clarence G. Bylsma.
The board alleged, in substance, as follows: That defendant is an attorney-at-law licensed to practice law in Wisconsin; that on December 26, 1961, defendant drafted a will for his uncle, Leon Perssion; that the will expressly excluded any bequest to Perssion's wife, Mary, or his daughter, Carol; that the will gave all Perssion's property to his sister, Mrs. Beatrice Eisenberg, the mother of defendant; that Perssion died April 9, 1962, leaving a net estate of $126,630.
In addition, paragraph VII of the complaint reads as follows:
"That at the time Defendant prepared LEON PERSSION's Will he occupied a fiduciary relationship with his client; that where such relationship existed, Defendant, by preparing an unnatural Will with his mother the only beneficiary, violated his duty as a lawyer for the following reasons:
"(a) Because of the inherent conflict of interest between the inheritance which would accrue to Defendant's mother (and indirectly to defendant) by virtue of the provisions of such Will and the advice he might give testator and the conflict of interest that exists between the Defendant who has such interest and LEON PERSSION's widow and child.
"(b) Because by drafting a Will under which his mother, BEATRICE P. EISENBERG, was sole beneficiary to the exclusion of LEON PERSSION's wife and child, reasonable grounds existed for him to have anticipated a Will contest.
"(c) Because by drafting such Will he created a situation which undermines the confidence of the public in the integrity of lawyers and the legal profession, and particularly the sanctity with which testamentary dispositions of property are to be regarded."
Defendant admitted all the allegations of the complaint except paragraph VII, and, in substance, denied the allegations of that paragraph. Defendant alleged, in substance, that Perssion was estranged from his wife; that Perssion's daughter had secretly been married approximately one year before her father's death; that the will contest had been brought by her guardian ad litem, and was not her true wish; that the county court admitted the will at the completion of the objector's case, and such decision was affirmed in this court. Defendant denied that the Perssion will was unnatural.
The Honorable ELTON J. MORRISON was appointed referee. After hearing, Judge MORRISON filed a report which included the following findings:
"A. That the will created in the minds of the public that undue influence had been exerted by the defendant, which only a full hearing before the County Court and the Supreme Court could properly dispel.
"B. That the defendant must have anticipated that the will would be contested.
"C. That there was a conflict of interest between the defendant, who in the minds of the public was an indirect heir, and the two heirs at law who were omitted.
"D. That the testator did not receive from the defendant the professional advice concerning the preparation of the will to which he was entitled, and that the public would be justified in concluding that the defendant's personal interest in the provisions of the will could well be responsible for such failure; that this conflict of interest cast a cloud upon the integrity of the defendant and the legal profession of which he is a member.
"E. That the daughter Carol is not, as the defendant represented her in his testimony (Page 108) a `very quiet, plain, introverted young lady. To see her now, if the Court does, she is 22 or 23 years old and she . . . has the appearance of a 14 or 15 year old girl. . ." When I had an excellent opportunity to observe her weeks later at the Milwaukee hearing on March 6, 1965, I found her to be beautiful, charming, well poised, unaffected, free from prejudice, highly intelligent, and appearing to be the age she is, twenty-two or three. At that hearing it was stated informally that she is the star pupil of the director of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra of which she is a member; that the Director has termed her one of the finest prospects that has ever come to his attention. From the impression I gained of her, I sought in vain to discover any possible reason or excuse for her father omitting her entirely from the will."
Judge Morrison recommended:
". . . that the defendant be found guilty of such unprofessional conduct in connection with the drafting and execution of the will herein as to have seriously impaired the confidence of the public in his integrity and the integrity of the legal profession of which he is a member; and that by reason thereof, the defendant be severely reprimanded by this honorable body and be required to pay all the costs herein, including the cost of plaintiff's attorney and the Referee. I may add that if it should appear that a fine should also be imposed, I would not dissent."
The board took exception to the leniency of the recommendation and moved for judgment imposing discipline. Defendant moved for dismissal.
Additional facts will be referred to in the opinion.
Defendant Donald S. Eisenberg is a lawyer, aged thirty-one, married, and has two children. He has practiced law in Madison since his admission in September, 1956.
The will in question, drafted by defendant, was before this court in Estate of Perssion. Objection to its admission had been made on behalf of Mrs. Carol Catherwood, Perssion's daughter, then twenty years of age. It was claimed that the will resulted from undue influence exercised by defendant and his mother. The county court admitted the will.
(1963), 20 Wis.2d 537, 123 N.W.2d 465.
Mrs. Catherwood appealed. We affirmed, holding that there was an inference of undue influence arising because the present defendant, the attorney who drew and supervised the execution of the will is a member of the family of the beneficiary, but that the inference was "overcome by other evidence the trial court considered more persuasive." In that opinion we pointed to evidence that Mr. Perssion was independent, very stubborn, and tenacious; that he considered defendant immature and often did not follow defendant's advice; that he was fifty-two when he made the will, and was not infirm.
The testimony in the present proceeding is not identical, but leaves very much the same impression, i.e., that Mr. Perssion was unusually self-willed. It appears that both his wife and his daughter learned the contents of the will during his life, but apparently deemed it consistent with his peculiarities.
Defendant argues that when considered in the light of the circumstances, i.e., the strained relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Perssion, Mr. Perssion's hurt over the fact that Carol had secretly married, and the fact that Mr. Perssion's sister, defendant's mother, had been close to him and had helped him financially, the will was natural. Defendant also argues that there was no conflict of interest in connection with the will, which disinherited Mrs. Perssion and Carol and left everything to defendant's mother, from whom defendant might someday inherit.
Defendant, however, misses the point. The will is unnatural on its face, and his probable interest in the benefits conferred upon his mother is sufficient that an inference of undue influence arises because of his activity in drawing and supervising the execution of the will. It was his duty as a lawyer, both to his client, and to the profession of which he is a member, to avoid so acting as to raise that inference. At the very least, he should have declined to supervise the execution of the will.
Estate of Perssion, supra, footnote 1.
State v. Horan (1963), 21 Wis.2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488.
Defendant, it seems to us, is saying that it would have been useless for him to argue with his uncle and that if he had declined to draw or supervise the execution of the will, his uncle would have had someone else do it, or would have drawn and executed the same will without the assistance of any lawyer. It may well be that Mr. Perssion would have done so, but it was defendant's duty to put him to that test or in some other way insure that there would be competent evidence which would readily and clearly overcome any inference of undue influence.
It should be noted that it appeared to be easy to prove the unhappy relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Perssion, and thus to establish that disinheriting the wife was not the result of undue influence. This was not the case with respect to disinheriting the daughter. Although there was evidence that Mr. Perssion had been hurt by the circumstances of her marriage, and that he disapproved of his son-in-law, there was also evidence that a relationship of love and affection between father and daughter continued thereafter. As noted in paragraph "E" of the referee's findings, above quoted, the referee had great difficulty in discovering any reason for Mr. Perssion completely disinheriting his daughter. Although Mr. Perssion surely had the right to do so, without justifying his action to anyone, the fact that such justification is difficult makes it harder to dispel the inference of undue influence and more obvious that defendant should have avoided creating such inference.
Paragraph "D" of the findings of the referee is undoubtedly based upon the defendant's admission that he did not discuss with his uncle the possibility of creating a trust for Carol's benefit. In arguing that Perssion's gift of all his property to his sister was not unnatural, defendant suggests that Perssion assumed that his sister would take care of Carol if Carol were in need. Assuming, as this argument suggests, that Perssion was interested in the welfare of his child, it seems highly probable that a disinterested attorney would have pointed out to him the possibility of a trust provision under which Carol would receive benefits as a matter of right. Although defendant's failure to do this may have been only a deficiency of skill or judgment, the conflict of interest may suggest to the observer that the failure was motivated by self-interest.
In State v. Horan, decided after defendant drew the Perssion will, we said:
Supra, footnote 3.
"Because the law on this subject has not been clearly defined or well understood by the members of the legal profession and no undue influence is involved, we deem a reprimand and the payment of costs to be sufficient."
State v. Horan, supra, page 75, footnote 3.
We reach the same decision here except to limit the amount defendant must pay. The costs in this proceeding are very substantial, approximately $3,200, and it seems sufficient to require defendant to pay $1,750 thereof.
It is ordered and adjudged that, the defendant be and hereby is reprimanded for his conduct and that he pay the sum of $1,750 toward the costs and expenses of these proceedings including the fees and disbursements of the attorney for the plaintiff.
WILKIE, J., took no part.