Opinion
No. 41714.
February 13, 1950.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, FRED H. MAUGHMER, J.
A. N. Abrams, Kansas City, for appellant.
J. E. Taylor, Attorney General, John S. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Mae E. Edwards was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for the murder, in the second degree of Iva Brown. She prosecutes this appeal as a poor person. As we view the record the only issue of substance is whether the court erred in failing to instruct on manslaughter.
The testimony for the State established that a number of friends gathered at the Edwards home in Kansas City, Missouri, on August 29, 1948, and had several drinks of beer or whiskey. Harold Lapsley, Albert Britton, Alice Rowe, Stella Blue, Iva Brown, and Mae E. Edwards were present. An argument finally developed over some matter of no great consequence between Iva Brown and Mae Edwards. One word lead to another; and, after several exchanges, Iva Brown stood up and reproved Mae Edwards for her use of opprobrious epithets, stating she was her friend. At the same time Mae Edwards got up, walked to a dresser, opened a drawer, took out a revolver, "wheeled around" and shot Iva Brown, who died a few minutes thereafter. Iva Brown made no threat and did nothing to cause defendant to shoot her.
Defendant testified, so far as material, to the following effect: An argument developed between Iva Brown (who was described as a stout woman) and defendant and Iva Brown threatened to whip defendant. Defendant arose and walked to the dresser and Iva Brown followed her, again threatening to whip defendant in her own house and telling her she was going to kill her. Iva Brown then grabbed defendant and tore her dress, and defendant shot Iva Brown.
The court refused defendant's request to instruct on manslaughter, and the issue is preserved in the motion for new trial. See State v. Burrell, 298 Mo. 672, 252 S.W. 709, 711; State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 1051, 193 S.W.2d 49, 55 [9].
In State v. Creighton, 330 Mo. 1176, 1191 (II), 52 S.W.2d 556, 559, 560 (II), one Hatton walked up to defendant, brushed against him and asked him if he was looking for trouble and what was he doing with his girl. Defendant replied: "I didn't know it was your girl." Defendant was then grabbed by the coat lapel, turned around and slapped, and when Hatton stepped back and reached for his hip pocket, defendant shot him. The court said, in holding a manslaughter instruction was required: "On the other hand, * * * if the evidence shows personal violence to the defendant, he will be entitled to a manslaughter instruction, notwithstanding he protests as a witness that he killed the deceased unwillingly, to save his own life. The doctrine of these cases is that evidence of violence to the person makes a jury question as to whether the killing was done in hot blood, and that the jury may believe the defendant's testimony concerning the battery, but disbelieve he acted in self-defense. And so it is reasoned he should have a manslaughter instruction in spite of his testimony on self-defense."
State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270, 277, states: " * * * neither words of reproach, how grievous soever, nor indecent provoking actions or gestures, however much calculated to excite indignation or arouse the passions, are sufficient to free the party killing from the guilt of murder. To have the effect to reduce the guilt of killing to the lower grade, the provocation must consist of personal violence. * * * There must be an assault upon the person, as where the provocation was by pulling the nose, purposely jostling the slayer aside in the highway * * *, or other direct and actual battery * * *. [Citing supporting authority.]" Quoted with approval in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805, 813 (II), 51 S.W.2d 84, 88 (II).
See also State v. Porter, 357 Mo. 405, 208 S.W.2d 240; State v. Littlejohn, 356 Mo. 1052, 1056, 204 S.W.2d 750, 752; State v. Northington, Mo.Sup., 268 S.W. 57, 58 [1]; State v. Inks, 135 Mo. 678, 37 S.W. 942, 945(5); State v. Perno, Mo.Sup., 23 S.W.2d 87, 89[5-7]; and the reasoning in State v. Bongard, supra. The foregoing cases fall on both sides of the issue according to their facts.
The record discloses that the trial court was fully cognizant of the applicable law but evidently inadvertently overlooked the testimony of, and the most favorable inferences deducible therefrom, for defendant.
The maximum punishment for manslaughter is ten years' imprisonment in penitentiary. § 4391, R.S. 1939, Mo.R.S.A. The State argues that since defendant received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, the failure to instruct on the lesser offense was harmless as the verdict indicates the jury did not contemplate assessing a punishment for less than second degree murder. The argument begs the issue. The jury never had an opportunity to consider the law of manslaughter; and it cannot be determined what effect the giving of an instruction on manslaughter might have had and whether withholding from the jury the consideration of said lesser offense, calling for a lesser punishment, harmed defendant. Consult State v. Aitkens, 352 Mo. 746, 761, 179 S.W.2d 84, 94. The situation differs where a defendant is guilty of a graver offense than that for which he is convicted as the error occasioning such a result is in his favor and does not harm him. Under statutory mandate defendant was entitled to have an instruction on man slaughter, there being evidence upon which to base it. § 4070, R.S. 1939, Mo.R.S.A.; State v. Littlejohn, supra.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
WESTHUES and BARRETT, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by BOHLING, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All the Judges concur.