Opinion
No. 33178-1-II.
May 8, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 03-1-01706-7, Stephen M. Warning, J., entered April 7, 2005.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Penoyar, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Van Deren, J.
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of Nathan Coughlin's charge for second degree unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to his Knapstad motion. Coughlin was not given notice that he lost his right to bear firearms after he pleaded guilty to a previous juvenile charge as required by RCW 9.41.047. The trial court dismissed his current charge for unlawful possession because he was not given notice under RCW 9.41.047. We reverse and remand.
State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986).
FACTS
Nathan Coughlin was arrested for suspected driving under the influence of intoxicants on November 29, 2003. The arresting officer searched Coughlin's vehicle and found a .25 caliber pistol in the console between the two front seats of the vehicle. The officer then checked Coughlin's record and discovered that in 1994 Coughlin was convicted of unlawful imprisonment. Coughlin was charged with second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, contrary to RCW 9.41.040(1)(b)(i) and driving under the influence, contrary to RCW 46.61.502(1). A person is guilty of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm if he owns, or has in his possession, any firearm and has been previously convicted of a felony not listed in RCW 9A.20. RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i). Therefore, Coughlin's previous conviction for unlawful imprisonment was relevant to his charge for second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.
It appears there may be a clerical error in the information because there is no RCW 9.41.040(1)(b)(i). RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i) must be the RCW that applies to Coughlin's charge for second degree unlawful possession.
Coughlin entered a guilty plea to unlawful imprisonment in juvenile court in 1994. He was never advised by the trial court that as a result of the unlawful imprisonment conviction he lost his right to bear firearms or that his right to bear firearms could only be reacquired by a court order. Coughlin's plea statement also did not state that he lost his right to bear firearms; but his disposition order did indicate that he could not possess weapons of any kind as a condition of his community supervision.
In 2002, Coughlin applied to purchase a rifle. He filled out a "Firearms Transaction Record" form and answered "no" to the question: "Have you been convicted in any court of a crime for which the judge could have imprisoned you for more than one year, even if the judge actually gave you a shorter sentence?" Clerk's Papers (CP) at 15. The form indicated that "NICS or the appropriate state agency" authorized the store to "proceed" with Coughlin's purchase. CP at 15; Report of Proceedings (RP) at 9. Based on this representation, Coughlin believed he was legally entitled to possess firearms.
Coughlin filed a Knapstad motion, arguing that his charge should be dismissed. Coughlin argued that his unlawful imprisonment proceedings did not inform him that he had lost his right to possess firearms or that his right could only be restored by court order, as required by RCW 9.41.047(1). Also, relying on State v. Leavitt, 107 Wn. App. 361, 26 P.3d 622 (2001), he asserted that his lack of notice was a defense to his second degree unlawful possession charge and that it should therefore be dismissed. The State argued that, even if Coughlin did not receive the notice required by RCW 9.41.047, the statute and case law do not require the court to dismiss an unlawful possession charge if a sentencing court failed to comply with the statute. The trial court granted Coughlin's Knapstad motion and issued findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding the motion.
The State appealed and a commissioner issued a ruling affirming the trial court. The commissioner reasoned that, as a condition for Coughlin's community custody for the unlawful imprisonment charge, it stated on his disposition that he was prohibited from possessing any kind of weapon. She reasoned that it was therefore reasonable for him to believe that the prohibition ended when his community supervision ended. The ruling also stated that it was reasonable for Coughlin to assume that his prohibition ended because a state agency approved his purchase of a firearm in 2002. The State filed a motion to modify the ruling, which the trial court granted and the case is now before us.
ANALYSIS
To prevail on a Knapstad motion, the defendant must show by sworn affidavit that there are no material facts in dispute and that the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346, 356, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). The defendant's affidavit must include all facts and law supporting dismissal. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356. The State may defeat the motion by filing an affidavit that disputes the material facts. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356. If the State does not deny the defendant's statement of facts or allege other material facts, the facts are deemed admitted and the trial court decides whether, as a matter of law, they establish a prima facie case of guilt. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356-57. "Since the court is not to rule on factual questions, no findings of fact should be entered" in the trial court's order. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 357. Although findings of fact should not be entered in a Knapstad ruling, our primary concern is that the trial court must not rule on factual matters. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356-57.
A trial court may dismiss a criminal charge under Knapstad if the State's pleadings and evidence fail to establish prima facie proof of all elements of the charged crime. State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 171 n. 32, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001). We will uphold the trial court's dismissal of a charge pursuant to a Knapstad motion if no rational finder of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. State v. Snedden, 112 Wn. App. 122, 127, 47 P.3d 184 (2002), aff'd, 149 Wn.2d 914, 73 P.3d 995 (2003); see also State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 357 n. 6, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (noting similarity between standards of review for Knapstad motion and challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence).
The State makes essentially one substantive argument on appeal. It argues that the trial court should not have granted the Knapstad motion because the State was not required to prove that a defendant understood that his possession of a firearm was illegal; it was only required to prove that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm. State v. Reed, 84 Wn. App. 379, 383, 928 P.2d 469 (1997). Also, the State asserts that a sentencing court's failure to inform a defendant of the loss of his right to possess a firearm only requires reversal if the court (1) misled the defendant into believing that he could possess firearms and if the defendant can demonstrate (2) prejudice from his lack of notice, which Coughlin did not do.
The State is correct that knowledge of the illegality of firearm possession is not an element of the crime. State v. Leavitt, 107 Wn. App. at 368. The State need only prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a firearm. Leavitt, 107 Wn. App. at 368. However, RCW 9.41.047(1) requires the court to "notify the person, orally and in writing, that the person must immediately surrender any concealed pistol license and that the person may not possess a firearm unless his or her right to do so is restored by a court of record."
Although ignorance of the law is generally not a defense, we must balance that longstanding principle with the "inherent unfairness of. . . . a sentencing judge inadvertently misleading a defendant about his legal obligations such that the defendant relied on this misinformation to his detriment." Leavitt, 107 Wn. App. at 368. Due process requires dismissal of an unlawful firearm possession charge only when a court misleads a defendant into believing that his conduct was not prohibited and the defendant shows prejudice. State v. Minor, 133 Wn. App. 636, 643, 137 P.3d 872 (2006) (citing State v. Carter, 127 Wn. App. 713, 720, 112 P.3d 561 (2005)).
Here, the parties dispute whether Coughlin was misled and whether he was prejudiced. In Leavitt, we held that the trial court misled Leavitt when it indicated that it was suspending his sentence as long as he abstained from certain conduct for one year, including not possessing firearms. The court explained that in stating that his sentence was suspended for one year if he didn't possess firearms, the court lead him to believe that his right to possess firearms would be reinstated after the one year suspension period. Leavitt, 107 Wn. App. at 363.
In Carter, Division Three held that Carter was not misled even though the juvenile court failed to advise him that he could not possess firearms because he did not demonstrate prejudice or sufficiently establish that he was misled. Carter, 127 Wn. App. at 720-21. And most recently, in Minor, we held that, although the trial court did not inform Minor that he was not allowed to possess a firearm and although the trial court failed to check the box on Minor's judgment and sentence that stated he was not allowed to possess a firearm, Minor did not demonstrate that he relied on the trial court's oversight in failing to comply with RCW 9.41.047. Minor, 133 Wn. App. at 644. We noted that unlike in Leavitt, the trial court did nothing to affirmatively indicate to Minor that he could possess a firearm and therefore did not mislead him. Minor, 133 Wn. App. at 644.
In Minor, the court further held that RCW 9.41.047 imposes no sanction for the court's failure to comply with the notice requirements and held that it is not a judicial function but a legislative task to prescribe a remedy. Minor, 133 Wn. App. at 645. The court therefore held that Minor's ignorance of the law was not a defense to his unlawful possession conviction and refused to assign a remedy for the trial court's violation of the statute. Minor, 133 Wn. App. at 645.
Here, the trial court dismissed Coughlin's unlawful possession charge under the Knapstad motion, which requires that are no material facts in dispute. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356. There are factual issues in dispute here and the trial court's dismissal was not proper. On Coughlin's disposition order, the court stated that he could not possess weapons of any kind as a condition of his community supervision. There is, therefore, a factual question as to whether this misled Coughlin into believing that he could possess a firearm like in Leavitt or if there is no evidence that he relied on this disposition order like in Minor. The State also assigns error to finding of fact number four, which stated that Coughlin's paperwork to purchase a firearm in 2002 was reviewed and checked by a local police agency. The State asserts that a police agency did not approve the paperwork. The trial court should not have entered factual findings in connection with its Knapstad motion because the court is not to rule on factual questions in a Knapstad motion. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356. The fact that it did issue factual findings demonstrates that factual issues were in dispute. Dismissal under Knapstad was not appropriate.
Our primary concern in reviewing a Knapstad motion is that the trial court must not rule on factual matters. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356-57. In dismissing Coughlin's charge it decided factual issues, and we reverse and remand for trial.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
HOUGHTON, C.J.
VAN DEREN, J.