Opinion
CR160170332S
09-08-2017
State of Connecticut v. Quentine Davis
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Brian T. Fischer, J.
On February 14, 2017 the defendant, Quentine Davis, filed a motion to suppress evidence. The grounds for the motion are that the police lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion when they seized the defendant as required by law. The defendant argues the subsequent events were fatally and impermissibly tainted by that unlawful seizure and therefore suppression is required.
On April 25, 2017 the court heard testimony from the following witnesses concerning this motion:
1. Officer Christina Altieri, New Haven Police Department
2. Officer Matthew Collier, New Haven Police Department
3. Officer Thomas Glynn, New Haven Police Department
Numerous exhibits were offered at the hearing, which were considered by the court. The parties submitted memorandums to the court subsequent to hearing which were viewed and considered by the court.
In reaching its conclusion, the court has fairly and impartially considered all of the evidence presented, evaluated the credibility of the witness, assessed the weight, if any, to be given to specific evidence, measured the probative force of conflicting evidence, reviewed all evidence and relevant case law, and has drawn inferences from the evidence of facts established by the evidence it deems reasonable and logical.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is hereby denied. The court finds the following facts to be relevant and credible.
On the evening of September 28, 2016 an anonymous male caller told the New Haven Police Department there was a young man with a gun between houses numbered 472 and 476 on Winthrop Avenue in New Haven. The call came at approximately 7:26 p.m.
The caller was looking out a window across the street from 472-476 Winthrop Avenue. The caller said a group of guys were hanging around a black infinity car. The group all had dark clothes on and the caller said one of the guys was holding a handgun. The group was not arguing or fighting.
The caller could not identify which one of the group was holding the handgun. The caller did not leave a name or number when asked by the police. The call lasted over two minutes.
The caller did utilize the 911 emergency system and provided to police his first-hand observations. During the call, the caller closed the window so the group could not hear him.
Within minutes of the call New Haven Police Officers Collier, Glynn and Cedeno responded to the weapons complaint. The officers were informed of the anonymous caller's information. There were a total of three police cars and five officers. The actual 911 call was dispatched to the police cars and was shown on the computer screen in the police car.
The officers responded in marked police cruisers in full uniform. At least one police vehicle had its siren on. Upon arriving at the Winthrop Avenue location the police observed six males standing around a black infinity.
As the officers began exiting their cruisers all six males began walking away from the police. Officer Glynn ordered the individuals to stop. Five of the six males did stop. Some officers unholstered their weapons at this time.
Officer Collier and Glynn recognized two individuals in the group from prior criminal interactions. The area of 472-476 Winthrop Avenue is a high crime area within New Haven.
One of the young men, identified as the defendant, continued walking away from the police on Winthrop Avenue. The police requested the defendant to stop, the defendant continued to walk.
The defendant had his hand at his waist in front of his body as he's walking away from the police. The defendant then extends his right arm towards a garbage can and places an object in it. A search of the garbage can produced a 9 millimeter handgun.
The police confirmed the caller's observations that there were several individuals around a black infinity in front of 472-476 Winthrop Avenue. The defendant was subsequently arrested for Criminal Possession of a Firearm and Carrying a Pistol without a permit.
After the arrest of the defendant, Officer Glynn called the phone number of the anonymous caller from the 911 dispatch system. Officer Glynn asked the man if his name can be put on the police report and the caller requested his name not be put in the police report.
DISCUSSION
I
" Under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, and under article first, [§ § 7 and 9] . . . of the Connecticut constitution, a police officer may briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jensen, 109 Conn.App. 617, 622, 952 A.2d 95 (2008). " When considering the validity of a [Terry] stop, [the court's] threshold inquiry is twofold . . . First, [the court] must determine at what point, if any . . . the encounter between [the police officers] and the defendant constitute[d] an investigatory stop or seizure . . . Next, [i]f [the court] concludes that there was such a seizure, [the court] must then determine whether [the police officers] possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion [that the individual is engaged in criminal activity] at the time the seizure occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benton, 304 Conn. 838, 843, 43 A.3d 619 (2012); accord State v. Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34, 49, 145 A.3d 861 (2016).
" Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion . . . The. police officer's decision . . . must be based on more than a hunch or speculation . . . In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 617, 778 A.2d 108 (2001). " When reviewing the legality of a stop, a court must examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 843-44.
II
Whether Police " Seized" the Defendant under Connecticut Law
As consistently noted, the preliminary question is to determine if, and when, the encounter between the defendant and the New Haven police amounted to an investigative stop. This is a fact sensitive inquiry and is significant because, if the encounter amounts to an investigative stop, the police must possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion at the time that the stop occurs .
" [Our Supreme Court has] defined a person seized under our state constitution when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained . . . In determining the threshold question of whether there has been a seizure, [courts] examine the effect of the police conduct at the time of the alleged seizure, applying an objective standard. Under our state constitution, a person is seized only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave . . . Therefore, [w]hether there has been a seizure in an individual case is a question of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 297 Conn. 1, 8, 997 A.2d 461 (2010); accord State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 844.
The court must initially determine the point in time when New Haven police actually effectuated an investigative stop or seizure on the defendant, if any. From this point, the court may move to the second inquiry: " [W]hether [the police officers] possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion [that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity] at the time the seizure occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 843; see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (" reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search").
Certain factors are relevant to determining if police conduct would make a reasonable person believe that he or she was not free to leave. These factors " include, but are not limited to: the number of officers and vehicles involved; whether the officers are uniformed; whether the officers are visibly armed or have their weapons drawn; whether the vehicles involved are marked police cruisers, whether the vehicles' sirens and emergency lights are activated, and whether the vehicles' headlamps or spotlights illuminate the defendant; whether the defendant is alone or otherwise appears to be the target of police attention; the nature of the location, including whether it is public or private property; whether the defendant is surrounded or fully or partially blocked in by the police; the character of any verbal communications or commands issued by the police officers; whether the officers advise the detainee of his right to terminate the encounter; the nature of any physical contact; whether the officers pursue after an initial attempt by the defendant to leave; whether the officers take and retain possession of the defendant's papers or property; and any other circumstance or conduct that bespeaks aggressiveness or a show of force on the part of the police, or suggests that the defendant is under suspicion or otherwise not free to leave." State v. Edmonds, supra, 323 Conn. 50-51; see also id., 59 (" [i]t is well settled that a reasonable citizen would not feel free to disregard a verbal command to stop issued by an armed, uniformed police officer"); State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 845-47 (failure to draw weapon or to signal defendant, although not dispositive, are highly relevant); State v. Burroughs, supra, 288 Conn. at 846-47 (favorably citing precedent from United States Supreme Court that seizure might occur when officer displays weapon or threatening presence of several officers exists).
The court finds the New Haven police " seized" the defendant when officers initially ordered the six men to stop. A reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard this initial order. Multiple, marked police cruisers proceeded to the location provided by the anonymous caller, uniformed New Haven police officers delivered the command to stop, some of whom un-holstered their weapons; four or five police officers were present during this initial command; and it appears that the six men were the only individuals on the street at the time.
III
Whether New Haven Police had a Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion to Seize the Defendant Under the Circumstances
The next inquiry is whether the police possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop. " An anonymous tip generally does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable suspicion unless the tip is suitably corroborated or otherwise exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability." State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 326 n.21, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005); see also Florida v. J.L., supra, 529 U.S. 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (" there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop"); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (anonymous tip seldom demonstrates veracity or basis of knowledge and, therefore, rarely justifies Terry stop standing alone).
" [I]nformants do not all fall into neat categories of known or anonymous . Instead, it is useful to think of known reliability and corroboration as a sliding scale. Where the informant is known from past practice to be reliable . . . no corroboration will be required to support reasonable suspicion. Where the informant is completely anonymous . . . a significant amount of corroboration will be required. However, when the informant is only partially known (i.e., [informant's] identity and reliability are not verified, but neither is [informant] completely anonymous), a lesser degree of corroboration may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torelli, 103 Conn.App. 646, 653, 931 A.2d 337 (2007); see also State v. Clark, supra, 297 Conn. 14-15.
" In the context of an anonymous tip, as in this case, a 'totality of the circumstances' test is used, requiring independent police investigation to corroborate details because [u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, [146-47, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612] (1972), an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity, Alabama v. White, [ supra, 496 U.S. at 329]. As we have recognized, however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. Id., [327].'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 617, quoting Florida v. J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at 270. " The question is whether the tip should be deemed sufficiently trustworthy in light of the total circumstances. Without a doubt, an anonymous tip can have certain other features that support reliability even if the police cannot narrow the likely class of informants." State v. Hammond, supra, 623.
A
Relevant United States Supreme Court Authority
As reflected by the parties' memoranda, certain cases from the United States Supreme Court dominate the field with regard to the issue presently before the court.
In Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at 326-27, the question presented was " whether the [anonymous telephone] tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop." An anonymous caller had informed police that an individual with cocaine would be leaving a particular apartment complex, at a particular time, in a specific vehicle, and that the vehicle would be headed to a specific motel. Id., 327. Police followed this specific vehicle for a period of time before stopping it supposedly on route to the specific motel " because [the female occupant] was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle." Id., 327. A consensual search revealed cocaine and marijuana within the vehicle and in the occupant's purse. Id.
The White Court noted that previous precedent " made clear . . . that those factors that had been considered critical under Aguilar and Spinelli --an informant's 'veracity, ' reliability, ' and 'basis of knowledge'--remain highly relevant in determining the value of his report . . . These factors are also relevant in the reasonable-suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to meet this standard." (Citation omitted; footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 328-29. Central to the court's conclusion that the officers possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant was the fact that the caller " predict[ed] respondent's future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information--a special familiarity with respondent's affairs." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 332. Such predictions were distinct from " easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip . . ." Id. " Anyone could have 'predicted' [such easily obtained facts] because [they were] condition[s] presumably existing at the time of the call." Id. The ability to predict future behavior, which police subsequently corroborated, bolstered the anonymous caller's reliability; see id.; and the likelihood that he was " probably right about other [incriminating] facts . . ." Id., 331.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
Subsequently, in Florida v. J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at 270-71, the Court further highlighted the significant role that predicting future behavior can play in assessing the reliability of an anonymous tip. There, an anonymous caller informed police that " a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id., 268. Police discovered a gun on the minor defendant's person following a search. Id. " Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three [black males at the bus stop] of illegal conduct." Id. The record did not contain an audio recording of the tip. Id.
Concluding that the officers lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk the defendant, the Court noted: " All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L." (Emphasis added.) Id., 271. Without any predictive information, " the police were without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." Id. The court also rejected the contention that the anonymous caller's accurate description of the accused strongly supported the informant's reliability. " An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." (Emphasis added.) Id., 272. Although the anonymous tip in J.L. lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant a Terry stop; id., 274; the opinion suggests that the Court might have reached a different result if the tipster explained the basis of his knowledge of illegal conduct. See id., 271.
The Court recently revisited White and J.L. when it decided Navarette v. California, supra, 134 S.Ct. 1683, and provided additional clarification on assessing the reliability of anonymous telephone tips to 911. In that case, a female caller informed 911 operators that a particular truck heading in a particular direction had just run her off the road. Id., 1686-87. Police officers stopped the truck roughly eighteen minutes after the 911 call, smelling marijuana as they approached the truck. Id., 1687, 1689. " A search of the truck revealed 30 pounds of marijuana." Id., 1687. The Court " [assumed] for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous . . ." Id., 1688.
The Court concluded that the call possessed adequate indicia of reliability for key reasons that are relevant to the case presently before the court. First, the caller was an eyewitness to the events she described. " By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle . . . the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip's reliability . . . This is in contrast to J.L., where the tip provided no basis for concluding that the tipster had actually seen the gun." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Id., 1689.
Additionally, the timeline of events and the startling nature of the tipster's call supported a belief that the caller was reliable. " Police confirmed the truck's location near mile marker 69 (roughly 19 highway miles south of the location reported in the 911 call) at 4:00 p.m. (roughly 18 minutes after the 911 call). That timeline of events suggests that the caller reported the incident soon after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable . . . There was no indication that the tip in J.L. (or even in White ) was contemporaneous with the observation of criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event, but those considerations weigh in favor of the caller's veracity here." (Emphasis added.) Id.
The Court also noted that " [a]nother indicator of veracity is the caller's use of the 911 emergency system . . . A 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity . . . As this case illustrates . . . 911 calls can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster's voice and subject him to prosecution . . ." Id., 1689-90; see also General Statutes § 53a-180d (class B misdemeanor to misuse emergency 911 system). The Court also noted that, since White and J.L., technological and regulatory developments provide police officers with at least some assurance that " a false tipster would think twice before using such a system." Id., 1690. Since 2001, cellular carriers must " relay the caller's phone number to 911 dispatchers" and " carriers have been required to identify the caller's geographic location with increasing specificity." Id.
In Freeman, the Second Circuit held that two anonymous 911 calls from the same individual regarding a man possessing a gun lacked adequate indicia of reliability. The court rejected the government's arguments that recording the 911 calls and possessing the anonymous caller's number sufficiently distinguished it from the holding of J.L. See U.S. v. Freeman, supra, 98. The reasoning of Navarette abrogates this portion of the Freeman decision, and Freeman is further distinguishable on the ground that 911 dispatchers in that case were unable to verify if the anonymous caller " actually saw a firearm." See id., 94. The Court's reasoning in Navarette v. California, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1689-90, that the use of the 911 system supports the reliability of the anonymous tip undercuts the defendant's reliance in the present case on U.S. v. Freeman, supra, 735 F.3d at 98-103. See Defendant's Reply, pp. 9-11.
Finally, the Court found it significant that the anonymous caller provided information that provided reasonable suspicion of ongoing drunk driving. See id., 1690-92. " The caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving." Id., 1691.
In the wake of Navarette, some federal circuits deem anonymous calls describing " an ongoing emergency situation" as being more reliable than calls detailing " general criminality." See, e.g., U.S. v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2014) (anonymous call detailing individual shooting at cars " was not simply one concerning general criminality"); see also U.S. v. Simmons, supra, 560 F.3d at 105 (" an anonymous 911 call reporting an ongoing emergency is entitled to a higher degree of reliability and requires a lesser showing of corroboration than a tip that alleges general criminality"; call detailed assault in progress possibly involving firearm).
Accordingly, when assessing the reliability of a call that the Court assumed to be anonymous, a majority of the Court in Navarette found it significant that: (1) the caller was an eyewitness to the events described; (2) police responded within eighteen minutes of the initial call, which recounted a startling event; (3) the anonymous caller used the 911 emergency system; and (4) the call provided reasonable suspicion of ongoing drunk driving. These factors provide further clarification in assessing the reliability of an anonymous telephone tip to 911. See, e.g., U.S. v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Navarette in finding anonymous 911 call about individual shooting at cars reliable).
The facts in the present case substantively correspond with aspects of the circumstances in Navarette . The caller in the present case provided 911 dispatch with his first-hand observations. " That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip's reliability." Navarette v. California, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1689. Additionally, the anonymous tipster called 911 dispatch as he observed the individual with a firearm, and police responded to the scene within minutes of the call. " That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable." Id. Notwithstanding the defendant's argument to the contrary, it is also significant that the anonymous caller in the present case utilized the 911 emergency system.
Two New Haven police officers recognized two members of the group after exiting their vehicles from prior criminal encounters. See, e.g. Tr. 4/25/17, pp. 38, 73. It is also significant to note two additional factors that seemingly exist in the present case that are relevant to the reasonable and articulable suspicion analysis. For example, the police in Navarette stopped the defendant's vehicle based solely on the anonymous 911 call. See Navarette v. California, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1687, 1690 n.2 (officers smelled marijuana after stopping truck and noting " that the 911 call created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime"). In the present case, the officers seemingly knew that the area of New Haven in question was a " high crime area" plagued by gun-related violence. See, e.g., Tr. 4/25/17, pp. 36-37, 69; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (stop in " high crime area" is among relevant contextual considerations in Terry analysis); State v. Peterson, 320 Conn. 720, 734, 135 A.3d 686 (2016) (presence in location known for criminal activity relevant consideration to reasonable suspicion analysis). Additionally, it appears that the six individuals spotted by New Haven police began to disperse immediately upon seeing the marked police cruisers turn onto Winthrop Avenue. See, e.g., Tr. 4/25/17, pp. 15, 37; see also State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 324, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (suddenly changing course upon seeing police " tends to support a reasonable suspicion that the individual may be involved in criminal activity"), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005).
The main distinguishing feature between the present case and Navarette corresponds with the severity or dangerous nature of the call's content, that is, the caller seeing an individual with a firearm. Navarette involved the startling event of allegedly being run off the road by another motorist and the possibility of ongoing drunk driving; the circumstances of the present case involve seeing an individual display a firearm in an area known for gun-related violence. In present society, it is reasonable to conclude that seeing a firearm in an area known for gun-related violence is a startling event for someone in the caller's shoes and potentially corresponds with ongoing criminal activity.
B
Relevant Connecticut Authority
Although Connecticut appellate courts have previously commented on the reliability of anonymous calls, such authority precedes Navarette . See, e.g., State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 778 A.2d 108 (2001). Additionally, only four cases in Connecticut cite Navarette and these decisions do not discuss the relevant factors for assessing the reliability of a 911 call . Although our appellate courts have provided substantial guidance on assessing the reliability of anonymous tips, Navarette clarifies how a court should assess anonymous 911 calls with regard to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
See State v. Peterson, 153 Conn.App. 358, 101 A.3d 337 (2014) (case involved extensive police surveillance, direct police observations, and various informant tips, not anonymous call to 911; majority cites Navarette for general principle that police must have reasonable and articulable suspicion), rev'd, 320 Conn. 720, 135 A.3d 686 (2016); State v. Tavares, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CR-12-226155-S (March 27, 2015, Alander, J.) (2015 WL 1919216) (case involved eight calls to police department or officers from anonymous caller regarding shipment of heroin, which provided substantial information about future conduct that police corroborated; cites Navarette for general proposition that " [a]n anonymous report sufficiently corroborated by police can provide reasonable and articulable suspicion for a stop"); State v. Atkinson, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CR-13-0152040-S, (January 23, 2015, Spellman, J.) (case did not involve anonymous call; cites Navarette for general reasonable suspicion principles) (2015 WL 671665); State v. Grullon-Millan, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CR-14-0152802-S (September 9, 2014, Seeley, J.) (2014 WL 5099425) (same).
In State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 615, police received an anonymous call regarding drug sales allegedly taking place at a church one block from the police station. " Herman Badger, the police sergeant who received the telephone call, did not recognize the caller's voice and could not recall whether the caller was male or female. Badger believed that the caller was excited and upset. The caller indicated only that the two subjects in question were black males of differing heights and gave only a partial clothing description, namely, that one of the subjects wore a blue and white coat, and the other wore a blue and red coat. The church was in an area known for previous drug sales . . . As the officers reached the [location of the drug sales], the subjects under observation . . . turned and walked [away]. Badger radioed [another officer] to stop the subjects. [The other officer], in response, proceeded down Dixwell Avenue in a southerly direction and pulled his parked patrol car across the northbound lane of traffic, onto the sidewalk, in front of the subjects, who then turned around and began walking in a southerly direction on Dixwell Avenue, toward . . . Badger. [One officer] then yelled to the men to stop. The three officers surrounded the subjects, and only then did [one officer] observe one of the subjects, later identified as the defendant, drop a bundle to the ground." Id., 615-16. Subsequent testing revealed that the dropped bundle contained narcotics. Id., 616. The dispositive issue before the court was " whether the tip implicating the defendant had sufficient indicia of reliability [in order to justify the stop.]" Id., 617.
In concluding that the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the court emphasized that " predictive information, " subsequently corroborated by police investigation, can play a significant role when assessing the constitutionality of a search. See id., 619-22. " In the present case, the anonymous tip provided no predictive information, and, therefore, the police could not test the tipster's knowledge and credibility. Nor could the police narrow the likely class of informants. The anonymous tip came in by telephone, and the record does not reflect whether the police made any notation or other documentation either by a voice recording or by tracing the call to a telephone number." (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 621-22. Additionally, the police only corroborated " innocuous facts, " not those related to criminal activity, which simply allowed police to " pinpoint the persons who were the targets of the accusation." Id., 623-24. Under such circumstances, the police did not possess a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity to justify a Terry stop. See id., 626.
Although courts have emphasized the significance of police corroborating predicted future behavior; see, e.g., State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 383-84, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (anonymous tip provided: name of person driving vehicle; detailed description of vehicle; specific destination of vehicle; and approximate time traveling in area); " [p]redicting future conduct of an alleged criminal is one way by which the police can test an anonymous informant's knowledge and credibility." (Emphasis added.) State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 621 n.10. " The question is whether the tip should be deemed sufficiently trustworthy in light of the total circumstances." Id., 623.
Notably, Hammond favorably cited to United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014, 121 S.Ct. 1748, 149 L.Ed.2d 670 (2001), when noting that Badger " could not ascertain whether the informant personally had observed the offending conduct or, if he had, when ." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Hammond, supra, 622. This citation, along with two footnotes in the opinion, strongly suggests that evidence that an anonymous tipster is an eyewitness to illegal activity can be a highly relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis. See id., 622 nn. 11 & 12 (court had no way of knowing " whether Badger had any objective reason to believe that this tip had some particular indicia of reliability" and rejecting state's argument, " as without a sufficient basis in the record, " that anonymous caller was eyewitness to reported drug sales).
In United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 352-53 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014, 121 S.Ct. 1748, 149 L.Ed.2d 670 (2001), an anonymous informant, in a face-to-face conversation, told police that he had just seen a man with a gun and provided police with a description of the man. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of that case, the police possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk the defendant based, in part, on the fact that " the officers in our case knew that the informant was reporting what he had observed moments ago, not what he learned from sale or second-hand sources." Id., 354. This was a feature that distinguished the case from the Supreme Court's decision in J.L. See id.
Although Hammond is factually similar to the circumstances of the present case and, therefore, should guide the court's analysis, two additional cases are relevant to the present motion to suppress. In State v. Brown, 279 Conn. 493, 516-19, 903 A.2d 169 (2006), our Supreme Court concluded that officers possessed a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant for drug possession based, in part, on an anonymous call detailing suspected drug sales. Officers from the Waterbury police department traveled to a particular area based on the anonymous tip and, upon arrival, witnessed the defendant engage in nervous, evasive behavior, which included placing a plastic bag in his shoe. See id., 496-97. The officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on such circumstances. Id., 519.
In passing, the court noted that, " [a]lthough an anonymous tip alone is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop, it may contribute, in combination with other evidence, to a reasonable suspicion for such a stop." (Emphasis added.) Id., 518.
The facts of the present case provide additional grounds to support a reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop (anonymous tip, standing alone insufficient, but in combination with other evidence can support reasonable suspicion).
Based on the foregoing, an anonymous tip can supply police officers with reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop when it exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability, is corroborated by police investigation, and is combined with other facts apparent to police prior to " seizing" the defendant. Courts closely scrutinize the circumstances in assessing the informant's veracity, reliability, and his or her basis of knowledge. Additionally, where the tipster is truly anonymous, courts in Connecticut have applied a heightened corroboration requirement, such that a significant amount of details need to be corroborated; courts in Connecticut have also frequently cited the need to corroborate incriminating facts, not just " innocuous details" that anyone could perceive. Notwithstanding Connecticut's jurisprudence, it is also significant to note that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Navarette post-dates much of Connecticut's case law on this point. Navarette is applicable to the circumstances presented.
C
Relevant Federal Authority
Following Navarette, certain circuits have had the opportunity to apply and discuss whether police possessed a reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant based on anonymous tip. Although the Second Circuit has cited Navarette, those decisions have not explicitly addressed Navarette 's factors. See, e.g., U.S. v. Compton, 830 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding motorist's report reliable because she " reported what she had just observed" and made her report " in person, " citing Navarette without analysis); U.S. v. Spencer, 646 Fed.Appx. 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2016) (reasonable suspicion based on agents' independent review of immigration documents, anonymous tip, and agents' personal observations).
Other circuits discussing Navarette have reached relatively consistent results, finding such tips reliable. See, e.g., U.S. v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 309-10 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Navarette when discussing reliability of identified tipster's observations of a potential trespass), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2145, 198 L.Ed.2d 218 (2017); U.S. v. Aviles-Vega, 783 F.3d 69, 74-77 (1st Cir. 2015) (stop justified because anonymous driver: personally observed firearm in defendant's vehicle; called police soon after; called about an " open and obvious" crime; and police corroborated make, model, occupancy, license plate, and trajectory of defendant's car); U.S. v. Beeson, 611 Fed.Appx. 773, 775 (4th Cir. 2015) (anonymous tip from eyewitness who placed call to 911 soon after observing suspicious activity supported finding of reasonable suspicion); U.S. v. Edwards, supra, 761 F.3d 984-85 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Navarette in finding anonymous 911 call about individual shooting at cars reliable); but see U.S. v. Bryant, 654 Fed.Appx. 622, 626 n.5 (4th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing from Navarette because tipster's assertion of illegality was bald statement that defendant was carrying gun and, therefore, did not establish firsthand observation).
IV
Whether Illegal Stop, If Any, Tainted the Defendant's Disposal of the Firearm
" Under the exclusionary rule, evidence must be suppressed if it is found to be the fruit of prior police illegality . . . All evidence is not, however, a fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have been discovered but for the illegal action of law enforcement officials . . . Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint . . . The initial determination is, therefore, whether the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 626-27.
" While a suspect's flight may, in certain cases, be considered in determining whether there existed a reasonable and articulable basis of suspicion . . . police conduct that provokes flight precludes the consideration of this factor . . . Were it otherwise, the officer could use the suspicious conduct that he himself induced as evidence that the defendant was acting suspiciously." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 655-56, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992). " Article first, § 8 of our state constitution protects citizens against the admission of evidence at trial that is obtained as a result of the unlawful activities of the police . . . The relevant inquiry is whether the unlawful conduct of the police induced the disposal of the incriminating items by the defendant. We reject the implication of the dicta in [ California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)], that the chain of causation is broken when a suspect escapes from an unlawful seizure, thereby allowing the admission in evidence of items subsequently discarded." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 659-60.
Additionally, " [t]he mere fact that a citizen turns and walks away from an approaching police officer does not . . . support a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminality." State v. Edmonds, supra, 323 Conn. 72-73; see also State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 625 (walking away from police does not amount to headlong flight). " [W]hen an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business . . . But unprovoked flight . . . by its very nature, is not 'going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite." Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.
The timing of the seizure or stop plays in the reasonable suspicion analysis; circumstances and events taking place after a reasonable person would not feel free to leave should not factor into the court's reasonable suspicion analysis. See, e.g., U.S. v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (" person's compliance with an officer's order to stop where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave is a seizure, and sets the point in time for evaluating the presence of reasonable suspicion for the stop"), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1008, 130 S.Ct. 516, 175 L.Ed.2d 377 (2009); State v. Benton, supra, 304 Conn. 843 (officers must possess reasonable suspicion " at the time the seizure occurred"). Additionally, it is significant that an individual has the right to " go about his business" when an officer lacks reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court limits its inquiry to determining: (1) the point in time when New Haven police " seized" the defendant; and (2) whether New Haven police possessed a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant at that point in time. If police lacked a reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant, he had the right to go about his business, and the court's inquiry would become " whether the unlawful conduct of the police induced the disposal of the incriminating items by the defendant." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 659-60. Under the circumstances of this case, the disposal of the gun would not be " sufficiently distinguishable" from the illegal seizure and " [was] in some sense the product of the illegal government activity." State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 627; see also State v. Oquendo, supra, 658-60 (defendant has not willingly relinquished reasonable expectation of privacy in items he disposes in response to unlawful police conduct).
To the extent that the state argues that the defendant's " action of continuing to walk away from police after being ordered to stop . . . represents a break in the causal chain"; State's Objection, p. 10; the court does not credit this argument. The state argues that the defendant committed a new crime of interfering with an officer " when the defendant ignored [the command to stop]." State's Objection, p. 11. This argument greatly conflicts with the ingrained constitutional principle that an individual is free to " go about his business" when an officer approaches him or her without reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.
CONCLUSION
An anonymous tip can provide police with reasonable suspicion when it exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability, is corroborated by police investigation, and is combined with other facts apparent to police prior to seizing the defendant. " The question is whether the tip should be deemed sufficiently trustworthy in light of the total circumstances." State v. Hammond, supra, 257 Conn. 623. Because this case involved a recorded anonymous call to 911, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Navarette is particularly useful for assessing whether New Haven police possessed a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The court finds the police possessed a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The motion to suppress is hereby denied.