Opinion
No. CR4-273002
September 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING ON THE AGGRAVATING FACTOR AND ON THE 53a-46 (h) STATUTORY BARS
The defendant, Robert Courchesne, requests, by motion dated June 5, 2003, that the court hold a hearing to determine whether there exists probable cause as to the alleged aggravating factor[s] and the lack of any statutory bars to death contained in § 53a-46a (h). The defendant claims his right to this hearing on the basis of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).
In Ring, the Supreme Court found that any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be found not by a judge but by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 595. "Capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Id., 589. During oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the request for a probable cause hearing as requested prior to the commencement of the penalty phase of the trial is not the holding of Ring. Counsel indicated that although his position is not directly supported by Ring, lower courts have interpreted Ring to mean that sentencing factors that make a defendant death eligible must be set forth in the charging documents. The defense cited various federal cases that analyze the holding in Ring as it applies to federal indictments and grand juries. These federal procedures do not apply to Connecticut capital cases because the fifth amendment right to a grand jury indictment "is not applicable to state prosecutions." Meade v. Warden, 184 Conn. 597, 601 n. 4, 440 A.2d 246 (1981). The defendant's reliance upon the cases in support of his argument is misplaced.
Connecticut complies with the substantive purpose of Ring because the sentencing aspect of a capital case is decided by a jury or a three-judge panel. See General Statutes § 53a-46a. Moreover, there is "no authority aside from the constitutionally required hearing in probable cause . . . that entitles a defendant to a pretrial judicial determination of ineligibility for the death penalty." State v. Solek, 242 Conn. 409, 431, 699 A.2d 931 (1997).
In this case, the defendant had a probable cause hearing before the guilt phase of the trial, as provided by General Statutes § 54-46a. The defendant was put on notice of the aggravating factor the state intended to submit on January 23, 2001, after having been convicted in September 2001 by a three-judge panel of the counts of capital felony, C.G.S. §§ 53a-54b (8) and (9) and two counts of murder C.G.S. § 53a-54a. In accordance with § 53a-46a, the case is now about to commence the penalty phase where the aggravating factor presented by the state is required to be established to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
P.A. 01-151 amended § 53a-54b effective October 1, 2001 and subsection (a) was renumbered as subsection (8) which was numbered to subsection (7).
The court has required the state to specify the aggravating factor and essential factors to put the defendant on notice of these factor[s] as well as the existence of any possible defenses.
Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars and Request for Essential Facts re: The Alleged Aggravating Factor granted July 24, 2003, D'Addabbo, J. Compliance August 15, 2003.
This court also refers and incorporates to its decision of November 27, 2001 Memorandum of Decision re: Amended Motion to Dismiss the Aggravating Factor and to Impose a Life Sentence because there is Insufficient Evidence to Justify Holding a Penalty Hearing (Sec. I).
THEREFORE: The defendant's motion for a probable cause hearing on the aggravating factor[s] and on the § 53a-46 (h) statutory bars to death is denied.
SO ORDERED.
FRANK J. D'ADDABBO, JR., J.