Opinion
Docket No. 25248.
Filed: April 25, 2000. Magistrate's decision denying motion to dismiss for violation of statutory right to speedy trial, reversed. Case remanded for entry of dismissal order. See State v. Clark, ___ Idaho ___, No. 26676, December 28, 2000.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. George D. Carey, District Judge; Hon. Carolyn M. Minder, Magistrate.
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; David William Simonaitis, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. David William Simonaitis argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Order denying motion to dismiss battery charge, affirmed.
Josh M. Clark entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of battery, reserving the right to appeal the magistrate's prior denial of his motion to dismiss the charge. On appeal, Clark asserts the action should have been dismissed due to the deprivation of his right to a speedy trial.
I. BACKGROUND
Clark was charged with misdemeanor battery, Idaho Code § 18-903, by complaint filed on January 10, 1997. The charge stemmed from an incident in which he allegedly hit and choked a woman. He pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on April 16, 1997. A pretrial conference was scheduled for August 19, 1997, and trial was set for September 8, 1997.
At the pretrial conference on August 19, the prosecutor informed the court that the victim lived in Montana and was unavailable for a September 8 trial because she was scheduled to take "board examinations" that day. The prosecutor also said that the victim could not travel to Boise for a trial between September 20 and October 6, 1997 due to her commitment to teach a class during that period. The magistrate vacated the original trial date over the objections of Clark, who expressly declined to waive his right to a speedy trial. The magistrate reset the trial for September 22.
On September 18, the matter of the trial date was again before the magistrate on the State's motion. Because Clark's case did not have a first priority setting on the September 22 date, and Clark's trial therefore might not go forward if other, higher priority cases scheduled for trial on the same day did not settle, the prosecutor recognized there was a risk that the victim would take time off work and travel from Montana to Boise to testify on September 22, only to learn that the trial would be vacated. To protect the victim from this risk, the prosecutor suggested three alternatives: (1) Clark's trial could be given the top priority for the September 22 date; (2) the trial could be continued to a date at which Clark's case could be given a first priority setting; or (3) if Clark would not stipulate to a rescheduling, he could be ordered to pay the victim's expense of travel to Boise if the September 22 trial ultimately had to be postponed. Clark again asserted his right to a speedy trial, objecting to a continuance and to the suggestion that he should absorb the victim's travel costs. The trial court concluded that giving Clark's trial first priority for September 22 was impossible because a higher priority criminal case was already set for that date and was unlikely to be resolved with a guilty plea. Therefore, the court continued the trial until December 15, 1997 which, in view of the court's crowded calendar, was the first date available at which Clark's trial could be given a top priority setting. On October 7, 1997, Clark filed a "Renewed Demand for Speedy Trial." In this motion, Clark requested a trial date prior to October 16, when the six-month limit established by Idaho Code § 19-3501(3) for misdemeanor trials would run. The magistrate denied the motion "based on court congestion."
Clark then moved to dismiss the case, alleging that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The magistrate conducted a hearing on December 15 and thereupon denied the motion. After receiving this ruling, Clark entered a guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. On the appeal to the district court, the decision of the magistrate was affirmed.
The sole issue before this Court is whether a violation of Clark's statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial occurred.
II. ANALYSIS
When reviewing an intermediate appellate decision of a district court, we focus upon the magistrate's decision and the record upon which it was based. Although we consult the district court's decision for the insight that it may provide, we review the magistrate's decision independently and without deference to the district court's ruling. State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814, 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct.App. 1997); State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 183, 911 P.2d 774, 776 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho 667, 668, 818 P.2d 782, 783 (Ct. App. 1991). Whether there was an infringement of Clark's right to a speedy trial is a mixed question of fact and law. We defer to the magistrate's findings that are based upon substantial evidence but freely review the magistrate's assessment as to whether, on those facts, the constitutional standards have been satisfied. State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 270, 954 P.2d 686, 688 (Ct.App. 1998).
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee "the right to a speedy and public trial." These guarantees are enhanced by I.C. § 19-3501, which sets time limits within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial.
Clark's statutory claim is based upon subsection 3 of § 19-3501, which provides that "unless good cause to the contrary is shown," a misdemeanor prosecution must be dismissed if "a defendant . . . whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty with the court." Clark contends that his rights under this statute were violated because he was not brought to trial within six months after the entry of his not guilty plea on April 16, 1997.
Under § 19-3501, if the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he was not brought to trial within six months of the entry of a plea and that the trial was not postponed at his request, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate "good cause to the contrary." State v. Cotant, 123 Idaho 787, 788, 852 P.2d 1384, 1385 (1993); State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 419, 913 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Ct. App. 1996). To determine whether the requisite good cause exists under the statute, the trial court must utilize the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court for constitutional analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Cotant, supra; State v. Russell, 108 Idaho 58, 696 P.2d 909 (1985); Beck, supra. The factors weighed in this balancing process are: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason or reasons for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his or her speedy trial right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Cotant, supra.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the trial was delayed beyond the six-month statutory window through no fault of Clark. Thus, the issue presented is whether, applying the Barker factors, the State has demonstrated good cause for the delay.
When addressing the first such factor, the cause of the delay, we consider the nature of the case, for "delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. See also State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 272, 954 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct.App. 1998); State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206, 211 (Ct.App. 1996). Clark's misdemeanor battery charge is not of a complex nature, and the two-month overage is a clear departure from the statutory standard. It is not, however, an extreme or egregious length of delay.
The second Barker factor is the reason for the delay. Even where the delay is precipitated solely by the State, the extent to which this should be weighed against the State varies according to the specific reason for the delay. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court explained:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
Here, the postponements of the trial were requested by the State out of consideration for the victim, and the length of the postponement was dictated by the court's schedule. When the State requested accommodation so the victim could avoid the risk of having to travel to Boise multiple times should the trial not proceed on the scheduled date, the court's congested calendar prevented a first priority trial setting within the six-month limit. Hence, there were two causes of the sixty-day delay: accommodation of the victim to minimize her inconvenience and expense, and the court's crowded calendar.
These reasons for the delay do not militate heavily toward a finding of a speedy trial violation. Although the postponements were at the behest of the prosecution, they were not for the benefit of the prosecutor or law enforcement personnel but for the convenience of Clark's alleged victim. The reasonable accommodation of a victim witness is a legitimate basis for a brief delay. This is particularly so in light of the provisions of the "Victims' Rights Amendment," Art. 1, § 22 of the Idaho Constitution, and I.C. § 19-5306, both of which confer upon crime victims the right to be present and the right to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity in the criminal justice proceedings. Although an excessive or unreasonable postponement for the convenience of a victim could unduly infringe upon an accused's right to a speedy trial, here the delay was of relatively brief duration and for a valid reason. The second cause of the delay that is involved here, trial court congestion, is one that generally is not weighed heavily against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Cotant, 123 Idaho at 789 n. 3, 852 P.2d at 1385 n. 3.
The third factor in the Barker balancing test is the defendant's diligence in asserting his speedy trial right. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. In this case, Clark asserted his right to a speedy trial throughout the process, raising it at the initial pretrial conference, again at the State's request for a first priority trial date, and one additional time before the expiration of the six-month period. It is clear that the trial court and the State were aware that Clark wanted a timely disposition of his case.
The most important of the factors to be weighed in the Barker test is the nature and extent of the prejudice suffered by the defendant. Cotant, 123 Idaho at 789, 852 P.2d at 1386; Russell, 108 Idaho at 62, 696 P.2d at 913; McNew, 131 Idaho at 273, 954 P.2d at 691. Clark asserts that he was prejudiced in his ability to present a defense, but this claim is unsupported by the record. Even before the first trial postponement, Clark represented that he did not intend to call witnesses at trial, and he has identified no specific way in which the two-month delay affected his ability to present evidence or to challenge the State's evidence. Clark, who was free on bond while awaiting trial, also claims prejudice from the prolongation of his anxiety and concern over the pending charge. Although this sort of emotional distress from living under the cloud of a pending criminal charge is entitled to consideration, our Supreme Court has stated that prejudice premised merely upon anxiety and concern, "is generally insufficient to demonstrate a speedy trial violation." Cotant, supra.
Here, the magistrate balanced the foregoing factors and determined that "good cause" was shown for the delay of Clark's trial beyond the statutory deadline. We find no error in this ruling. Although Clark was diligent in demanding a trial within the time limit, the slight delay was justified to accommodate legitimate needs of the victim witness and the demands of the court's trial calendar, and Clark has identified no substantial prejudice caused thereby. On balance, these factors do not weigh in favor of dismissal under I.C. § 19-3501(3).
In addition to his claim premised on § 19-3501(3), Clark has asserted a violation of his speedy trial rights under the federal and state constitutions. A constitutional analysis entails applying the same Barker v. Wingo balancing test that is utilized in determining whether "good cause" for the delay has been shown under § 19-3501. See State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 94, 936 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Ct.App. 1997); Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho at 38, 921 P.2d at 215. Although we recognize that the constitutional guarantees are not identical to the statutory protection, for the reasons stated above with respect to Clark's statutory claim we conclude that the district court was correct in holding that no constitutional violation occurred.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court, affirming the magistrate's denial of Clark's motion to dismiss, is affirmed.
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge SCHWARTZMAN CONCUR.