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State v. Dukelow

Supreme Court of Hawaii
Jun 27, 2003
24233 (Haw. Jun. 27, 2003)

Opinion

24233

June 27, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (CIV. NO W01-92)

On the briefs:

Valerie Dukelow, defendant-appellant, prose.

Kumu B. Vasconcellos, Deputy Attorney General, State of Hawai`i, for plaintiff-appellee.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and ACOBA, JJ., and CIRCUIT JUDGE SAKAMOTO, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY


SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Valerie Dukelow (Dukelow) appeals from (1) an April 3, 2001 order of the district court of the second circuit (the court) granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai`i, in behalf of the Hawaiian Homes Commission (Commission) and Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (the DHHL), (2) the court's April 11, 2001 judgment for possession, and (3) the court's April 11, 2001 writ of possession ejecting Dukelow from the subject residential lot. The court suit was brought subsequent to a contested case hearing between Dukelow and the DHHL held before the Commission pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 91. As a result of the hearing, the Commission issued a Decision and Order directing Dukelow to surrender and vacate the residential lot (Lot No. 38) that she leased from the DHHL. Dukelow did not appeal to the circuit court as allowed under HRS chapter 91 from the Decision and Order.

The Honorable Douglas H. Ige presided over this matter.

Dukelow failed to vacate Lot No. 38 within the sixty days provided by the Decision and Order. Therefore, the DHHL brought an action of ejectment in the court. The court then issued the order and judgments described supra.

On appeal, Dukelow maintains that: (1) the DHHL is barred from utilizing procedures set forth in HRS chapter 91 to eject a lessee because the United States Congress never gave its consent to incorporate the Hawai`i Administrative Procedure Act into the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act; (2) her DHHL home loan in the amount of $45,604.84 at a fixed interest rate of 8.75% was improper; and (3) her contested case hearing was invalid because it was not held before the Commission members. However, points (1), (2), and (3) could have been or were raised in the contested case hearing. Dukelow did not appeal from the Commission's Decision and Order and, therefore, the Decision and Order became final and unreviewable. Thus, Dukelow's points of error on appeal are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Res judicata applies when "(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) there was final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom res judicata is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Haw. 143, 148, 976 P.2d 904, 909 (1999). Additionally, as noted in State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 858 P.2d 712 (1993), res judicata applies "not only [to] the claims that were actually litigated in the first action, but also . . . all grounds of claim and defenses that might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided." Id. at 190, 858 P.2d at 725 (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 599, 837 P.2d 1247, 1261 (1992) (brackets omitted).

The doctrine of res judicata applies to administrative decisions. "Where a party does not appeal a final administrative decision that decision becomes final and res judicata." Hawkins v. State, 900 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995) (quoting Guertin v. Pinal County, 875 P.2d 843, 845 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1994)); see also United States v. Utah Constr. Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) ("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." (Citations omitted.)); State v. Higa, 79 Haw. 1, 8, 897 P.2d 928, 935 ("`The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also apply to matters litigated before an administrative agency.'" (Quoting Santos v. State, 64 Haw. 648, 653, 646 P.2d 962, 966 (1982).)), reconsideration denied, 79 Haw. 1, 897 P.2d 928 (1995). Moreover, as to Dukelow's point (2), Hawaiian Homes Commission Act § 215 states that "all unpaid balances of principal shall bear an interest rate of two[-] and[-]one-half percent or higher as established by rule adopted by the department." Also, Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR) 10-3-47(d) provides that "[l]oan interest rates shall be determined based on the availability of funds as well as the current interest rate for such loans in the private sector." Additionally, as to Dukelow's point (3), HAR § 10-5-33(c)(1) provides that contested case hearings may be held before a hearings officer endowed with the authority "to make a recommended decision to the commission in writing to be acted upon by the commission."

Accordingly, the court's April 3, 2001 order granting summary judgment and its April 11, 2001 judgment for possession and writ of possession are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, June 27, 2003


Summaries of

State v. Dukelow

Supreme Court of Hawaii
Jun 27, 2003
24233 (Haw. Jun. 27, 2003)
Case details for

State v. Dukelow

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF HAWAI`I, in behalf of the HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION and…

Court:Supreme Court of Hawaii

Date published: Jun 27, 2003

Citations

24233 (Haw. Jun. 27, 2003)

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