Opinion
AC 45512
05-02-2023
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STERLING D. DECOSTA
J. Christopher Llinas, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Meryl R. Gersz, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state's attorney, and Steven M. Lesko, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Argued April 3, 2023
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crimes of interfering with an officer and reckless driving, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, geographical area number nine, where the defendant was presented to the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J., on a plea of guilty to the charge of interfering with an officer; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of reckless driving, and the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
J. Christopher Llinas, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Meryl R. Gersz, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state's attorney, and Steven M. Lesko, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Suarez, Js.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Sterling D. DeCosta, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered after a plea of guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. In sentencing the defendant, the court imposed only a fine of $200, which the defendant immediately and voluntarily paid before leaving the courthouse on the date the judgment was rendered. On appeal, the defendant claims that the judgment must be reversed because the court improperly did not advise him during its plea canvass that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to a jury trial.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
Even in criminal cases, "an appeal is purely a statutory privilege accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86, 88-89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) ("it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal"). General Statutes § 54-96a provides in relevant part: "Any person appealing from the judgment of the Superior Court, adjudging him to pay a fine only, may pay the same at any time before the hearing in the Supreme Court or Appellate Court, without further cost, which payment shall vacate the appeal and restore the judgment." See also State v. Eastman, 92 Conn.App. 261, 264-65, 884 A.2d 442 (2005) (interpreting § 54-96a). Because the defendant voluntarily has paid the fine, the legislature has directed that this appeal shall be vacated and the judgment "restore[d]."
The appeal is dismissed.