Opinion
ID No. 0301012010.
Submitted: July 9, 2007.
Decided: August 28, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
This 28th day of August, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 9, 2003, a jury found Johnny Collins ("Collins") guilty of rape in the first degree pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a)(6). He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Collins' conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Now before the Court is Collins' first pro se motion for postconviction relief.
See Docket 19, 24, 38, 40.
2. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
3. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. However, under Rule 61(i)(5), the bars to relief under (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
The motion must be filed within three years if the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, and within one year if the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005. See Rule 61, annot. Effect of amendments.
4. In applying the procedural imperatives to this case, Collins' claims are not barred. Collins' motion was timely filed, there have been no prior postconviction proceedings, and his bases for relief have not been formerly adjudicated. Moreover, the bases for relief that were required to be asserted at trial or on direct appeal were asserted as required by the court rules. Therefore, the merits of Collins' motion will be addressed.
5. Collins claims he was denied the right to confront the witnesses against him and that his counsel was ineffective. As support for these claims, Collins contends the following: counsel refused to ask the witnesses the questions he had prepared or question the victim about her past crimes of dishonesty; counsel failed to be with Collins in every phase of his court appearances; counsel failed to request and submit psychological or psychiatric examinations for both Collins and the victim; counsel failed to investigate, subpoena, and introduce exculpatory evidence to prove the victim fabricated her story; counsel failed to communicate the findings of the pre-sentence investigation to Collins; counsel failed to make a favorable statement at sentencing; and counsel failed to provide notice to Collins of his trial date.
See Docket 40.
6. Collins also asserts numerous other claims in his motion, both in support for his contention that his counsel was ineffective and also as separate grounds for relief. These claims are: counsel failed to file "motions" prior to trial; counsel failed to prepare Collins for all phases of trial; counsel failed to inform Collins of his constitutional rights and failed to protect those rights; counsel failed to investigate and present evidence and witnesses Collins requested; counsel failed to introduce and present at trial a defense of extreme emotional distress and duress; counsel failed to comply with Collins' Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; counsel failed to present an alibi defense, entrapment defense, and a "substantial defense"; counsel failed to "come back to" Collins on re-direct to "open the door" to the victim's past criminal behavior; counsel failed to investigate and subpoena witnesses for trial; counsel failed to introduce "extrinsic evidence" under D.R.E. 608(b); counsel violated D.R.E. 502; counsel failed to make any pre-trial motions; counsel failed to effectively express all elements to support a rape in the first degree conviction; counsel failed to file a motion for Family Court to handle the case; counsel failed to use the "necessity principle to raise issues at trial"; counsel violated Rule 1.4 of The Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct; Collins sentence was disproportional; Collins was denied his Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se at trial; Collins' constitutional right of a "fair jury voir dire" was violated; Collins' right to due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment was violated; and Collins was denied a fair "venire process." Collins, however, provides no support for these claims. They are all either completely conclusory, entirely unsubstantiated, unintelligible, or simply nonsensical. Therefore, the Court will not consider them.
Id.
See State v. Jordan, 1994 WL 637299, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Jun. 23, 1994) ("This Court need not address Postconviction Relief claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."); Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) (citations omitted) ("This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated."); State v. Canon, 1999 WL 1441997, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 9, 1999) (The Court found Defendant's claim "repetitive, vague, and entirely conclusory, warranting summary dismissal."); State v. Brown, 1998 WL 735880, at *3 (Del. Super Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) ("Conclusory claims raised in a defendant's motion for postconviction relief are insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and will not be addressed."); State v. Dividu, 1992 WL 52348, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Feb. 12, 1992) ("[M]ovant has failed to provide any factual support for his perfunctory allegations. He does not state, for example, in what regard his counsel failed to prepare for trial[.] As Rule 61(b)(2) obviously contemplated, without this information I am unable to effectively evaluate the merit of movant's claims."); State v. Morgan, 2004 WL 1732282, at *2 n. 1 (Del.Super.Ct. July 27, 2004) ("Defendant makes an assertion in ground five concerning a motion for postconviction relief which is unintelligible and consequently, ignored."); State v. Maldonado, 2004 WL 2735463, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov. 5, 2004) ("Defendant makes an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, which frankly, is nonsensical.").
A. Confrontation Clause
7. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" Collins maintains that he was denied the right to confront the witnesses against him because his counsel refused to ask the witnesses the questions he had prepared and failed to question the victim about her past crimes of dishonesty. The Court does not agree.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 615-616 (Del. 2001) ("The Confrontation Clause provides defendants in criminal cases with the right to confront witnesses who testify against them.").
8. While the Court is at a loss as to what "questions" Collins wished his counsel to ask of certain "witnesses," the Court does observe that, with respect to the victim (who was 14 years old during the commission of the crime), the victim's legal inability to give consent would have precluded defense counsel from asking the victim about her consent to sexual intercourse with Collins. Similarly, D.R.E. 609(d) would likely have also prevented defense counsel from inquiring into the victim's "past crimes of dishonesty" that Collins alleges she committed, and for which he provides no details. In defense counsel's affidavit submitted in response to the Court's request under Rule 61(g)(2), he admits that while Collins did offer information about the victim and provided proposed questions to ask her, attempting to elicit such information would have been precluded by the rape shield statute and/or inadmissible because the victim was legally incapable of consent, which was Collins' proffered defense. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Collins' Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was not infringed upon due to his inability to question the victim about her consent and her alleged past crimes of dishonesty.
See Docket 44.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
9. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test by showing both: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the errors by counsel amounted to prejudice. The defendant faces a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable" in attempting to meet the first prong. Under the second prong, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding would have had a different result. If either prong is not met, the defendant's claim fails.
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996) (citation omitted).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Fletcher v. State, 2006 WL 1237088, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. May 9, 2006).
10. Collins has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test. Contrary to Collins' claim, and as stated in counsel's affidavit, counsel was present with Collins for all of his appearances in this Court. Although counsel was not present during Collins' preliminary hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, Collins was represented in that proceeding by another public defender. Counsel also states in his affidavit that he, in fact, did not seek psychiatric or psychological examinations of either Collins or the victim because there was simply no good faith basis in fact or law to justify such a request. Counsel further states that, despite Collins' allegation, his client did not make him aware of any "exculpatory" evidence that would have established that the victim fabricated her storty. As for Collins' contention that counsel failed to communicate the pre-sentence investigation findings and did not make a favorable statement at sentencing, counsel responds that he did discuss with Collins the likely effect his prior record would have on the sentence and that he made as favorable a statement as possible at the sentencing hearing. Finally, with respect to Collins' claim that his counsel failed to provide him with notice of his trial date, while counsel has no recollection of whether he provided that notice to Collins, the Court is aware that this issue came up once before.
See Docket 44.
11. Just prior to the second day of trial, Collins himself made a motion for mistrial in open court. In support of the motion, Collins asserted the same complaint he now makes, which is that he had no notice of his trial date. The Court denied the motion and stated: "There's ample evidence in this file that you have been notified of various trial dates. There have been several trial dates in this case. So your motion is denied." The Court stands behind that decision. The record in this case reveals that trial was originally scheduled for July 30, 2003 and, upon defense counsel's request, that date was continued. On August 15, 2003, this Court's criminal administrative judge issued a trial scheduling order re-scheduling Collins' trial to October 7, 2003. Collins thus had over two months to inquire as to his new trial date, but never made that inquiry. Therefore, the fact that counsel may have inadvertently failed to timely inform Collins of the trial date is not, by itself, grounds for finding that counsel's representation was ineffective.
Docket 34, p. 4.
12. Altogether, in considering Collins' contentions in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court finds that he has failed to demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As a result, Collins has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.
13. For the sake of argument, even assuming counsel committed errors in his representation, the trial would have still resulted in a guilty verdict. The evidence in this case was overwhelming. Collins testified during trial that he did, in fact, have sexual intercourse with the 14 year old victim. Collins' DNA was also matched to the "products of conception" which were obtained after the victim underwent an abortion. What is more, prior to trial, defense counsel and this Court made repeated attempts to explain to Collins that because the victim was a minor, her consent was not a viable defense. Despite these attempts, however, Collins continued to believe that he was innocent of the charges because, according to him, the victim seduced him into having sexual intercourse. Collins was unrelenting in this belief even after he was found guilty, and reiterated at sentencing that, even though he impregnated the victim, "[i]t was on her doing" because "[s]he forced us." To this day, Collins apparently continues to believe that he did not commit a crime since, in his mind, the minor victim consented to having sexual intercourse. Therefore, because of the uncontested and irrefutable evidence against Collins, counsel's alleged errors would have had no impact on the outcome of the trial.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (Under the second prong, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding would have had a different result.).
See Docket 36, p. 11.
Id. at 13.
14. Based on all the foregoing, Collins' motion for postconviction relief is DENIED in part and SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.