Opinion
No. 5-223 / 04-0913
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, James A. Weaver, District Associate Judge.
Robert Arthur Davis appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. AFFIRMED.
Gregory Johnston, Muscatine, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Korie L. Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Robert Arthur Davis appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in denying him the right to impeach the State's sole witness. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
The record reveals the following facts. At approximately 2:05 a.m. on the morning of January 9, 2003, Muscatine Police Officer Adam Raisbeck was on patrol traveling north on Park Avenue in Muscatine, Iowa when he observed a vehicle also traveling north in the right-hand lane of the road in front of him. Park Avenue is a four-lane road with two lanes in each direction. The vehicle initially caught Officer Raisbeck's attention because he observed it strike a curb near the Phillips 66 gas station on Park Avenue. Raisbeck testified that he continued to observe the vehicle as it approached the intersection of Washington Street and Park Avenue. He stated that he saw the vehicle cross the center line, saw it was in the middle of both lanes as it came to the intersection, and that it made a right turn onto Washington Street from the middle of the two lanes. After the vehicle made its right turn onto Washington Street Officer Raisbeck activated his top lights and stopped the car for improper lane usage. When Raisbeck spoke to the driver he noticed "a strong smell of alcohol coming from the interior of the vehicle." Raisbeck suspected the driver was intoxicated. The driver was later identified as the defendant, Davis.
Davis fumbled with his wallet in trying to produce his driver's license for the officer, he exhibited some difficulty in keeping his balance after getting out of his vehicle at the officer's request, and failed three field sobriety tests administered by Raisbeck. Davis complained he was cold as he waited with Raisbeck for the fifteen minutes required before Raisbeck could conduct a preliminary breath test (PBT). As a courtesy to Davis, Officer Raisbeck allowed him to return to his vehicle to wait. While in his vehicle Davis used some sort of mint mouth spray which Raisbeck could smell as he approached the vehicle to ask Davis to submit to a PBT after the required time had passed. Davis refused the PBT and Raisbeck then arrested Davis for OWI. At the station Davis consented to a breath test which revealed an alcohol concentration of .217.
Davis was charged by trial information with OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). Davis filed a motion to suppress arguing, in part, there was "no reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant the stop" of his vehicle on the night in question. A hearing was held on the motion to suppress. In questioning Raisbeck during this hearing, Davis's attorney stated it was his belief that at the previous suppression hearing Raisbeck testified he did not give Davis a PBT. The State objected on the grounds the hearing was supposed to be limited to the stop. The court sustained the objection, told him his questioning had to relate to the "reasonable basis for the stop," and informed him not to go beyond the basis of the motion. In a ruling denying the suppression motion the court found that Davis's "manner of driving, taking place over a short distance, could cause a reasonable person to conclude the defendant was having difficulty controlling his vehicle due to some type of impairment." Davis waived jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a trial to the court. The court found Davis guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirty-seven days in jail with all but two days suspended.
This was Davis's second motion to suppress and suppression hearing. The court's ruling on the second motion is the only one challenged by Davis on appeal. This second hearing was specifically limited by the district court to the issue of whether there was reasonable cause for the vehicle stop.
The court expressly declined to rule on the other grounds set forth in the motion because the leave to file a second motion to suppress was limited to Davis's challenge to the basis for the stop.
Davis appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, contending the court erred in finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him. He also argues the court erred in denying him the right to impeach Officer Raisbeck, the State's sole witness, by offering his prior contradictory sworn testimony to material facts from prior proceedings arising out of the same matter.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
A challenge to the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510 (Iowa 1997). We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998). In doing so, we make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the record. Id. We give deference to the trial court's findings of fact because of its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). Error was preserved here by the district court's adverse ruling on Davis's motion to suppress. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 44.
The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961).
We ordinarily review a district court's evidentiary and trial objection rulings for abuse of discretion. Kurth v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 628 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2001); State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 680-81 (Iowa 1992). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion `on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.'" State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2000)). "The scope of cross-examination is a matter of trial court discretion; we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion, and then only if it appears that prejudice results." State v. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 1982).
III. MERITS.
Davis contends that all the evidence obtained after the stop was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in violation of the comparable provision of the Iowa Constitution. We generally interpret the scope and purpose of article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution as being the same as federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 44, and find no reason to do otherwise here.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in a prosecution, no matter how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995).
The Fourth Amendment requires a police officer must have reasonable cause to stop an individual for investigatory purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). An automobile stop is subject to these Fourth Amendment protections and will be upheld only when it is reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95 (1996).
When a person challenges a stop on the basis that reasonable suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, [reasonably warrant a belief] that criminal activity may have occurred. Mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal activity is not enough. Whether reasonable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer, including all information available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to stop the vehicle. The legality of the stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the officer involved in the stop.
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (internal citations omitted).
The first issue on appeal is whether Officer Raisbeck, based on his observations of Davis's driving, had specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief criminal activity may have occurred or was occurring. As set forth above, Raisbeck testified he saw Davis hit a curb, straddle two lanes, and then make a right-hand turn while straddling both lanes. A traffic violation, however minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop a motorist. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996). Davis's approach to make his right turn and his making a right-hand turn from the middle of two lanes was a violation of a traffic law and thus in itself gave Officer Raisbeck reasonable cause to stop Davis. See Iowa Code § 321.311(1)(a) ("Both the approach for a right turn and right turn shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway."); State v. Malloy, 453 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990) (officer had grounds to stop vehicle which made a right-hand turn from the middle lanes of a five-lane, one-way street because it violated Iowa Code section 321.311(1)(a)).
However, Raisbeck was not limited to his observation of Davis's illegal right-hand turn in making his reasonable suspicion calculus. Whether reasonable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer, including all information available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to stop the vehicle. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204. We conclude Raisbeck's observation of Davis's illegal right turn, together with the other observations he made of Davis's driving set forth above clearly gave him reasonable cause to stop Davis. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Davis's manner of driving justified the officer's reasonable belief criminal activity may have been occurring. We conclude the district court correctly denied Davis's motion to suppress.
Davis next contends the court erred in denying him the right to impeach Officer Raisbeck, the State's sole witness, by offering his allegedly contradictory sworn testimony, regarding purportedly material facts, that he had given in earlier proceedings in this case. As set forth above, Davis attempted to question Raisbeck at the second, limited suppression hearing in an attempt to show he had testified at the first suppression hearing that he did not give Davis a PBT. The State objected that this went beyond the scope of the hearing, which the court had specifically limited to the issue of the reasonableness of the stop. Davis argued the testimony was necessary to impeach Raisbeck. The court sustained the State's objection, stating that Davis had to limit his questioning to matters which related directly to the reasonable basis for the stop and he could not to go beyond his limited motion.
It is well settled that the veracity of an adverse witness may generally be placed in question by showing that material facts are other than as stated by the testifying party. State v. Roth, 403 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Iowa 1987); State v. Fowler, 248 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Iowa 1976). The offer of impeachment evidence, however, is not without limits. Id. "[I]mpeachment evidence is admissible only if it addresses a non-collateral issue." State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 794 (Iowa 2001); Fowler, 248 N.W.2d at 520. "Impeachment evidence is non-collateral if its contents are admissible for any purpose independent of the contradiction." Belken, 633 N.W.2d at 794. Our supreme court has identified two categories of independently admissible impeachment evidence. Id. "The evidence is either relevant to resolving an issue material to the case, or it pertains to the general credibility of the witness." Id.; see also Roth, 403 N.W.2d at 767.
The record is clear that the second suppression hearing was limited solely to the issue of the stop, more specifically whether Officer Raisbeck had reasonable cause for the stop. The district court reiterated this limitation in sustaining the State's objection at issue here and again in its written order denying Davis's motion to suppress. Whether Raisbeck gave inconsistent testimony regarding something which occurred after the stop, here whether he gave Davis a PBT, was not material to the very limited issue before the court at the December 24, 2004 suppression hearing, nor did it pertain to Raisbeck's general credibility. Accordingly, Davis's attempt to impeach Raisbeck went to a collateral matter.
Furthermore, assuming Raisbeck did testify at the first suppression hearing that he did not give Davis a PBT, Davis has not cited and we have not found anything in the record showing that Raisbeck at any time gave contradictory testimony on this point. The consistent theme of Raisbeck's testimony throughout multiple hearings and trial appears to be that he initially intended to give a PBT, preliminarily offered one, but then ultimately decided to not give one after Davis had compromised the validity of any test result by ingesting mints or using breath spray.
Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion, nor was Davis prejudiced, by the court sustaining the State's objection and excluding this evidence. IV. CONCLUSION.
Furthermore, we agree with the State that Davis has not spelled out how, if the court did abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence, prejudice resulted from such exclusion. As set forth above, we will only reverse a court's ruling on the proper scope of cross-examination for an abuse of that discretion, and then only if it appears that prejudice resulted. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d at 117.
We conclude the district court did not err in denying Davis's motion to suppress because there were specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, could lead Officer Raisbeck to reasonably believe that criminal activity may have occurred or was occurring. We further conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's objection and excluding the evidence Davis was attempting to use to impeach Raisbeck. The attempt to impeach Raisbeck went only to a collateral matter and Davis has not shown how he was prejudiced by the court's exclusion of this evidence. Any other issues raised by Davis on appeal are either sufficiently addressed herein, waived, or without merit.