Summary
In State ex rel. Franks v. Clark, Fla. 1950, 46 So.2d 488, the petitioner was employed as a special investigator by the attorneys for the defendant, who was a white man charged with the murder of a Negro.
Summary of this case from Strawder v. StateOpinion
May 26, 1950. Rehearing Denied June 16, 1950.
Joseph A. Varon, Hollywood, for petitioner.
Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General and Reeves Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
We assumed original jurisdiction in this case to review an order of contempt.
Based upon oral testimony of several jurors, the Circuit Court of Broward County issued a rule nisi against petitioner. An answer was filed, testimony was taken pro and con. Petitioner was ruled in contempt and sentenced to serve 60 days in Jail.
It is first urged that oral testimony taken before the court was an insufficient predicate for the rule nisi. This question is settled adversely to petitioner in Croft v. Culbreath, 150 Fla. 60, 6 So.2d 638 and cases therein cited.
The next question is whether the petitioner's return and answer of denial under oath to the rule nisi entitled him to a discharge. Petitioner relies upon Ex parte Biggers, 85 Fla. 322, 95 So. 763; Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755, 31 A.L.R. 1226, and Croft v. Culbreath, supra. On this question we must hold against petitioner for more than one reason. This answer did not deny the acts charged. It only denied the motive, hence the cited cases are not in point. We may also cite with approval our cases of Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185; Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182; Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182; Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 345, 141 So. 178; Sloan v. Brown, 114 Fla. 739, 154 So. 514.
Aside from the precedents cited, the state relies upon Sec. 38.22, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A., which provides: "Power to punish. Every court may punish contempts against it, whether such contempts be direct, indirect, or constructive, and in any such proceeding the court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, but the punishment imposed by a justice of the peace shall not exceed twenty dollars fine, or twenty-four hours' imprisonment." We take notice of it but do not construe it inasmuch as we are able to uphold the order without benefit of the legislative act. A grant of power to a court is tempting but the acknowledgment of it presupposes the authority to withdraw same. As we have said, the power to punish for contempt is a necessary and inherent one in a court. Therefore we take notice of the statute but decline to place a construction upon it.
The final question relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. The rule of law in this regard was stated by us in Baumgartner v. Joughin, supra [ 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 188]: "Approaching a juror to find out how he stands with reference to a case, or sounding out a juror to ascertain whether he can be corruptly influenced, or any attempt to influence the results of jury trials by improper means, or acts which have a tendency to enable a person to make certain the result of a litigated case involving a trial by jury, are justly regarded as acts tending to interfere with the due administration of justice, and are punishable as contempts. The inherent nature and tendency of such practices is justly regarded as evil, being viewed as an infringement upon the equilibrium of mind and independence of judgment of those jurors who are likely to be called upon to become triers of fact, and who, outside of their own conscience, are answerable to no one for errors in their decisions."
Petitioner was employed as a special investigator by attorneys for defendant, a white man, who was charged with the murder of a Negro. Petitioner admitted that his employment called for him to investigate the prospective jurors who were summoned in the case. Pursuant to such employment he called upon a number of the prospective jurors and inquired, in substance, if they could give the defendant a fair break — how they would vote on the basis of circumstantial evidence — whether they were born in the South and how they felt about Negroes. He asked one prospective juror if she was acquainted with any of the defense attorneys. When she answered in the affirmative he suggested that she not mention that fact and told her he thought she would make a good juror.
When necessary petitioner exhibited a badge implying an authority to interrogate the prospective jurors. From the admissions made and the testimony as a whole there can be no doubt of petitioner's guilt and we therefore remand him to custody.
So ordered.
CHAPMAN, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.