Opinion
No. 5-837 / 04-1614
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge.
Tracy Dennis appeals from her convictions for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary and willful injury, arguing her confession was coerced. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Julie Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Tracy Dennis moved to suppress statements she made to police officers about a robbery and murder. The district court denied the motion and Dennis was ultimately found guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and willful injury. Dennis now reiterates her contention that her confession was coerced. We agree, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Frank Schmidt died of stab wounds to his chest. Officers took Tracy Dennis into custody and questioned her about the stabbing. During the videotaped interrogation, Dennis admitted she and another woman planned to rob Schmidt and admitted she was present when the stabbing occurred. She denied involvement in the stabbing.
Most, but not all, of the interrogation was videotaped.
The State charged Dennis with first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and willful injury. Iowa Code §§ 707.2, 711.2, 708.4(1) (2003). Tracy moved to suppress the statements she made to law enforcement officers on the ground that they were obtained involuntarily. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, the State offered a portion of Dennis's videotaped statements. Dennis responded by offering the balance of the videotape and by testifying at trial. The jury found her guilty on all three counts. Following sentencing, Dennis appealed.
On appeal, Dennis contends (1) the district court erred in failing to suppress her statements to law enforcement officers on the ground of promissory leniency, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the admission of her statements on evidentiary grounds. We find error was preserved on her assertion of promissory leniency and find it unnecessary to analyze the issue under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric.
II. Promissory Leniency
Dennis argues that one of the officers who questioned her, Detective William Thomas, impliedly promised she would not be found guilty of murder. In her view, his promises of leniency rendered her confession involuntary and inadmissible.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently clarified that this issue should be decided on an evidentiary, rather than a constitutional, basis. State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 27-28 (Iowa 2005). Our review, therefore, is at law. Id. at 27 (citing State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 14, 85 N.W.2d 598, 600 (1957)). As the court stated in Mullin,
[W]here there is no dispute as to the words used or their obvious meaning and the circumstances surrounding the expressions, then it is a matter of law upon which the court must pass and, in doing so, answer the query as to whether there appeared some assurance that the accused might gain in some manner relating to his punishment by issuing the solicited statement relative to his guilt.
Mullin, 249 Iowa at 15, 85 N.W.2d at 601.
Here, there is no dispute concerning the words used by Detective Thomas, as key portions of the interrogation were captured on videotape. The following excerpts are instructive:
These excerpts are not based on a transcription of the videotaped statements but on our review of the videotape.
Detective Thomas: I'm not being a prick. I'm trying to do you a favor. I'm trying to point out to you how you look. . . .
Detective Thomas: I'm trying to do you a favor. . . .
Detective Thomas: If you didn't have the knife in your hand and you didn't stab the guy, what do you have to worry about? The only thing you have to worry about is being dishonest.
Detective Thomas: Tracy, if you didn't have the knife in your hand, what do you have to worry about? The only thing you have to worry about is covering it up.
Detective Thomas: Did you have the knife in your hand?
Dennis: No.
Detective Thomas: Did you stab him?
Dennis: No.
Detective Thomas: Then why wouldn't you want to tell us the truth? . . .
Detective Thomas: We're trying to help you out. Did you have the knife in your hand? No. Did you stab this guy? No.
Detective Thomas: We're not the bad guys. Okay? You didn't stab the guy. Okay? The guy didn't get robbed. He was murdered first. Okay? He was murdered first. Don't let this thing with the robbery hang you up. He was murdered.
Detective Thomas: We're not the bad guys. Okay? I'm not being a prick. I'm trying to help you see the light. Okay? Alright? Did you stab him?
Dennis: No.
Detective Thomas: Okay, you didn't stab him. Now I want you to tell me the truth, Tracy.
Detective Thomas: If there was a plan to rob this guy, there was a plan to rob this guy. Did you stab him?
Dennis: No.
Detective Thomas: He got murdered, not robbed. Okay?
Detective Thomas: We're not being pricks. We're trying to help you out here. Trying to make you see the light. You didn't have the knife in your hand. You didn't stab him. Okay?
In assessing whether these statements amount to promises of leniency, we, like the Iowa Supreme Court in McCoy, look to what the court said in Mullin. There, the court explained that the statements must be made by "one in authority" and must contain "clear" inducements or inducements that could be "reasonably inferred by the language used." Mullin, 249 Iowa at 16, 85 N.W.2d at 601. The court stated that a mere instruction to tell the truth would not amount to an improper inducement. Mullin, 249 Iowa at 16, 85 N.W.2d at 601. The court continued,
However, when the officer or officers go further and explain just how it will be better or wiser for the accused to speak, these statements may suddenly become more than an admonishment or assume the character of an assurance or promise of special treatment which may well destroy the voluntary nature of the confession in the eyes of the law.
Id. at 16, 85 N.W.2d at 601-02.
Applying these principles, we conclude Detective Thomas's cited statements to Dennis were promises of leniency. They were not simply advisory opinions to tell the truth. Instead, they were clear assurances that Dennis would not be prosecuted for murder if she did not stab Schmidt.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize the district court did not have the benefit of McCoy, which rejected the constitutionally-grounded "totality of the circumstances" test for assessing voluntariness in this context. Under that test, Dennis's appearance, demeanor, poise, and relative control of her emotions, all cited by the court, may well have supported a finding of voluntariness, notwithstanding her admissions that she had a reading disability and was addicted to crack cocaine and alcohol. However, under the evidentiary test articulated in Mullin and reaffirmed in McCoy, we believe a finding of promissory leniency is compelled as a matter of law.
McCoy involved virtually identical statements made by the same detective, more than twenty times. The district court deciding McCoy in the first instance found the statements were promises of leniency but declined to decide whether the same result would have been mandated if the statements were made only once or twice. 692 N.W.2d at 29. Our reading of the facts and law in McCoy and the opinions cited in McCoy, lead us to conclude that there is no numeric litmus test. In this case, the promises of leniency were not isolated or tangential.
Anticipating this conclusion, the State asks us to engage in a constitutional harmless error analysis and find that the error in admitting the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 430 (Iowa 2003). As we have resolved the promissory leniency question on an evidentiary rather than a constitutional basis, we decline to apply that type of harmless error analysis.
The question remains, however, whether the error in admitting the confession was prejudicial as an evidentiary matter. See Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598 (stating the question is whether the trial court committed "prejudicial error" in permitting jury to consider confession induced by promises of leniency). On this question, the court has essentially found coerced confessions presumptively prejudicial. In Mullin, the court stated:
[A] confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise, "for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used or decide upon its effect on the mind of the prisoner," and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence by force or other inducement has admittedly been exerted upon him. "Voluntary" [is] defined as meaning a statement made of the free will and accord of the accused, without coercion, whether from fear of any threat of harm, promise, or inducement or any hope of reward.
Id. at 14-15, 85 N.W.2d at 600 (emphasis added). Similarly, in State v. Quintero, 480 N.W. 2d 50 (Iowa 1992), the court stated,
A coerced confession should not be admitted in evidence because of its inherent lack of reliability. Our cases have long reversed criminal convictions for admitting involuntary confessions. The rule was developed, not as a constitutional principle, but because the law has no way of measuring the improper influence or determining its effect on the mind of the accused.
Quintero, 480 N.W.2d at 52 (emphasis added).
Under this authority, admission of Dennis's confession was prejudicial and the error requires reversal.
As for Dennis's trial testimony concerning the events, McCoy held that such testimony, elicited in response to the State's decision to introduce a police confession, was also inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree." McCoy, 692 N.W.2d at 29-30.
III. Disposition
We reverse and remand for a new trial. Dennis's videotaped confession, all evidence garnered as a result of the confession, and her trial testimony are inadmissible on retrial.