Opinion
November 14, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County, D.O. Rogers, J.
Walter W. Woolfolk, Lake Wales, for appellant.
Wm. A. McRae, Jr., Bartow, for appellee.
This appeal is from a final decree validating an issue of City of Bartow Utilities Tax Bonds in the aggregate amount of $500,000 bearing interest at 3 1/2 per cent, the proceeds to be used for financing the construction and improvement of streets, storm sewers, sidewalks and appurtenances in the city. It is admitted that said improvements are essential to preserve the public convenience and safety as well as the physical and economic well being of the City. It is also show that said Utilities Tax Bonds hereinafter referred to as bonds, are to be serviced solely and exclusively from City Utilities service taxes and if required, from surplus revenues of the combined electric, water and sewer system as pledged by the ordinance authorizing them.
It is first contended that the City of Bartow is without authority to pledge the net proceeds of its utilities service taxes for payment of the bonds to provide the designated utilities without an approving vote of the freeholders as contemplated by Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution, F.S.A.
The authority for the utilities service taxes is expressly authorized by Chapter 22829, Acts of 1945, Section 167.431, F.S.A. See also State v. City of Bartow, Fla., 45 So.2d 886; State v. City of Bartow, 147 Fla. 67, 2 So.2d 125 and Wilson v. City of Bartow, 124 Fla. 356, 168 So. 545, where this question was answered contrary to the contention of the appellants. The following cases rule the question in approval of the decree appealed from: Schmeller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 38 So.2d 36; State v. City of Pensacola, Fla., 40 So.2d 569; State et al. v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 42 So.2d 580 and State v. Daytona Beach, Fla., 42 So.2d 764.
It is next contended that the City of Bartow is devoid of power to enter into an irrevocable contract for the levy and collection of utility service taxes for the life of the bonds when the applicable provisions of its charter and the law authorizing them may be repealed by the legislature at any time.
There is no merit to this contention. It is conclusively answered contrary to the contention of appellants by the cases cited in the question immediately preceding this one. See also Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 24 L.Ed. 760 and McQuillin Municipal Corporation, Sections 804 and 868.1.
It is finally contended that the City of Bartow has no authority to pledge as additional security for the payment of said bonds, the surplus revenues of the combined electric, water and sewer systems remaining after the payment of all principal and interest obligations to which the revenues of said systems are presently pledged.
Ordinance 268-A of the City of Bartow in terms authorizes the issuance of the bonds and shows clearly that they are to be serviced solely and exclusively from utilities service taxes, and additionally if required from surplus revenues from the City's combined and consolidated electric, water and sewer systems. State v. City of Bartow, 147 Fla. 67, 2 So.2d 125 answers this question contrary to the contention of appellant. See also Schmeller v. City of Fort Lauderdale and State v. City of Daytona Beach, supra. State v. City of Pompano Beach, Fla., 47 So.2d 515 and City of Jacksonville v. Savannah Foundry Co., Fla., 47 So.2d 634 are also pertinent.
Other questions urged have been explored and found to be destitute of merit. The decree appealed from is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and CHAPMAN, THOMAS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
SEBRING, J., not participating because of illness.