Opinion
110,603.
10-03-2014
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Floyd COATES, Jr., Appellant.
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Kevin N. Berens, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Kevin N. Berens, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., LEBEN and ATCHESON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Floyd Coates, Jr., appeals three particular aspects of the Thomas County District Court's order requiring him to pay restitution to the owner of a comparatively new, high-performance pickup truck he stole. We find no error in the restitution order and affirm.
Coates pleaded guilty to felony theft for taking the truck in Thomas County in mid–2012 and abandoning it, considerably worse for wear, in Wichita about a week later. The truck was full of trash and nearly drained of a motor additive. The vehicle had been driven almost 6,000 miles between the time it was taken and recovered. The victim's checkbook was missing from the truck.
Based on the victim's testimony and other evidence presented at the restitution hearing, the district court ordered Coates to pay the victim $3,223.84 and to reimburse State Farm Insurance Company $4,523.52 for what it paid the victim on her claim under her motor vehicle insurance policy. On appeal, Coates contends the district court erred in awarding the victim expenses she incurred for travel and lodging to go to Wichita to retrieve the truck from the police department, the charge for a copy of her initial report of the theft to law enforcement officers in Thomas County, and the cost of installing a trailer hitch on a new truck the victim purchased using the stolen truck as a trade-in.
In light of the Kansas Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding district court jurisdiction to enter restitution orders, we have independently examined that issue. See State v. Frierson, 298 Kan. 1005, 319 P.3d 515 (2014) ; State v. Charles, 298 Kan. 993, 318 P.3d 997 (2014) ; State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 319 P.3d 506 (2014). At the sentencing hearing, the district court set over the determination of the amount of restitution at Coates' request because he wanted to explore the factual basis for the amount the State sought. The district court granted that request and later held an evidentiary hearing at which Coates and his lawyer were present. Under the circumstances, the district court retained jurisdiction to decide restitution and to enter an appropriate order. See Frierson, 298 Kan at 1021.
As provided in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–6604(b)(1), the district court must “order the defendant to pay restitution, which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime[.]” If a defendant is placed on probation, as Coates was, payment of restitution “for the damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime” is to be a condition of that probation. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–6607(c)(2). In State v. Hand, 297 Kan. 734, 738, 304 P.3d 1234 (2013), the Kansas Supreme Court recognized that district courts have wide latitude in fashioning a restitution amount that compensates a victim for the financial loss a criminal defendant has inflicted. The statutory test for causation in restitution awards is a broad one. 297 Kan. at 739 the (“statutory reference to damage or loss ‘caused by’ a defendant's crime is not modified by the adverb ‘directly’ ”).
The district court included travel costs and one night's lodging in Wichita for the victim. We do not understand Coates to be challenging the amount as unreasonable, only that the expenses were not “caused by” the crime within the meaning of the restitution statutes. Given the distance between Thomas County and Wichita, we cannot say that travel and lodging expenses were inappropriate items of restitution. The victim plainly incurred those costs as a direct result of the theft of the truck and the thiefs decision to dump the vehicle in Wichita.
At the restitution hearing, the victim testified that she had to get a copy of the theft report at the request of credit agencies because a number of forged checks had been drawn on her account. The law enforcement agency charged her a small copying fee for the report. A checkbook had been in the truck when it was stolen. Coates objects to the copying fee because he was not charged with forgery or some other crime related to the checks. But the broad causation test would encompass this expense to the victim. Coates stole the truck, and, as a result, the victim no longer had custody or control over those checks. Even if some unknown person took the checks out of the truck after Coates had abandoned the vehicle, his criminal conduct played a substantial part in the forgeries. They could not have occurred without his actions. The forgeries are sufficiently linked to Coates' wrongful actions that the modest expense the victim incurred to protect against any adverse financial consequences constitutes an appropriate component of a restitution award. The cost would be a foreseeable one when a theft reasonably could include checks, credit cards, or other financial documents. Those are items people routinely have in their motor vehicles from time to time.
Finally, Coates objects to the cost of installing the trailer hitch on a new truck. The victim was advised that the trade-in value of the stolen truck, which was fairly new, would drop noticeably after the theft appeared on motor vehicle reports. The victim decided to trade in the truck and purchase a new one. The new truck did not come with a trailer hitch as a standard item. The victim, however, needed the hitch so the truck could be used to haul hay and for other tasks on her farm. The hitch was not a luxury item. Again, while the cost to install the trailer hitch may not have been an expense directly caused by the theft, it was sufficiently related to the crime to be included in a restitution order, as contemplated in Hand.
We, therefore, find no error in those aspects of the restitution order Coates has challenged on appeal.
In the interest of completeness, we mention that Coates raised an Ivory challenge to the use of his criminal history to set the length of his sentence and three arguments related to the district court's decision to revoke his probation. By the time the appeal had been briefed and reached this court for decision, Coates had served his underlying prison sentence of 12 months and had been released from custody by the Department of Corrections. The motions panel of this court issued an order on June 2, 2014, finding only the restitution issue “to be ripe for decision.” In light of State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, 286 P.3d 866 (2012), the sentencing and revocation issues appear to be moot. Coates has not indicated otherwise and did not seek reconsideration or modification of the June 2 order. We, therefore, have not addressed those points.
Affirmed.